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1. ABSTRACT
This thesis comprises three interconnected research projects on corporate governance, the
risk of involuntary delisting, and earnings management, using evidence from Vietnamese
listed firms. Although prior research has documented the effects of corporate governance
on these business outcomes, further research focussed on business and markets in
Vietnam is particularly interesting. Vietnam has a unique institutional setting,
characterised by weak law enforcement, inadequate protection of minority shareholders,
high ownership concentration and government intervention, and the increasing
importance of foreign investors.
The first essay examines the scandal involving the most high-profile Vietnamese listed
company that faced the threat of bankruptcy due largely to ethical and governance
breakdowns. Because Vien Dong Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Company (DVD) was a
fast-growing and successful business, its collapse shook public confidence. The sudden
failure of DVD in 2011 has raised questions about the ethics of its senior management
team and particularly the effectiveness of its internal and external corporate governance
schemes. An analysis of qualitative and quantitative data from various sources suggests
that DVD’s failure was brought or exacerbated by dishonest and self-interested
managerial activities involving accounting and stock price manipulation, and a series of
violations of existing laws and regulations. This study is the first to scrutinise the DVD
scandal in terms of its ethical practices and corporate governance weaknesses, the
objective being to assist regulators and other stakeholders who can learn from its
bankruptcy. This case study suggests that corporate governance and ethical failure
contributed to severe strategic errors, with catastrophic consequences for the company.
Its findings indicate that weak or questionable corporate governance and ethical practices
should be a signal to all potential investors and to corporate regulators. The DVD scandal
i

was the equivalent in Vietnam of the US Enron. The results of this study support the
literature in suggesting that promoting an ethical corporate culture and good corporate
governance practices, while not always able to prevent companies from collapsing, are
needed to bring into line the competing interests of related parties, leading potentially to
both better corporate financial performance and lower levels of inherent business risk.
Building on the findings from the first essay, the second essay empirically examines the
effect of corporate governance on the risk of involuntary delisting using hand-collected
data of 815 Vietnamese non-financial firms from 2008 to 2019. Firms with a more
negative or undesirable corporate governance metric emerge as being significantly
associated with the risk of involuntary delisting. That relationship is more pronounced in
non-state-owned enterprises, firms with high foreign ownership, low concentration of
ownership, and high growth firms. Tests of out-of-sample forecasting accuracy indicate
that including corporate governance measures enhances the discriminatory power of the
delisting prediction model. Results are robust to the use of distance to default and credit
default swap spread as alternative outcomes of poor performance. Furthermore, the results
are verified using instrumental variable and propensity score matching methods to address
potential reverse causality and sample selection bias.
Knowing that deficient corporate governance mechanisms may encourage managerial
misbehaviour, the last essay reveals that corporate governance quality restrains earnings
management, measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals. Using handcollected data of 800 Vietnamese non-financial firms from 2008 to 2018, this study
provides evidence that the beneficial effect of corporate governance on reducing earnings
manipulation is driven by a firm’s ownership structure and its growth opportunities. In
particular, corporate governance quality is significantly associated with less likelihood of
earnings management in privately owned firms, firms with high foreign ownership and
ii

low concentrated ownership, and high growth firms. The observed results are validated
using alternative measures of discretionary accruals and total accruals, and alternative
model specifications designed to address endogeneity issues. The findings from this study
are generalisable to other emerging markets and have practical implications for business
stakeholders in Vietnam.
Overall, the findings of these three essays demonstrate that corporate governance quality
is substantial in determining company-related outcomes in Vietnam. By examining the
level of compliance with the regulations and best practices and their effects on firms’
delisting risk and earnings management activities, this study confirms the regulators’
assertions that for listed companies, better quality corporate governance can remove the
incentive to engage in opportunistic behaviours and produce better outcomes, i.e.
reducing the risk of involuntary delisting and earnings distortion. This thesis suggests that
in emerging market economies where shareholder protection and law enforcement are
still inadequate, stakeholders should view indicators of weak or non-existent corporate
governance mechanisms as a theoretically and empirically justifiable signal of not only
an undeveloped corporate culture but also of a corporation with greater probability of
poor future performance and possible illegality and bankruptcy.
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: Two-stage Least Squares

AUROC

: Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve

BoD

: Board of Directors

CEO

: Chief Executive Officer

CGI

: Corporate Governance Index

DHT

: Ha Tay Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Company

DVD

: Vien Dong Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Company

GDP

: Gross Domestic Product

GMS

: General Meeting of Shareholders

HNX

: Hanoi Stock Exchange

HOSE

: Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange

IAS

: International Accounting Standards

IFC

: International Finance Corporation

IFRS

: International Financial Reporting Standards

IPO

: Initial Public Offering

IV

: Instrumental Variable

JSC

: Joint Stock Company

KTB
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: Law on Bankruptcy
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: Law on Securities
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PSM

: Propensity Score Matching

PTK

: Phu Thinh Metallurgy Joint Stock Company

RE

: Random Effect Model

ROA

: Return on Assets
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: Receiver Operating Characteristics

ROE

: Return on Equity

SB

: Supervisory Board

SEO

: Seasoned Equity Offering

SOE

: State-owned Enterprise

SPP

: Saigon Plastic Packaging Joint Stock Company

SSC

: State Securities Commission

TA

: Total Assets

UPCoM

: Unlisted Public Company Market

VAS

: Vietnamese Accounting Standards

VIF

: Variance Inflation Factor

VND

: Vietnamese Dong
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1. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the three studies in the thesis. Specifically, section 1.2 presents
background information about corporate governance and firm outcomes. Section 1.3
states the motivation for undertaking these studies and briefly discusses research
questions related to each study. Section 1.4 proposes the theory and methodology of the
thesis. The final section is an introduction to the remaining chapters of this study.
1.2 Background of corporate governance and firm outcomes
In modern public companies, shareholders entrust the operations of day-to-day business
to the firm’s management. This separation of ownership and control has resulted in the
famous agency problems that Jensen and Meckling (1976) first referred to. Managers take
on a responsibility to maximise firm value; however, they expose an alarming level of
short-termism in decision-making by focusing on projects that result in short-term high
profits for their own advantage. As such, corporate governance serves as a crucial role to
mitigate agency problems and reduce agency costs to protect shareholder wealth (Shleifer
& Vishny 1997). Prior studies find that companies with good corporate governance have
better performance (Larcker et al. 2007), higher stock liquidity (Ali et al. 2017) and a
lower probability of default risk (Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003). Specifically, strong
corporate governance overcomes the problem of information asymmetry between insiders
(e.g., managers) and outsiders (e.g., investors), as well as among outsiders; thus, corporate
information transparency is improved (Leuz et al. 2003). By reducing agency costs and
information costs, functional corporate governance mechanisms curtail managerial
opportunism (Ali et al. 2018) and improve business performance (Duchin et al. 2010).
Chen et al. (2007) contend that a good corporate governance structure can grant investors
more protection as the management team will act in the best interests of shareholders
1

under proper monitoring mechanisms. Additionally, corporate governance can further
enhance businesses’ outcomes if the advisory role of the board is augmented (Hoang et
al. 2016a). Badolato et al. (2014), Davidson et al. (2005) and Klein (2002) reveal the
benefits of internal governance mechanisms, such as audit committee and board of
director characteristics in lowering agency costs and information asymmetries, which
results in limiting managerial opportunism. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the
monitoring and advising functions of the board of directors and the supervisory board1.
These are crucial internal corporate governance mechanisms that protect shareholder
wealth and enhance firm outcomes.
Corporate governance has garnered more attention from the general public, academics,
and policy-makers, especially since the unscrupulous scandals of many leading
corporations internationally, such as Enron, Parmalat, and WorldCom. These scandals
were blamed on deficient or corrupt corporate governance mechanisms. Many guidelines
and recommendations on best corporate governance practices have been issued and
applied widely worldwide in an attempt to stimulate transparency and efficiency, protect
minority shareholders, and facilitate the timely and accurate disclosure of all material
matters. In Vietnam, in 2019, the Corporate Governance Code of Best Practices for
Vietnamese public companies was introduced as a result of the collaboration between the
State Securities Commission (SSC) and International Finance Corporation (IFC). The
Code defines corporate governance as “a system of structures and processes for the
direction and control of companies to ensure the long-term sustainability of the company
in the best interests of its shareholders and stakeholders” (SSC & IFC 2019, p. 16). This
Code not only takes into account the good governance practices that have been employed

1

The supervisory board is a distinctive feature of the governance structure in Vietnam. The
functions of the supervisory board are similar to, but broader compared to, the audit committee.
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in legislation but also introduces standards that exceed the requirements in laws and
regulations. This Code has been drawn up based on the notion that effective corporate
governance mechanisms play a crucial role in enhancing long-term company
performance. In particular, a sound governance system promotes more efficient boards in
terms of supervising and counselling the top management team, improves making
decisions, boosts operational efficacy, and reduces risk (SSC & IFC 2019). In turn, this
helps to develop market confidence and integrity, resulting in better competitiveness and
reputation for Vietnamese firms and easy access to capital markets.
Even though the emphasis on the positive impacts of efficient corporate governance on
firm outcomes is evident from the Code, not much literature has been published on
corporate governance as it relates to firm outcomes in Vietnam, i.e. the risk of involuntary
delisting, and earnings management activities. While prior research in Vietnam mainly
examines the governance-performance nexus, to date only one study by Nguyen and Dao
(2017) investigates the risk of delisting in Vietnam and one by Essa et al. (2016) on the
issue of earnings management in that country. However, these studies are both subject to
data and methodology limitations. For instance, they do not take into account endogeneity
issues, resulting in potentially biased estimates (Ali et al. 2018; Wintoki et al. 2012).
Moreover, their sample includes 60 of the largest listed companies so the findings may
not be generalised to small and medium-sized companies. They both consider individual
characteristics of governance mechanisms in their analyses; they ignore the possibility
that other governance mechanisms may be complements and forego the impact of
composite corporate governance quality. Consequently, the effects of corporate
governance quality on the risk of involuntary delisting and earnings management in
Vietnam are still not known. This thesis seeks to fill the void in our knowledge by
examining the relationships between corporate governance quality, the risk of involuntary
3

delisting and earnings manipulation, using evidence from Vietnamese listed firms.
1.3 Motivation and research questions
Motivated by agency and resource dependence theories, this thesis examines the link
between corporate governance, risk of involuntary risk, and earnings management in
Vietnam. In particular, agency theorists suggest that the separation between the principals
(shareholders) who own the company and agents (executives) who act in the interests of
the principals may lead to principal-agent problems (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Because
the agent’s incentives may not be perfectly aligned with those of the principal, there is a
need to draw up a contract between the principal and agent to motivate the agent to
maximise the firm’s market value. In other words, firms should create an appropriate
corporate governance mechanism to induce the agent to act in the best interests of the
principal (Nguyen et al. 2015b). Agency theory suggests that a better board composition
which is the keystone of corporate governance frameworks can enhance the monitoring
functions of directors; thus, eliminate agency costs and affect firm outcomes significantly.
Meanwhile, according to resource dependence theorists, a firm is an open social entity
and there is a need for environmental linkages between the firm and outside resources
(Pfeffer 1973). The board functions not only to monitor but also offer essential resources,
such as human capital in the form of experience, expertise and reputation and relational
capital such as a network with other firms and environmental contingencies. Doing so
will enhance firm performance through their connections with the external environment
(Hillman et al. 2000). Daily et al. (2003) argue that diverse board resources provide firms
with the necessary support in comprehending its environment; they can help businesses
improve their decision-making, performance, and survival (Hillman et al. 2009).
In general, the two theories propose that corporate governance mechanisms are essential
in aligning the interests of different parties, including especially directors/managers and
investors/shareholders toward maximising company success and hence shareholder
4

wealth. This inspires the undertaking of three interrelated essays on corporate governance
and different firm outcomes, using evidence from Vietnamese listed firms.
The first essay of the thesis examines an unprecedented scandal concerning a listed
company, Vien Dong Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Company (DVD). The collapse of DVD
in 2011, one of the most promising companies in the pharmaceutical industry but
suddenly became the first company listed on the Vietnamese stock market to face
bankruptcy, traumatised the public. For the first time, the threat of bankruptcy became
real in Vietnam. In response to the wrongdoings of DVD, the Minister of Finance
amended the Code of corporate governance and issued new legislation to strengthen the
corporate governance system in Vietnam, i.e. Circular No. 121/2012/TT-BTC, dated July
26, 2012, and Circular No. 52/2012/TT-BTC, dated April 5, 2012. These Circulars require
more stringent governance regimes and increase the transparency of the stock market.
Although the importance of efficient corporate governance in restraining misbehaviour is
implied in the new legislation, no studies have examined the root causes of the collapse
of DVD. The lack of literature calls for in-depth research that investigates the scandal of
DVD to benefit various stakeholders to whom the lessons from its failure may be vital.
This essay answers this call by delving into the underlying ethical and governance-related
issues that resulted in the corporate failure and drawing lessons that all stakeholders, such
as companies, investors, creditors, regulators, and policy-makers should be aware of to
prevent the same events in the future. In particular, this essay answers three main
questions:
1.

What caused the failure of a reputational and financially-sound company in Vietnam?

2.

What were the red flags that all stakeholders - especially its investors and regulators
- neglected?

3.

What should we learn to prevent similar incidents from happening again?

The second essay provides a comprehensive analysis of the association between corporate
5

governance and the risk of involuntary delisting. Theoretically, an efficient governance
structure stimulates transparency and efficiency and protects minority shareholders’
wealth. This robs managers of the incentive to pursue their own interests or agendas, such
as empire-building, risk-taking, and overcompensation at the expense of minority
shareholders (Ali et al. 2018). Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), on the other hand, document
that deficient governance mechanisms result in the moral hazard problem, which in turn
increases agency problems and information asymmetry. As a consequence, managerial
misbehaviour increases, leading to the deterioration of firm value, and an increase in the
risk of involuntary delisting (Charitou et al. 2007). The existence of a listing gap in
Vietnam, its distinctive institutional settings, and the lack of prior studies make this
empirical study timely and may shed new light on the existing literature by responding to
this research question: Does better corporate governance quality reduce the risk of
involuntary delisting?
The third essay examines the association between corporate governance and earnings
distortion by managers who misuse their judgment to manipulate the transactions
documented in financial reports (Healy & Wahlen 1999). Chen et al. (2007) assert that
proper corporate governance mechanisms facilitate information transparency, ensure the
fair treatment of all shareholders and promote the timely and accurate disclosure of all
material matters. In the same vein, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) reveal that a deficient
corporate governance structure may result in severe agency costs and information
asymmetry, which promotes managerial misbehaviour and encourages them to indulge in
earnings management. Given the inconsistent findings in the literature, the absence of
prior research in Vietnam, and the unique institutional setting of that country which is
more susceptible to earnings management, this study aims to answer the following
question: Does better corporate governance quality restrain earnings management
activities?
6

1.4 Methodology
Aiming to better understand the complex aspects of the phenomenon, the first essay
follows the analysis procedures introduced by Gini (1985) to conduct a case study on the
collapse of DVD from the ethical and governance dimensions. To increase the validity
and reliability of data sources, this study collects data from various sources, including the
company’s annual reports, public announcements, prospectus and other published
information, stock analysts’ reports, newspaper articles, and published electronic media
content for the longest possible period of observation. These data are analysed using the
document-analysis method following McKinnon (1988).
The second essay empirically examines the effect of corporate governance efficiency on
the risk of involuntary delisting, using the sample of 701 non-financial firms listed and
114 non-financial firms involuntarily delisted from either the Ho Chi Minh Stock
Exchange (HOSE) or the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) from 2008 to 2019. This study
uses a Cox proportional hazards model and a logistic regression to empirically test the
relationship. To address potential endogeneity bias, this study applies two-stage least
squares (2SLS) and the propensity score matching method (PSM). The receiver operating
characteristics (ROC) curves are used as an evaluation technique to measure the
discriminatory power of the prediction models.
The last essay examines the impact of corporate governance on earnings management,
using the sample of 800 non-financial firms listed on either the Ho Chi Minh Stock
Exchange (HOSE) or the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) from 2008 to 2018. The
influence of corporate governance on earnings management is empirically tested using
random effects model to mitigate the unobserved heterogeneity. To deal with simultaneity
bias, this study examines the changes in discretionary accruals when corporate
governance quality changes and applies two-stage least squares (2SLS). Finally, this
study uses propensity matching score methods (PSM) to eliminate the sample selection
7

bias.
To measure corporate governance quality, this thesis employs 13 characteristics of
governance structure, taking into account the Corporate Governance Codes and the
Vietnam Corporate Governance Code of Best Practices (SSC & IFC 2019). and establish
a corporate governance index for the Vietnamese firms. Involuntary delisting is the
incidence that a firm is forced out of the exchange by the stock market authorities.
Earnings management is measured by the absolute value of abnormal accruals using the
modified Jones model.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
This thesis contains seven chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the rationale of this study,
outlines the motivations, and presents the research questions. The theory and
methodology are also described in this chapter. The remainder of this thesis is as follows.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Vietnamese institutional setting. In particular, this
chapter introduces the Vietnamese stock market and the practices of corporate
governance, bankruptcy, delisting, and earnings management in Vietnam. Chapter 3
presents the theoretical framework underpinning this study, including agency theory and
resource dependence theory. Chapter 4 investigates the novel scandal of a Vietnamese
listed firm, proposes red flags and draw lessons from its collapse. Chapter 5 studies the
impacts of corporate governance on the risk of involuntary delisting. Chapter 6 studies
the association between corporate governance and earnings management. Chapter 7
provides an overall summary of the thesis. It also explains the implications of the findings,
limitations, and recommendations for future research.
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2. CHAPTER 2 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
2.1 Introduction
This chapter demonstrates the institutional setting of Vietnam. Vietnam has made a
significant transition from a state-dominated to a market-oriented economy through a set
of transformation, such as liberalisation, privatisation, restructuring, and legal and
institutional reforms to meet the challenges that have arisen from the political system’s
change. This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the
Vietnamese stock market, and Section 2.3 presents corporate governance practices in
Vietnam. Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 introduce bankruptcy, delisting and earnings
management practices in Vietnam, respectively. Section 2.6 concludes this chapter.
2.2 Overview of the Vietnamese stock market
2.2.1 A brief history of the Vietnamese stock market
Vietnam recently became one of the world’s most rapidly growing countries, with an
annual average GDP growth rate of 6.1 percent from 2008 to 2018 (World Bank 2019a).
Despite the rapid growth rate, the Vietnamese capital market is still in its infancy. Its
capital market was only initiated in 1998 when Vietnam’s Prime Minister signed the
Decree No. 48/1998/ND-CP and Decision No. 127/1998/QD-TTG on the establishment
of two securities-trading centres, which are revenue-generating non-business units under
the State Securities Commission of Vietnam (SSC). However, it was not until 2000 that
the Ho Chi Minh City Securities Trading Center, the largest stock exchange in Vietnam,
began operating, while the Hanoi Securities Trading Center was formally launched in
2005. Then, the Ho Chi Minh City Securities Trading Center and the Hanoi Trading
Center were converted into the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) and the Hanoi
Stock Exchange (HNX) in 2007 and 2009, respectively. Both stock exchanges are
limited-liability companies with 100 percent state ownership under the control of the
9

Ministry of Finance (Hanoi Stock Exchange 2013; Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 2015).
The listing rules of each exchange can be amended with SSC approval to better monitor
its members and listed firms. In 2000, two stocks were listed on the HOSE, Refrigeration
Electrical Engineering JSC (REE) and Saigon Cable and Telecommunication Material
JSC (SAM). In 2018 749 firms were listed on two stock exchanges. As of February 2019,
the two exchanges have a market capitalisation of about US$146 billion. Figure 2.1
illustrates the market capitalisation of the Vietnamese stock market from 2008 to 2018.

Figure 2.1 Market capitalisation of the Vietnamese Stock Market, 2008 – 2018
Source: Data are extracted from the World Bank (2019b)
Apart from the two stock exchanges, there are the Unlisted Public Company Market
(UPCoM), a market at HNX, which trade shares of public companies not listed on the
exchange. UPCoM was formed in 2009 with ten original companies. Securities registered
for UPCoM must be registered for depository at the Vietnam Securities Depository.
Currently, stocks and convertible bonds of unlisted public companies and stocks of
delisted companies are trading on UPCoM. As of February 2019, UPCoM hosts 810
companies, with a market capitalisation of around US$42 billion. SSC is the principle
regulatory body that supervises the Vietnamese stock market.
Table 2.1 demonstrates the indicators of GDP growth rate per annum (Panel A) and
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market capitalisation in US$ billion (Panel B) of the Southeast Asian countries with
available data (World Bank 2019a, 2019b). It shows that in spite being the fastest growing
economy in the Southeast Asian region in recent years, Vietnam still has the lowest level
of market capitalisation. This is mainly because the capital market in Vietnam is very
young compared to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Table 2.1 GDP growth rate per annum and market capitalisation of the Southeast
Asian countries, 2008 - 2018
Country

2008 2009 2010

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Panel A. GDP growth rate per annum (%)
Indonesia

6.01

4.63

6.22

6.17

6.03

5.56

5.01

4.88

5.03

5.07

5.17

Malaysia

4.83 -1.51

7.42

5.29

5.47

4.69

6.01

5.09

4.45

5.74

4.74

Philippines 4.15

1.15

7.63

3.66

6.68

7.06

6.15

6.07

6.88

6.68

6.24

Singapore

1.87

0.12

14.53 6.26

4.45

4.82

3.90

2.89

2.96

3.70

3.14

Thailand

1.73 -0.69

7.51

0.84

7.24

2.69

0.98

3.13

3.36

4.02

4.13

Vietnam

5.66

6.42

6.24

5.25

5.42

5.98

6.68

6.21

6.81

7.08

5.40

Panel B. Market capitalisation of the Southeast Asian countries (billion US$)
Indonesia

99

215

360

390

428

347

422

353

426

521

487

Malaysia

189

289

409

396

467

500

459

383

360

456

398

Philippines

52

86

157

165

229

217

262

239

240

290

258

Singapore

265

481

647

598

765

744

753

640

640

787

687

Thailand

103

177

278

268

390

354

430

349

433

549

501

Vietnam

12

33

37

26

37

45

52

59

73

125

133

Sources: World Bank (2019a, 2019b)
2.2.2 Regulations on prohibited acts on the Vietnamese stock market
The legal framework on the stock market in Vietnam includes the Law on Securities
(LoS) 2006, revised in 2010, and recently, Law on Securities 2019 which will come into
force on 1 January 2021 and other sub-law documents. Article 9 of the LoS 2006
prohibits a person from (i) directly or indirectly cheating, swindling, fabricating
untruthful information or omitting necessary information; thus, causing material
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misleading which badly affects the public offering, listing, dealing, trading, investment,
securities and securities market service provision; (ii) disclosing misleading information
to entice and instigate others to buy, sell securities or disclosing untimely and insufficient
information that seriously affects the securities prices on the market; (iii) using inside
information to buy or sell securities for oneself or others; disclosing or giving inside
information or advising another person to buy or sell securities on the basis of inside
information; (iv) conspiring with others to buy or sell securities to create the appearance
of false supply of and demand for securities; trading securities by colluding with or
enticing others to continuously purchase or sell securities to manipulate the securities
prices; combining or employing other trading modes to manage securities prices. LoS
2006 does not introduce penalties for the breach of these acts. Instead, sanctions of
administrative violations on the securities market are provided under Decree No.
108/2013/ND-CP dated 23 September 2013. Article 28 of Decree 108 imposes the
maximum fine of VND 1.4 billion for violations of regulations on prohibited acts on the
stock market under LoS 2006.
The LoS 2019 not only supplements the prohibited acts under LoS 2006 but also imposes
sanctions for them. In particular, individual or organizations committing one of the
following actions shall carry a maximum fine of ten times the illegal revenues obtained
from violations in sanctioning administrative violations2: (i) using internal information to
buy or sell securities to oneself or another person; disclosing or providing inside
information; advising another person to buy or sell securities based on inside information;
(ii) using one or several accounts of oneself or another person, trading securities to create
artificial demand or supply; collaborating with another person in trading securities to
manipulate securities prices; using other methods, with or without false information, to

2

See Article 132 of the Law on Securities 2019
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distort securities prices. In case there is no illegal revenue or the fine based on the illegal
revenue is smaller than the maximum fine, then the maximum fine shall apply. The
maximum fine for other securities offences is VND 3 billion for organizations and VND
1.5 billion for an individual. Depending on the nature and seriousness of the violations,
the offender shall be charged with criminal offences.
2.3 Corporate governance practices in Vietnam
2.3.1 Definitions of corporate governance
Corporate scandals of the last two decades, such as American International Group, Arthur
Anderson, Barings, Enron, Parmalat, Royal Bank of Scotland, and WorldCom, were
caused by failures in corporate governance and gave rise to the urgent need to inaugurate
proper corporate governance mechanisms (Collins 2009). Even though “corporate
governance” is now one of the most widely used terms in the modern business vocabulary,
there is no internationally agreed upon definition of it. While definitions of corporate
governance vary based on the jurisdiction, it can be generally defined in a narrow or a
broad sense (Solomon 2013). A narrow perspective limits corporate governance in a
relationship between a firm and its shareholders. This traditional approach has been welldocumented in agency theory and embedded in the Cadbury Report, which demonstrates
corporate governance as:
the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards of directors are
responsible for the governance of their companies. The shareholders’ role in
governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves
that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the
board include setting the company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put
them into effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to
shareholders on their stewardship (Cadbury 1992, p. 14).

In recent years, more attention has been paid to a more complete view of corporate
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governance which considers corporate governance as a network of relationships between
a firm, its shareholders, and a broad range of stakeholders, among which are employees,
suppliers, customers, creditors, regulatory bodies, and the local community where the
firm operates. This stakeholder-centric approach to corporate governance expresses
concerns over ethics and accountability and has been articulated in stakeholder theory.
Generally, the existing literature has documented a critical similarity between different
approaches to corporate governance, which is the concept of accountability. While
narrow views highlight firm’s responsibilities to shareholders, such as the sufficient
protection of shareholder rights and the fair treatment of the shareholders, the broader
definitions focus on the level of accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders, i.e.
companies have a responsibility to the wider society. Solomon (2013) acknowledges the
increasing significance of the need for firms to be accountable to stakeholders in the
modern world and encapsulates this view in defining corporate governance as “the system
of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that
companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially
responsible way in all areas of their business activity” (Solomon 2013, p. 7).
In Vietnam, the most explicit concept of corporate governance was first documented in
the regulations on corporate governance applicable to listed firms in 2007. In the
regulations, corporate governance is defined as a system of rules to make sure that a
company is efficiently functioned and supervised in behalf of shareholders and
stakeholders. Recently, in August 2019, the State Securities Commission (SSC) in
collaboration with International Finance Corporation (IFC) launched the first version of
the Corporate Governance Code of Best Practices for Vietnamese public companies. The
Code defines corporate governance as “a system of structures and processes for the
direction and control of companies to ensure the long-term sustainability of the company
14

in the best interests of its shareholders and stakeholders” (SSC & IFC 2019, p. 16). This
Code confirms its central role to which stakeholders now adhere in corporate governance
matters.
2.3.2 Corporate governance structures of shareholding companies
Across different nations, companies generally adopt either one-tier (unitary)3 or two-tier
(dual)4 board structures. Figure 2.2 depicts the corporate governance structures in onetier and two-tier board systems.

Figure 2.2 Corporate governance structures in one-tier and two-tier board systems
In a unitary (one-tier) board system, members of the board of directors, including both
executive and non-executive directors, are elected at the general meeting of shareholders
(GMS). The unitary board appoints the group of managers, to whom it gives authority
(Mallin 2013). In a dual (two-tier) board system, there are two separate boards: a board
of management and a supervisory board. While the board of management has

3

The terms “one-tier board” and “unitary board” are used interchangeably in the literature (Block
& Gerstner 2016; Mallin 2013).
4
The terms “two-tier board” and “dual board” are used interchangeably in the literature (Block
& Gerstner 2016; Mallin 2013).
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responsibility for running the daily business of the company, the supervisory board is in
charge of supervising the financial reporting system and ensuring full compliance with
laws and regulations (Mallin 2013). Members of one board cannot serve on the other
board. The GMS usually assigns members of the supervisory board who then appoint
members of the board of management. Sometimes employees may elect some members
of the supervisory board, especially in Germany.
While US and UK companies adopt the one-tier model and companies in Austria,
Germany, and Denmark conform to the two-tier variant, Vietnamese companies apply a
“hybrid” board structure (Hai 2008), which is elaborated here. According to the Law on
Enterprises 2005, a shareholding company in Vietnam must have the following
governance structure, including the general meeting of shareholders (dai hoi dong co
dong); a board of directors (hoi dong quan tri – sometimes referred to as a board of
management; and a CEO (tong giam doc or giam doc – sometimes referred to as a general
director or a director). If the company has either more than 11 individual shareholders or
one (or more) institutional investor(s) holding more than 50 percent of the equity capital,
having a supervisory board (ban kiem soat – sometimes referred to as an inspection
committee or a control board) is mandatory5.
Similar to both unitary and dual board systems, the GMS in Vietnam plays the most
significant role in the decision-making process for a shareholding company. GMS elects
members of the board of directors (BoD) and the supervisory board (SB). The BoD is the
governing body of the company, which has full authority to execute the major rights and
obligations as follows: deciding on management matters; appointing or dismissing the
CEO or other top managers; supervising the senior management team running the daily

5

See Article 95 of the Law on Enterprises 2005.
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business of the company, and advising on and implementing decisions of the GMS6. The
significant difference between the unitary and dual models and the hybrid model in
Vietnam is the characteristic of the SB.
In Vietnam, the Law on Enterprises 2005 mandates large shareholding companies to
establish a separate SB elected by the GMS, which is independent of the BoD and
executives. The SB supervises the BoD and CEO in the best interests of the shareholders.
There is no hierarchy between the BoD and SB, which differs from the hierarchical
superiority of the SB to the board of management in a dual board system. The SB is
specialised in supervising financial reporting and audit activities and is expected to
provide shareholders with the highest protection in upholding the credibility of a firm’s
financial statements. However, the SB in Vietnam has no power to appoint or dismiss
executives (Hai 2008), which limits the authority of the SB over the BoD. Moreover, the
members of the SB are usually middle-ranking or low-level employees of the company;
thus, they often lack the authority to challenge any senior-management misconduct.
Furthermore, in Vietnam, where it is not infrequent that a powerful chairperson or CEO
may dominate the board, there is a tendency to rubber-stamp decisions of the SB. This
fuels distrust in their working relationships and complicates the relationship between
supervisors and managers. Consequently, the SB finds it hard to perform its role in
supervising the management team proficiently and discovering deficiencies in the firm’s
operation. Therefore, it is questionable whether the SB is effective in controlling
managerial opportunism and protecting shareholders’ wealth in Vietnam.
The new Law on Enterprises 2014 (LoE 2014) took into account potential issues in the
existing corporate governance structure and has been revised to provide firms with more
flexibility to select the desired governance structure (World Bank 2015). The LoE 2014

6

See Article 108 of the Law on Enterprises 2005 or Article 149 of the Law on Enterprises 2014.
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allows a shareholding company to choose between the traditional governance structure as
in LoE 2005 and the new structure, including the general meeting of shareholders, a board
of directors, and a CEO with the following requirements applicable to the BoD: at least
20 percent of the board members must be independent to oversee the management of the
company, and the company must establish an internal audit committee within the board7.
Figure 2.3 demonstrates two models of corporate governance for shareholding companies
in Vietnam in accordance with the Law on Enterprises 2014.

Figure 2.3 Two corporate governance structures for shareholding companies
under the Law on Enterprises 2014
2.3.3 Corporate governance law and regulatory framework for public companies
Vietnam, similar to China, is characterised as a fast-growing transition economy8 (IFC

7

See Article 134 of the Law on Enterprises 2014.
A transition economy refers to a transition from a centrally planned to a market-based economy
through liberalisation, macroeconomic stabilisation, restructuring and privatisation, and legal and
institutional reforms. There are 25 transition economies in Europe and the former Soviet Union,
and four such economies in Asia, i.e. Cambodia, China, Laos, and Vietnam (IFC 2000). Hoskisson
et al. (2000) define developing and transition economies as emerging markets.
18
8

2000). Prior to 1987, Vietnam was a centrally planned economy that had state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) only. After the 1986 Doi Moi (Reform), Vietnam formed a multisectored market economy with the rapid development of privately owned companies
(Pham et al. 2015). Vietnam’s legal system is based on French civil law system with some
common law influence, especially in the framework for corporate governance (Robinett
et al. 2013). The Foreign Investment Law, which was enacted in 1987, introduced initial
concepts of corporate governance in Vietnam, specifically for the foreign-invested
enterprises (IFC 2010). Until 1999, the Law on Enterprises, which based on corporate
legal rules of Anglo-American law, had been the first formal legal framework on
corporate governance in Vietnam. At present, the following principle laws and
regulations reinforce corporate governance practices in Vietnam: (i) the Law on
Enterprises in 1999 and its replacements in 2005 and 2014; (ii) the Law on Securities in
2006 and its amendments in 2010, and replacement in 2019 that will take effect on 1
January 2021; (iii) the Corporate Governance Code in 2007 and its amendments in 2012
and 2017 which will entirely come into force on 1 August 2020; (iv) the Disclosure Rules
in 2010 and amendments in 2012 and 2015; and (v) the listing rules of the Ho Chi Minh
and Hanoi stock exchanges.
Corporate governance standards applicable to public and listed companies in Vietnam
have been specified in the Corporate Governance Codes. In particular, the first regulation
on the Corporate Governance Code, the so-called Decision No. 12/2007/QD-BTC, dated
13 March 2007, was first promulgated by the Minister of Finance soon after the Ho Chi
Minh Stock Exchange was launched. This Decision applied to companies listed on the
stock exchange or a securities-trading centre. Intending to strengthen corporate
governance in Vietnamese public companies, Circular No. 121/2012/TT-BTC, dated 26
July 2012 and Decree No. 71/2017/ND-CP, dated 22 September 2017 were issued on
corporate governance of public companies. According to the IFC (2010), corporate
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governance regulations in Vietnam comprise the following three categories of rules: 1)
Legal requirements refer to mandatory legal requirements and can be recognised by using
terms like “must”, “is obliged to”, and “cannot”; 2) Compliance allows companies to
breach specific rules under the extenuating circumstances and is marked by the use of the
word “shall”; and 3) Suggestions require neither disclosure nor compliance, and are
characterised by terms such as “should” or “can”. In general, the Corporate Governance
Codes impose rules on: shareholders’ right and general meeting of shareholders; board of
directors and members of the board of directors; supervisory board and members of the
supervisory board; conflict of interest prevention; reporting and disclosure of
information; corporate governance application in large-scale public and listed companies;
and supervision and violation handling regimes.
Compared to Decision 12, Circular 121 regulates the corporate governance of all public
companies, instead of only listed companies. The Circular is divided into nine chapters
and 38 articles which impose rules on: shareholders’ right and general meeting of
shareholders; board of directors and members of the board of directors; supervisory board
and members of the supervisory board; conflict of interest prevention; reporting and
disclosure of information; corporate governance application in large-scale public and
listed companies; and supervision and violation handling regimes. In addition, the new
Circular introduces some provisions aimed at improving corporate governance
mechanisms in Vietnam, including:
(1)

stricter definitions of non-executive members of the board of directors and
independent members of the board of directors;

(2)

more detailed regulation on the protection of the legitimate interests of the
shareholders;

(3)

requirements on responsibilities of major shareholders to disclose information in
accordance with law;
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(4)

new rules on the shareholders' meeting were also issued. These indicate that a public
company has to set up the procedures for convoking and voting at a general meeting
of shareholders under the Law on Enterprises, the relevant legislation, and the
company's charter. In addition, they have to disclose the information on the final
list of shareholders entitled to attend the general meeting of shareholders at least
five days before the close of the final list;

(5)

stricter requirements on reports of the board of directors and the supervisory board
on the general meeting of shareholders;

(6)

more disclosure of information as information relating to the board nominees is
required to be disseminated on the company's website at least seven days before
convoking the general meeting of shareholders;

(7)

at least one-third of members of the board of directors of public companies must be
non-executive members;

(8)

new rights of members of the board of directors under Law on Enterprises, the
legislations, and the company's charter;

(9)

a stricter requirement applies to listed companies and large-scale public
companies, at least one-third of the members of the board of directors must be
independent members;

(10) a more stringent requirement on supervisory board that no members of the
supervisory board may work in the accounting/finance department of the public
company or be a member or staff of the independent auditing company that
currently audits the public company’s financial statements;
(11) if the supervisory board detects violations of law or the company’s charter of
members of the board of directors, director (general director), and any other
managers, they must inform in writing to the board of directors within 48 hours.
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After seven days from the notification date, if no actions are made, they must report
directly to the State Securities Commission.
Even though the Codes are envisioned to introduce the best corporate governance
practices that are suitable to the Vietnamese institutional setting, Le and Walker (2008)
reveal the lack of compliance with corporate governance among listed firms in the
country. This is mainly because of the weak law enforcement and absence of a
punishment regime in contemporary securities law and other regulations (Hoang et al.
2016a; Kabir & Thai 2017). Furthermore, many listed companies are former SOEs in
which the state may still hold the controlling interest and appoint one or more
representatives on the board to supervise firms’ business affairs (Tran & Holloway 2014).
Additionally, many Vietnamese firms are owned by a few shareholders who are likely to
assign their immediate family members to the board of directors and the key management
positions and navigate decision-making through directors and managers. The government
intervention and the dominance of concentrated ownership in Vietnam have led to the
lack of proper supervision and a higher probability of expropriation of minority
shareholders.
In 2019, the State Securities Commission (SSC) in collaboration with the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), introduced the first Vietnam Corporate Governance Code of
Best Practices for public companies. This Code is mainly built upon the OECD Principles
of Corporate Governance, consisting of ten principles and five key areas of corporate
governance that are relevant to the current issues with corporate governance in Vietnam.
The Code not only takes into account the good governance practices that have been
employed in legislation but also introduces standards that exceed the requirements in laws
and regulations. This Code is intended to support public and listed companies in aligning
with international corporate governance standards, to foster investor confidence, and to
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facilitate the sustainable growth of the economy.
2.3.4 Corporate governance in Vietnam
This section describes the specific characteristics of corporate governance in Vietnam
relevant to the study.
2.3.4.1 Deficient law enforcement and inadequate minority shareholder protection
Vietnam is characterised by low minority shareholder protection (Hoang et al. 2016b;
IFC 2010; Tran & Holloway 2014) and the absence of corporate control laws (Pham et
al. 2015). As reported by the World Bank (2016), with reference to protecting minority
investors, Vietnam has the distance to frontier scores9 of 30 in 2010 and 45 in 2016. The
score of 30 in 2010 means Vietnam was 70 percentage points away from the frontier
constructed from the best performances across all economies and across time. In 2016,
the score was improved to 45 but it was still poor compared to the best performances in
the world. The low level of minority shareholder protection has led to the
underdevelopment of the capital markets in Vietnam (IFC 2010). Additionally, another
characteristic of Vietnam is weak law enforcement (Kabir & Thai 2017). For example,
despite the Corporate Governance Code in 2012 requiring that one-third of the board must
be non-executive directors, Asian Development Bank (2014) reveals that the level of
compliance with this Code is still low or at best only minimal.
2.3.4.2 The high intervention of the government
After embarking on the “test” in 1990, the “trial” in 1992, and the “equitization” on a
large scale from 1996 onwards, many Vietnamese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have
been equitised by becoming joint-stock companies in which the state may still hold the

9

This score shows the distance of a market to the “frontier”, which represents the best
performance observed across all markets in the Doing Business sample since 2005. A market’s
distance to frontier is calculated on a scale from zero to 100, where zero represents the poorest
performance and 100 represents the frontier.
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controlling interest. According to this privatisation process, the government facilitated
investor share purchases of all small and medium-sized firms in insignificant industries
and distributed these shares to firms’ employees and other investors before listing.
However, until 2007, the biggest SOEs were still under consideration for equitisation, and
so far, only some of them were successfully converted into listed companies (Robinett et
al. 2013; Tran & Holloway 2014). However, many key sectors such as those in the
“banking, education, electricity, media and publishing, mining, oil and gas, post and
communications and railways and shipbuilding sectors” are still operating under a
government monopoly (IFC 2010, p. 26). In many privatised SOEs, the government
maintains a controlling interest of at least 50 percent state equity and functions as the key
shareholder. The state also appoints directors to the firm’s board of directors and its chief
executive officer (CEO), who represents the equity of the state. This type of government
intervention is also observed in public companies without significant levels of state
ownership (Tran & Holloway 2014). Hai and O'Donelle (2017); Kim and Tru (2019)
examine the reform of SOEs in Vietnam and conclude that SOEs present a challenge to
the economy because of their poor performance and inefficient resources allocation. This
can be explained by SOEs’ concentrated ownership that reduces the disciplinary effect of
the capital market and the threat of bankruptcy. Due to government intervention and
political connections, there is not much competition among SOEs. They are empowered
to set their own prices. Moreover, bad debts and losses are commonly wiped out by the
state (Nguyen & van Dijk 2012). Thus, the substantial roles of state ownership may
challenge the effects of good corporate governance mechanisms in SOEs.
2.3.4.3 Ownership concentration
Similar to many other emerging economies, many Vietnamese privately-owned
companies typically begin as a small business owned by a controlling shareholder and
one or more significant blockholders who own directly or indirectly more than five
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percent of the total shares with voting rights (IFC 2010; Nguyen et al. 2017; Robinett et
al. 2013). Although these companies have expanded considerably, the controlling
shareholders remain the same. It is a common practice that most of the controlling
shareholders assign their immediate family members to the board of directors and the key
management positions. This insider-dominance structure tends to cause a lack of proper
supervision, facilitate the expropriation of minority shareholders, and result in the capital
market’s inefficiency.
2.3.4.4 The increasing importance of foreign shareholders
In Vietnam, although domestic investors dominate the capital markets, capital flows from
foreign investors have increased rapidly. By August 2016, local investors had around
1.6 million securities accounts; meanwhile, those of foreign investors were nearly 19,000,
with a total amount of more than US$16 billion (Vietnam Securities Depository 2016).
Until 2016, foreign ownership in Vietnam had been limited to a maximum of 49 percent
of the total shares of listed companies. However, Decree 60/2015/ND-CP dated 26 June
2015 removed the restriction on the maximum shareholding of foreign investors in
Vietnam. This is a substantial decision taken by the government to boost foreign
ownership in the Vietnamese stock market. In Vietnam, the majority of foreign investors
are from developed countries where shareholders have significant awareness of corporate
law, strong minority shareholder protection, and strict disclosure requirements. They
possess higher expertise and can effectively monitor the senior management team as they
are independent of the management. Lel (2019) documents that in countries with weak
investor protection laws in place, foreign investors are more active in the corporate
governance environment than do domestic investors. They are willing to take corrective
actions by intervening in management. Therefore, the lifting of the foreign ownership
restriction is observed as a decisive move to enhance capital market efficiency in
Vietnam.
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2.4 Bankruptcy practices in Vietnam
2.4.1 Bankruptcy laws in Vietnam
In Vietnam, the Law on Bankruptcy (LoB) which is governing the bankruptcy process in
Vietnam was first introduced in 1993, then amended in 2004. From January 2015, Law
on Bankruptcy No. 51/2014/QH13 replaced this law and has since been in force.
However, under Vietnamese law, there is no concept of individual insolvency, but only
insolvent enterprises (Dang 2017).
According to the LoB 2014, to start bankruptcy procedures, a petition must be submitted
by creditors (unsecured and partly secured), staff, trade unions, legal representatives,
shareholders or certain management personnel. The petitioner must provide evidence that
the enterprise has become insolvent, i.e. it has failed to pay its due debts within three
months to file a bankruptcy petition. After the acceptance of the bankruptcy request, the
court will decide whether to open the bankruptcy proceedings and notify creditors and
debtors of the firm. Once the court issues the decision to start the bankruptcy process, the
business activities of the company will be subject to the supervision of the judge in charge
of the case. The company must then lists its assets and prepare a list of creditors with
details of the debts. Following the completion of the lists of assets and creditors, the court
will organise the company’s creditors’ meetings to discuss its situation and seek creditor
approval via creditor resolution. If creditors approve of a rehabilitation plan, the firm will
implement the recovery plan under the administration of the court and creditors within a
maximum of three years from the approval of the resolution. If the firm fails to recover
its operations within the approved time, the court will declare the bankruptcy of the firm.
If the creditors consider that the company is not recoverable in the creditors’ meeting, the
court will commence liquidation procedures.
Despite the efforts of Vietnamese legislators to strengthen the bankruptcy framework, the
progress is still hampered because of the lack of expertise of legal professionals and the
authorities while dealing with the highly complex procedure (Schulz Noack Barwinkel
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Law 2019). As a consequence, with the aim to strengthen the legal framework in Vietnam,
the Supreme People’s Court of Vietnam collaborated with the Ministry of Justice and the
Supreme People’s Procuracy to introduce the Joint Circular No. 07/2018/TTLT-BTPVKSNDTC-TANDTC in June 2018. The new circular provides guidance on the
enforcement procedures for decisions of the court on bankruptcy proceedings and ensures
better coordination between the enforcement bodies and courts (Das 2018). This new
circular was observed to bring positive effects on the bankruptcy proceedings in Vietnam
(Schulz Noack Barwinkel Law 2019).
2.4.2 Bankruptcy practices in Vietnam
While bankruptcy legislation has been instrumental in restructuring financially distressed
firms in developed countries, in Vietnam, bankruptcy is mostly a theoretical option for
corporate restructuring (Le & Nguyen 2012). Bui et al. (2020) observe that bankruptcy
procedures are not common in Vietnam. They report that the cases that the courts declare
the firm as bankrupt are very rare. For example, in 2017, only 45 enterprises declared
bankruptcy out of about 400 cases where petitioners filed a petition for bankruptcy
proceedings. Meanwhile, the number of firms being liquidated stands at over 10,000 cases
in the same year (Bui et al. 2020).
Thuy (2013) reveals that Vietnamese companies are reluctant to declare bankruptcy due
to constraints from different stakeholders. First, creditors, who are mostly commercial
banks, pressure firms not to take the case to court. Under the Bankruptcy Law, assets will
be distributed following the priority rules. Thus, when all other priority claims are paid
in full, creditors may receive just a minor part of the debts. The fear of not being able to
recover the debts and losing reputation discourages creditors to file a petition with the
court. Another reason is if firms file for bankruptcy, banks will have to create a provision
for the debts. As the filing process is relatively time-consuming these loans will be
categorised as bad debts and seriously damage banks’ annual profits. Second, under the
Bankruptcy Law, firms’ top management teams are forbidden to establish new firms or
27

manage others within three years from the day that the court declares bankruptcy. This
gives managers the incentive to avoid bankruptcy. Third, unlike developed markets,
firms’ owners in Vietnam are likely to be controlling shareholders. As they have a residual
claim on the assets their damage is more severe when firms go bankrupt, which hinders
their motivation to file for bankruptcy. Fourth, cumbersome procedures of bankruptcy
proceedings lead to the reluctance of firms to file for bankruptcy. In particular, under the
Bankruptcy Law, the judge must issue decisions to open proceedings within 30 days from
the date of receiving an application for the opening of bankruptcy procedures. However,
in practice, as bankruptcy enforcement lies under the purview of the provincial court of
the locality where the companies registered for its business, it is subject to a significant
delay (Dang 2017). Last but not least, as per SOEs, no government agency wants their
affiliated companies to go bankrupt, because this can gravely damage their reputation to
the public, the country as a whole and the regions in particular. Thus, instead of filing for
bankruptcy, SOEs that fell into bankruptcy tend to borrow more to operate or in the worstcase scenario, they choose to liquidate.
Bankruptcy cases are much scarcer among listed firms. Since the establishment of the
stock exchanges in 2000, there have been only two companies that faced bankruptcy,
these being Vien Dong Pharmaceutical JSC (DVD) in September 2011 and Saigon Plastic
Packaging JSC (SPP) in November 2019. Because of the rarity of bankruptcy cases on
the Vietnamese stock market, their impacts are substantial to stakeholders and traumatise
the whole market. Thus, this calls for an in-depth examination of the determinants of their
bankruptcies to draw valuable lessons from them.
2.5 Delisting practices in Vietnam
2.5.1 Patterns of listing and delisting in Vietnam
The first stock exchange in Vietnam first began operating officially in 2000 with the
initial listings of only two stocks, i.e. Refrigeration Electrical Engineering JSC (REE) and
Saigon Cable and Telecommunication Material JSC (SAM). Meanwhile, the Hanoi Stock
28

Exchange was formally launched in 2005. Figure 2.4 displays the annual number of
listings and delistings from the major Vietnamese stock exchanges from 2000 to 2019.
The first delisting occurred in 2009 and the events of delisting have risen noticeably since
2012. The ratio of net listing flow to the number of listed firms has deteriorated
significantly since 2013, which shows the existence of a serious problem. An increase of
delistings, coupled with a significant decline of listings, has raised concerns about the
attractiveness of the Vietnamese stock market.

Figure 2.4 Annual number of firms listed and delisted from major Vietnamese
Stock Exchanges from 2000 to 2019.
Source: Data are hand-collected from HOSE and HNX listing and delisting
announcements over the period 2000 – 2019
2.5.2 Delisting rules in Vietnam
Delisting is defined as the removal of listed firms from a stock exchange. The evolution
of market regulations on delisting in Vietnam has been slow. It was only in 2006 that the
National Assembly first introduced the Law on Securities and in 2007, the Government
issued Decree No. 14/2007/ND-CP detailing the implementation of the Law on
Securities. This Decree elaborates on the delisting rule in Vietnam with an aim to filter
out inefficient firms. The following are brief descriptions of delisting reasons stated in
the Decree:
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(1) the firm no longer meets the listing requirements in one year;
(2) the firm suspends its major business activities for more than one year;
(3) the firm has its business registration certificate or operating license withdrawn;
(4) shares are not traded within twelve months;
(5) the firm suffers losses in three consecutive years or accumulated losses exceed the
charter capital in the latest audited financial statement before the time of
consideration;
(6) the firm ceases to exist due to merger and acquisition, division, splitting, liquidation,
or bankruptcy;
(7) the auditing firm does not accept to perform the audit or has opinions disapproving
or refusing to give opinions on the latest year's financial statements of the listed firm;
(8) the firm fails to submit annual financial statements for three consecutive years;
(9) the State Securities Commission and the stock exchange find that the firm has forged
listing documents or listing documents containing serious misleading information
affecting investors' decisions;
(10) the firm seriously violates the obligation to disclose information or is classified as
unsuitable for listing, which is judged by the stock exchange or the State Securities
Commission;
(11) the firm terminates the listing at its own request.
Since 2009, 211 firms have been delisted from Vietnam’s stock exchanges. Around 30
percent of listed firms left voluntarily for reasons such as mergers and acquisitions,
restructuring or liquidation, while others were forced by the securities exchanges. Figure
2.5 depicts a breakdown of delisted firms by delisting reasons.
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Figure 2.5 The total number of delistings due to specific reasons, 2009 – 2019
Source: Data are hand-collected from HOSE and HNX delisting announcements over
the period 2009 – 2019
2.6 Earnings management practices in Vietnam
2.6.1 Accounting regulation and enforcement in Vietnam
Following the end of what was known as the First Indochina War in 1954, Vietnam
established a centralised controlled economy. The planned economy regime and the
accompanying accounting system were considerably influenced by Communist China
and the Soviet Union. With the opening of its economy in 1995, Vietnam’s accounting
system was transformed to meet the demands of the new market economy. According to
Bui (2011), the Vietnamese accounting legislation structure comprises four hierarchical
levels, i.e. Accounting Law passed by the National Assembly, mandatory regulations
validated by the Government, accounting standards, and circulars and guidelines issued
by the Ministry of Finance.
Unlike Western countries such as the US and UK, where professional bodies issue
accounting standards, the Vietnamese State, through the Ministry of Finance, has
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maintained a monopoly position on accounting regulations and standards to supervise
accounting activities and enforce compliance with the standards (Bui 2011; Rezaee et al.
2019). Between 2001 and 2005, the Ministry of Finance promulgated Vietnamese
Accounting Standards (VAS) with 26 accounting standards, which are in line with the
International Accounting Standards/International Financial Reporting Standards
(IAS/IFRS), with some adjustments to suit the Vietnamese setting (Bui 2011). In 2003,
the Accounting Law was first introduced, representing a milestone in the country’s
accounting history. This law created a legal framework for professional accounting
activities for all economic sectors.
Unlike the principal-based International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the
Vietnamese accounting system is rule-based and has little flexibility. The chart of
accounts in financial statements is mandated by accounting standards in Vietnam. Even
though IFRS is not mandatory in Vietnam, some listed companies, especially cross-listing
firms in foreign stock exchanges, publish two separate financial statements based on VAS
and IFRS (Rezaee et al. 2019). However, Le and Walker (2008) find that in spite of strict
regulatory instruments, implementing the law and regulations, and developing good
corporate governance for listed firms present tough challenges in Vietnam.
2.6.2 Earnings management in Vietnam
Earnings management is defined as a false statement of the actual performance of a
business by its insiders (Klein 2002). This occurs when managers misuse their judgment
to manipulate the transactions in financial reports to either misinform stakeholders about
the underlying firm performance or to affect contractual outcomes that are determined by
the reported information (Healy & Wahlen 1999). Earnings manipulation has been
pervasive in Vietnam due to its distinctive institutional setting. First, this is because of
the administrative governance approach in Vietnam. The regulators in Vietnam often rely
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on accounting information to administer listed firms. To issue additional shares to
existing shareholders and to carry out a merger and acquisition with another firm, a firm
listed on HOSE and HNX needs to satisfy specific criteria. For example, that firm has to
obtain a positive return on equity (ROE), or the ROE of the merged firm needs to be
higher than the firm’s ROE for five consecutive years. Similarly, the most common
reasons for delisting in Vietnam are the reported losses in three straight years, or
accumulated losses exceed the charter capital in the latest audited financial statement
before the time of consideration. Given that SSC relies on accounting numbers to decide
whether firms can issue additional shares, conduct an M&A, and be forced to leave the
exchange, managers have the incentive to manage earnings to achieve their purposes.
Moreover, the dominance of concentrated ownership in Vietnam also encourages
earnings management activities. Since controlling shareholders are likely to assign their
immediate family members to the board of directors and key management positions, the
outcome is a lack of proper supervision and the greater probability of expropriation of
minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders can boost their desire to distort the actual
value of the firms for their own interests, such as gains from stock sales, empire-building,
and delisting avoidance. Due to weak law enforcement and the lack of minority
shareholder protection schemes (Hoang et al. 2016a; Kabir & Thai 2017), minority
shareholders are reluctant to take listed companies to court. The fact that minority
shareholders rarely challenge controlling shareholders on critical issues in Vietnam
worsens the earnings management issue. Civil litigation is infrequent in Vietnam because
of deficiencies in the civil law and the absence of a punishment spectrum in contemporary
securities law and other regulations. All of these factors have contributed apparently to
the high level of earnings management in Vietnam.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, the unique institutional setting in Vietnam is reviewed and the context
relevant to this study is highlighted. The chapter starts with a brief overview of the
Vietnamese stock market, the formation of the Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi stock exchanges,
and Unlisted Public Company Market. This chapter also compares the market
capitalisation of Vietnam’s stock market with other stock exchanges in Southeast Asia.
The chapter then documents the hybrid corporate governance structure in Vietnam, which
raises the question about whether studies in other countries document information that is
relevant to the Vietnamese context. The current laws and regulations on corporate
governance in Vietnam are outlined, as are the corporate governance practices. The
bankruptcy laws of Vietnam were explained followed by a brief overview of bankruptcy
practices. Then, the chapter illustrates the patterns of listing and delisting in Vietnam and
delisting rules and identifies reasons why firms are delisted from the stock exchanges in
Vietnam. The final topic discussed concerned the current accounting regulations and
enforcement and the practices of earnings management in Vietnam.
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3. CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Introduction
Although agency theory has been considered the dominant theory in studies on corporate
governance (Mallin 2013; Monks & Minow 2011), Eisenhardt (1989) argues that agency
theory may not entirely capture the complexity of companies. Daily et al. (2003) show
the limitation of heavy reliance on agency theory to explain corporate governance
phenomena and recommend applying a multi-theoretical approach to identifying the
mechanisms that might reasonably improve managerial functioning. For instance, the
monitoring role of directors, the primary internal governance mechanism, has been wellconceptualised by agency theory; however, other theoretical frameworks could enlighten
us on company directors’ advisory role. More recently, another theoretical perspective,
resource dependence theory, has emerged in the literature. Although this theory analyses
corporate governance from different perspectives, it may in fact complement agency
theory.
This chapter reviews the structural theoretical frameworks for this thesis. It begins with a
summary of agency theory in Section 3.2, followed by an overview of resource
dependence theory in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 provides a theoretical framework to explain
the effect of corporate governance on firms’ outcomes. The chapter concludes with a
summary in Section 3.5.
3.2 Agency theory
Agency theory arose as a consequence of the expansion of stock markets (Solomon 2013).
Before stock markets existed, companies raised funds from wealthy individuals, mostly
the owner’s relatives, resulting in the marriage of ownership and control. To expand,
many firms sought funding from a wide variety of investors and changed from founder
control to professional supervision (Young et al. 2008). Investors provide external funds
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to firms by purchasing shares; however, they are not liable for company debts. Their
liability is limited to the investment they place in the investee company. Even though they
own the company, they tend not to involve themselves in running the company and
delegate control over their investment to the firm’s directors and ultimately managers.
This gave rise to a significant change in the way companies were organised. Shareholders,
who own and invest in listed firms, entrust the operations of day-to-day business to the
firm’s management. This separation of ownership and control has resulted in the endemic
agency problems discussed by Berle and Means (1933), which were first explained
theoretically by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They define an agency relationship as “a
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decisionmaking authority to the agent” (Jensen & Meckling 1976, p. 308). They demonstrate that
the separation between the principals (shareholders) who own the company and agents
(company executives) who act in the interest of the principals may lead to principal-agent
problems because their objectives are different. While the ultimate goal of a company is
to maximise shareholder wealth, managers focus on projects that gain high short-term
profits for their own advantage at the expense of shareholders.
The theoretical relationship between the principal and the agent is based on three
assumptions about people, organisations, and information. In particular, it is assumed that
the principal and the agent are both opportunistic, rational and risk-averse; there are
different time horizons and information asymmetry among members of the organisation,
and information can be traded (Eisenhardt 1989). Thus, the agent’s incentives may not be
perfectly aligned with those of the principal, leading to a costly contract between the
principal and agent to induce the agent to act in the best interests of the principal. Attempts
by the principal to ‘monitor’ the agent incurs agency costs which can be broken down
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into monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss (Jensen & Meckling 1976). In their
study, Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify monitoring costs as the costs borne by the
principal to ensure the fulfilment of the agent; bonding costs as the costs incurred by
agents to show the shareholders they are accountable and are acting in the best interests
of the principal; and a residual loss which is the loss that the principal bears in terms of
shareholder wealth reduction, simply because it is impossible to create a contract that
perfectly aligns both parties’ incentives. Finally, total agency costs are the sum of the
principal’s monitoring costs, the agent’s bonding costs and any remaining residual loss
(Solomon 2013). Nonetheless, these costs can be abated if firms can establish effective
corporate governance schemes to bring the managers’ interests more in line with those of
the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Nguyen et al. 2015b).
Recent studies in finance and economics have revisited agency theory and document that
the traditional conflicts between principals and agents are common and natural in
developed countries. Young et al. (2002) analyse corporate governance in emerging
markets and conclude the coexistence of the principal-agent and principal-principal
conflicts in emerging markets. However, they emphasise the prevalence of conflicts
between majority and minority shareholders in emerging market economies, which arise
from the unique institutional setting of emerging economies such as high ownership
concentration, the significance of government connections and proliferation of business
groups, and not ensuring the legitimate protection of minority shareholders’ rights
(Young et al. 2008). In developed economies, external governance mechanisms, such as
the strong market for corporate control, limit the potential for expropriation by controlling
shareholders. In contrast, such protection rarely exists in emerging market economies
where product markets, managerial labour markets, and takeover markets are not
functioning well. This results in undesirable changes in the dynamics of corporate
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governance in these nations and calls for better governance mechanisms to deal with the
conflicts between majority and minority shareholders.
Dharwadkar et al. (2000) document that the shortage of robust legal frameworks for
protecting minority shareholders results in a weak governance environment that
exaggerates traditional principal-agent conflicts. When boards of directors - the strategic
internal governance mechanism - lack the institutional support to operate well, they are
less likely to monitor the management team effectively (Peng 2004). Thus, ownership
concentration becomes an adequate substitute for weak external mechanisms to alleviate
traditional principal-agent problems. Theoretically, blockholders are helpful because they
have more incentive and greater ability to control managers by affecting the vote on board
nominees and resolutions, waging a proxy fight, and threatening to “vote with their feet”.
Moreover, the reduction of liquidity of large shareholdings can ease the level of shorttermism by blockholders (Boyd & Solarino 2016). Nevertheless, unlike minority
shareholders, controlling shareholders are able to expropriate the interests of these
shareholders, resulting in other severe agency problems between majority and minority
shareholders and higher agency costs in firms with principal-principal conflicts
(Claessens & Yurtoglu 2013).
Controlling shareholders may collude with the management team, abrogate monitoring
instruments, such as the board of directors (Dharwadkar et al. 2000), and engage actively
in corporate decisions to reallocate firms’ resources to achieve private benefits at the
expense of minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny 1986). Moreover, as the liquidity of
stock markets declines due to concentrated ownership, less information is contained in
stock prices, which weakens the monitoring ability of capital markets. To attract minority
shareholders, controlling shareholders have to signal to the public that they will not
expropriate minority shareholders’ rights, and must establish a high reputation for being
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reliable, resulting in higher bonding costs in businesses with principal-principal conflicts
(Young et al. 2008). If controlling shareholders expropriate minority shareholders
severely, the market loses confidence in the firm and discounts the value of its shares.
Minority shareholders may choose to divest themselves of shareholdings which puts the
wealth of controlling shareholders at risk. Therefore, retaining minority shareholders is
not only in the interest of companies but also controlling shareholders.
In order to help firms reduce agency problems and enhance their accountability to
shareholders and other stakeholders, several codes of practice have been established to
recommend best practices for internal corporate governance structure, for example, the
role of outside directors, audit committee, and risk management. Solomon (2013)
postulates that a stand-alone mechanism may not exert a substantial impact on corporate
governance. Nevertheless, together, these mechanisms can be surprisingly effective in
improving firms’ corporate governance practices.
3.3 Resource dependence theory
While the agency (monitoring) role of the board of directors is the main focus in much of
the literature on corporate governance, its resource dependence role (advising and
counselling) has attracted much attention in recent studies. Pfeffer (1973) suggests that a
firm is an open social entity that is not self-directed, and is in need of external resources
such as human and capital resources, and information to survive. Resource dependence
theory seeks to describe company directors’ resource dependence role as a vital link to
the external environment. In particular, according to Hillman et al. (2000) the board
functions not only to authorise managers’ decisions and monitor the enactment of these
decisions but also offer essential resources to enhance firm performance through their
connections with the external environment. For instance, outside directors who are also
executives of financial institutions may assist firms in acquiring a stable source of funds,
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while outside directors who are legal experts may offer firms valuable advice and
information, provide firms with some types of legitimacy, and reduce transaction costs
related to the regulatory body or government department (Daily et al. 2003). Resource
dependence theorists propose that the board is a valuable governance mechanism that
helps firms curtail resource constraints, get access to scarce resources from outside, and
manage firms’ environmental relationships (Hillman et al. 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik
1978). While uncertainty weakens a firm’s ability to control resources and hinders its
daily operations, directors who can connect it with its external environment provide an
effective mechanism to cope with such uncertainty, generating better operational
functioning and firm performance (Daily et al. 2003).
Based on the need for external resources, Hillman et al. (2000) identify four groups of
directors as follows. First, insiders who are current or have been owners or employees of
the firm in the past may be valuable resource providers given their expertise on the firm
and its competitive environment. Second, business experts who may be current or retired
executives or directors in other large corporations may have outstanding decision-making
and problem-solving expertise and thus lead the way on business strategy. Third, support
specialists such as public relations experts and lawyers are different from business experts
in terms of not having management experience, yet they may bring their specialised
expertise to the firm. Lastly, community influencers such as political leaders and leaders
in society or community organisations may not have direct experience in controlling firms
in similar environments but may provide beneficial knowledge and connections to other
groups.
Daily and Dalton (1994b) emphasise that including outsiders on the board is
advantageous in terms of accessing valuable resources and increasing legitimacy. In later
research on the nexus between board size and firm performance, Dalton et al. (1999)
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conclude that having more individuals on the board offer more available resources to
firms as they can gather support from the external environment. In the same vein, Daily
et al. (2003) demonstrate that these resources improve the firm’s performance and its
probability of survival as a result of the benefits that directors bring to firms: firstly,
human capital in the form of experience, expertise and reputation; and secondly, relational
capital such as a network with other firms and environmental contingencies (Hillman et
al. 2009).
Boyd and Solarino (2016) note refinements to resource dependence theory - which has
been used to explore the impact of different types of ownership on firm outcomes (Katila
et al. 2008; Peng & Jiang 2010). They point out that shareholders are not uniform; they
have dissimilar goals, attitudes to risk, and investment horizons. They may coexist in the
same firm and make different contributions to it. For instance, insiders can bring in useful
in-house expertise, whereas controlling shareholders and blockholders can offer crucial
resources in a crisis. As a result, firm performance and survival probability are enhanced.
However, Katila et al. (2008) argue that the dependence on resources may create the
“sharks dilemma” which is described as the pressure that firms are brought under when
compromising between resources provided by new investors and the potential
embezzlement of their own resources by the same investors - “sharks”. They challenge
the traditional view of resource dependence theory, because it focuses narrowly on the
resource dependence that pushes firms to establish connections yet neglects the potential
misappropriation of resources that pushes them away. For example, state ownership can
benefit firms substantially with regard to resource provision and more lenient regulatory
oversight. However, at the same time, a state owner may prioritise political and social
goals over business interests, making it less appealing and profitable to private investors
in the firm. For this reason, the trade-offs between costs and benefits of external resources
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should be investigated thoroughly under the lens of both agency and resource dependence
theories.
3.4 Theoretical framework for the effect of corporate governance on firm outcomes
Agency theory and resource dependence theory are two major approaches employed in
corporate governance research. Agency theory scholars suggest that the differences in
risk preferences and interests between shareholders and managers and majority
shareholders and minority shareholders require remedies to bring into line the opposing
interests (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Young et al. 2008). They claim that when the
misaligned goals and poor oversight combine, this will result in serious problems. In their
survey on corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) propose that corporate
governance can solve agency problems. Meanwhile, resource dependence theorists
emphasise the nexus between the firm and its business environment (Pfeffer & Salancik
1978). External resources are limited and boards of directors and diverse forms of owners
strive to increase firm performance by providing scarce resources, such as expertise,
advice, reputation, financial buffers for a crisis, and communication and social networks
(Boyd & Solarino 2016; Hillman et al. 2009). These resources are vital to firms and assist
them to increase the likelihood of survival (Daily & Dalton 1994b). Table 3.1 below
presents a theory-based framework that links corporate governance with different firm
outcomes.
Table 3.1 Theoretical perspectives on corporate governance
Agency theory

Resource

Synthesis

dependence theory
CEO

(-) Can exacerbate (+) Can provide skills CEO duality may be

Duality

board

and

expertise

effectiveness and unified

as detrimental as the CEOs

leadership may adopt investment

compromise board leads to better business policies
independence

understanding
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that

benefit

themselves;

thus,

deviate

from

shareholder

wealth

maximisation.
However,

unified

leadership may provide
more

informed

guidance, especially in
turbulent times due to a
better understanding of
the firm.
Outside

(+) Can improve (+)

directors

monitoring
(-)

Can

essential resources and important

Can

compromised

internal

be effective suggestions

governance mechanism

by

to

controlling

ensure

the

competence of the board

shareholders
exploit

provide Outside directors are an

to

as

minority

shareholders

they

serve

both

fiduciary and advisory

for

roles. However, they

private profits

may lack firm-specific
expertise

and

compromised

be
by

controlling shareholders
to

exploit

minority

shareholders
Board size

(+) Smaller boards (+) Larger boards can Board size may have
are less likely to gather more resources mixed impacts on firm
encounter
coordination

from

the

and environment

external outcomes. On the one
hand, smaller boards

communication

tend

to

problems

involved

be

more

and

more

efficient in decisionmaking;

thus,

more

effective in monitoring
the management team.
Conversely,
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smaller

boards

reduce

the

diversification of the
expertise and provide
less external links.
Board

(+) Can improve (+)

diversity

monitoring

Can

provide Board diversity can be

essential resources

beneficial as it offers
better monitoring over
executives and provides
more diverse expertise,
vital

resources,

and

adopt proper strategies
to increase firm value.
Controlling

(+) Can improve (+)

shareholders monitoring

Can

provide Controlling

crucial resources in a shareholders

have

(-) Can collude crisis situation

greater power to control

with managers to

managers and provide

expropriate

vital

minority

especially in a crisis;

shareholders

yet, they may collude

resources,

with managers or other
investors to pursue their
own goals.
State

(+) Can improve (+) Can provide stable On the one hand, state

ownership

monitoring

resources, legitimacy, ownership

can

be

(-) Can prioritise and regulatory relief

advantageous thanks to

political and social

easy access to resources,

goals over firm

sometimes at a lower
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter surveyed and explained the theoretical perspectives that form the
background for the following empirical study. First, it reviewed the two theories applied
in this research, i.e. agency theory and resource dependence theory. Second, the
combination and overlap between these two theories were discussed to examine the
impact of corporate governance on different firm outcomes, including ultimately the
probability of delisting and the level of earnings management. Different corporate
governance mechanisms were evaluated in terms of the two theories. This analysis
showed that even though corporate governance mechanisms may have contradictory or
uncertain influences on firm outcomes, they are essential in aligning the interests of
different parties, including especially directors/managers and investors/shareholders
toward maximising company success and hence shareholder wealth.
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4. CHAPTER 4 THE FALL OF THE VIETNAMESE ENRON: AN
ANALYSIS FROM GOVERNANCE AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES
4.1 Introduction
The bankruptcy of Enron in 2001 was the consequence of internal governance failures
and the recklessness of its stakeholders, including auditors, investment banks, stock
analysts, consultants, and credit rating agencies (Di Miceli da Silveira 2013). The Enron
scandal, which eventually contributed to the creation of the new phrase “Enron ethics”,
provided a strong ethical message to various stakeholder groups (Sims & Brinkmann
2003) and brought about a significant change in accounting and corporate governance
regulations in the US. It resulted in the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002,
which required a higher level of transparency, honesty and accountability (Coates 2007)
in order to enhance public confidence in corporate governance (Angur 2009). Similar
corporate failures have been observed worldwide, including OneTel in 2001, Ansett
Australia and WorldCom in 2002, Parmalat in 2003, China Aviation Oil in 2005,
Blockbuster in 2010, and Nokia in 2013. In Vietnam, a decade later, the unprecedented
collapse of Vien Dong Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Company (DVD), the first company
listed on the Vietnamese stock market to face bankruptcy, was also attributed to its ethical
failure, inadequate internal corporate governance practices, and weak external corporate
governance mechanisms.
Similar to the rise of Enron in the US, DVD began as one of the most promising
companies in the pharmaceutical industry, with the largest distribution system in
Vietnam. From the first day it was listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE)
in December 2009 until September 2010, DVD performed outstandingly well, with its
share price increasing by over 100 percent from VND 74,000 to VND 150,000. However,
the arrests of its CEO-Chairman, Le Van Dung, and related persons in late 2010 disclosed
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a series of frauds to the public, resulting in its price plummeting. On the last day of trading
in November 2011, its stock price plunged to VND 3,50010. Its bankruptcy traumatised
the public and especially its investors. The collapse of DVD attracted greater attention
from the public due to the company’s reputation and the high profile of its leader. Le Van
Dung was the 60th-richest man on the Vietnamese stock exchange as of 2009 (Minh
Quang 2010), and the company was recognised as the national leader in technology
transfer, owning the nine best-selling pharmaceutical products in Vietnam. Moreover, the
company was funded by prestigious banks and strategic institutional investors, including
ABBank, Indovina Bank, HSBC, ANZ, Bank Invest, and Deutsch Bank AG London. In
2009 and 2010, three analyst firms provided “buy” recommendations and one firm
recommended that investors “hold” the DVD shares based on its sound financial ratios
and prospective business opportunities. For example, between 2007 and 2009, the firm’s
ROE stayed between 20 and 25 percent, its revenue growth rate was in the range of 20 to
60 percent during the period, and it paid out 25 percent of its profits as cash dividends. It
is shocking that even after the suspension of the seasoned equity offering (SEO) by the
State Securities Commission and disclosure of its infringement, the securities-advisory
company Truong Son Securities Inc. still suggested that investors should buy DVD
shares. Moreover, the firm’s 2007, 2008, and 2009 financial statements had been audited
by high-profile auditing firms: Ernst & Young Vietnam and Auditing and Consulting Co.,
Ltd. They had issued unqualified opinions on DVD’s financial statements. Moreover, the
DVD scandal was the first of a series of corporate governance failures in prominent firms
in Vietnam that included the Asia Commercial Joint Stock Bank, J&V Medical
Instrument JSC, Ocean Group JSC, and Drilling Mud JSC.

10

See Figure A.1 in Appendix A for DVD share prices and trading volume from its first day on
the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange to its last trading day on September 1, 2011, and some critical
events that might have affected its stock prices
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In the wake of the DVD scandal, new legislation was enacted to strengthen the corporate
governance system in Vietnam, Circular No. 121/2012/TT-BTC, dated 26 July 2012,
which concerned corporate governance standards for public companies. It replaced
Decision No. 12/2007/QD-BTC, dated 13 March 2007, which concerned the corporate
governance applicable to listed companies. This Circular requires more-stringent
governance regimes and aims to bring the Vietnam regulatory framework closer to global
best practice (IFC 2012). In addition, the Ministry of Finance issued Circular No.
52/2012/TT-BTC, dated 5 April 2012, on the disclosure of information to the securities
market, aims to increase transparency and improve the protection of minority
shareholders. Meanwhile, those accused of stock price manipulation were first prosecuted
for criminal liability when Law No. 37/2009/QH12 on amendments and supplements of
the Penal Code No. 15/1999/QH10 took effect in 2010. An array of critical events and
announcements relating to DVD from March 2010 to September 2011 is listed in Table
A.1 in Appendix A.
This chapter undertakes a case study on the collapse of DVD to delve into the underlying
ethical and governance-related issues that resulted in the corporate failure, and further to
criticise the potential weakness of the Vietnamese capital market system, which has not
been tackled in prior research. A case study research method makes possible an in-depth
analysis of unknown phenomena while maintaining the comprehensive and substantial
characteristics of real-life events (Yin 2012). Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) posit that
using a case study method is appropriate to build theory, as each case serves as a unique
experiment that represents an analytic unit. Aiming to gain a subtle understanding of the
complex aspects of the phenomenon and define relationships among factors that explain
corporate scandals, this study follows the analysis procedures introduced by Gini (1985)
to conduct a case study from ethical and governance dimensions. To increase the validity
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and reliability of data sources, this study collects data from various sources, including the
company’s annual reports, public announcements, prospectus and other published
information, stock analysts’ reports, newspaper articles, and published electronic media
content for the longest possible period of observation. These data are analysed using the
document-analysis method following McKinnon (1988).
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section introduces the success story of
DVD and its ambitious expansion strategies. Section 4.3 elaborates the scandal, including
accounting frauds, the misstatement in the SEO prospectus, and stock price manipulation.
Then, the real root of the DVD debacle is discussed, including the company’s internal
corporate governance issues and external flaws that resulted in its collapse. Section 4.5
identifies “red flags” that could have been detected by investors before the failure, and
Section 4.6 documents the main lessons from the DVD scandal. The concluding section
summarises the key points of the study, highlighting its limitations and contributions.
4.2 The successful story of DVD
Vien Dong Pharmaceutical JSC (DVD), formerly known as Dai Ha Thanh
Pharmaceutical JSC, was established in 2004 and operated as a pharmaceutical and
cosmetic trading company. In 2007, DVD merged with Hanoi – Vien Dong International
JSC and Ho Chi Minh – Vien Dong International JSC and acquired 100 percent of the
outstanding shares of Hanoi – Vien Dong Pharmaceutical JSC and Da Nang – Vien Dong
Pharmaceutical JSC, becoming a parent company. Moreover, together with Yvery France
and other individual partners, DVD built its Lili of France Joint Venture factory for $24
million. The core business of DVD was to purchase licenses from foreign pharmaceutical
firms to manufacture and distribute pharmaceutical products domestically under the brand
name of Lili of France, which accounted for more than 90 percent of the firm’s revenue.
Since the Lili of France factory was not yet operating, DVD outsourced its manufacturing
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to nine reputable factories: three in South Korea, one in India and five in Vietnam. The
license-purchase strategy helped DVD reduce product launch times by as much as 75
percent and shorten the time to build a strong brand image from five to two years.
In developed countries, consumers are more likely to prefer local products because they
perceive the quality is superior (Dickerson 1982; Hustvedt et al. 2013; Nguyen et al.
2008). In contrast, consumers in Vietnam are not very ethnocentric about goods and
services produced locally, tending to favour foreign brand products manufactured in
advanced economies over both foreign-brand products manufactured in Vietnam and
domestically branded products (Mai & Smith 2012; Mai & Tambyah 2011). In this way,
DVD stood out among its competitors because of its international equivalent-quality
products at competitive prices. In 2009, DVD was the leading pharmaceutical distributor
in Vietnam, owning nine best-selling products in Vietnam. By June 2009, the company
purchased more than 50 licenses and over 250 brands. DVD had 22 branches throughout
the country and the widest pharmaceutical distribution network in Vietnam. Notably, the
Lili of France brand by DVD was widely recognised by Vietnam’s 18,000 pharmacies,
clinics, and hospitals.
Expansion: Ambitious R&D and M&A Strategies
In an attempt to attain a higher growth rate, DVD pursued ambitious R&D strategies. It
began by building the Lili of France Joint Venture factory with advanced manufacturing
technology and equipment imported from Germany, India, France, and China. The
factory was slated to start functioning in early May 2010 to assist DVD’s pharmaceuticalmanufacturing and R&D activities. Additionally, it was expected to not only comply with
the GMP-WHO standard but also a higher standard, GMP-FDA, so that it could export
its products to the United States. In 2010, DVD planned to launch two promising
products: firstly, Fludon H1, which is considered to be safer and at least three times more
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economical than the well-known Tamiflu; and secondly, a non-addictive sedative
product. DVD’s goals were that Fludon H1 would become Vietnam’s top brand in the flu
treatment segment and that the new sedative product would occupy the Vietnamese
market. DVD could then sell licenses to other countries.
Besides R&D enhancement, M&A had become one of DVD’s strategic activities since
2010. DVD’s business strategy was to select pharmaceutical companies that could assist
DVD’s manufacturing activities, then to purchase at least 20 percent of total shares. In
March 2010, DVD signed a strategic contract with Savi Pharmaceutical JSC (Savipharm),
one of its outsourcing factories in Vietnam. DVD bought 261,329 shares of Savipharm,
equivalent to 20.78 percent of its charter capital. This M&A transaction initiated an
uptrend in DVD’s stock price until September 2010, when the SSC suspended DVD’s
public offering for further investigation. From June 2010, DVD started to acquire Ha Tay
Pharmaceutical JSC (DHT). This M&A was a part of DVD’s strategy to obtain DHT’s
effective manufacturing system and valuable real estate (Thanh 2011). The apparent highyield core business activities and power-hungry expansion strategies impressed investors
and the capital market, and no-one openly questioned the recklessness of those aggressive
business strategies.
4.3 DVD scandal and its ethical issues
The DVD case undoubtedly raises critical issues of governance, especially concerning
the ethical behaviour of the executives and the board. The scandal evoked the public
blame when severe ethical compromises, including accounting manipulation, stock price
manipulation, and other offences by its top management team, were revealed.
4.3.1 Accounting manipulation
Zona et al. (2013) suggest that managerial fraud, which refers to the intentional activities
of managers to deceive, swindle, and victimise investors and other stakeholders (Zahra et
al. 2005). For instance, insider trading, embezzlement, failure to disclose and
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misrepresenting the facts, and cover-ups is the material of corporate scandals, An
investigation into the DVD scandal showed that its top management team falsified its
business operations to inflate its revenue and net-income figures to facilitate and enhance
its initial public offering (IPO) and seasoned equity offering (SEO), and to increase its
share price (State Securities Commission 2011).
These operations were carried out through related companies created by DVD’s CEOChairman Le Van Dung. While these companies were established under the names of his
family members and friends, Mr. Dung was the one who effectively controlled their
operations. According to financial statements from 2007 to 2010, the majority of the
DVD’s revenue arose from business activities with Lili of France JVC, Vien Dong
International JSC, Hoan Thien Trading and Engineering Development JSC (DTEC), and
Medi Medical Investment JSC. Notably, Lili of France JVC was one of DVD’s
subsidiaries, with DVD having 97 percent ownership; meanwhile, Vien Dong
International JSC’s CEO was Le Van Dung, and its Chairman was Le Van Manh, Mr.
Dung’s younger brother. DTEC and Medi Medical Investment JSC were controlling
shareholders of DVD; they had actively traded DVD shares since its IPO (Minh 2010).
Moreover, Do Minh Hien, a related person to Le Van Dung, was DTEC’s CEO and Medi
Medical Investment JSC’s representative. Mr. Dung set up these companies and used fake
invoices and contracts of great value to record fictitious revenue for DVD. Because of its
seemingly sound financial results, DVD could borrow more funds from ABBank, ANZ,
HSBC, and Indovina. According to its 2010 financial statements, as of 31 December
2010, DVD’s total liabilities were more than VND 918 billion, including VND 913 billion
as current liabilities and VND five billion as long-term liabilities.
Although at that time DVD’s current assets were VND 1,023 billion, accounts receivable
from its related parties made up 94 percent of this figure: DVD’s actual cash and
equivalents were only VND 1.6 billion. After the investigation of SSC on related-party
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transactions, DVD restated its financial information and sent official letter No.
12/CV/2011, dated 14 January 2011, indicating that as of 31 December 2010, the
unconfirmed amount of DVD’s liabilities was VND 641 billion. At the extraordinary
shareholders’ meeting on 30 March 2011, DVD and its shareholders agreed to sell its
assets, including the Lili of France JV factory, Savifarm shares, and other assets
(Vneconomy 2011). However, DVD could not meet all of its debt obligations, and thus
filed for bankruptcy proceedings by ANZ in May 2011. The extent of the fraud only came
to light after DHT, the target company in the M&A, discovered DVD’s intention to
acquire the firm illegally and started to investigate DVD’s activities in an attempt to resist
the hostile takeover.
4.3.2 Stock price manipulation
4.3.2.1 Manipulation of DVD’s stock prices
To manipulate DVD’s stock prices, Le Van Dung opened 12 trading accounts under his
name and the names of related parties at three securities companies: Bao Viet Securities
JSC (BVSC), Sacombank Securities JSC (SBS), and Saigon-Hanoi Securities JSC (SHS).
During the period from 1 January 2010 to 30 September 2010, Mr. Dung traded DVD
shares between accounts in 119 trading sessions with 1,725 matched orders to artificially
increase the share price. Notably, there were 28 times that Mr. Dung sold DVD shares
and used the advance to buy back the shares on the same day. These transactions
contradict the rule that investors are allowed to open only one trading account and are
prohibited from buying and selling the same stock on the same day11 (Thanhniennews
2011). In addition to trading shares between accounts to increase the liquidity of DVD
shares, Mr. Dung and his accomplices attempted to undertake M&As with other

11

According to Decree No. 74/2011/TT-BTC, dated 1 June 2011, on guidance on stock trading,
since January 2011 investors have been allowed to open multiple accounts at different securities
companies and to buy and sell the same stock in the same trading session.
53

pharmaceutical companies to lure investors into buying DVD shares at high prices.
4.3.2.2 Manipulation of DHT’s stock prices
In addition to his six accounts at SBS, Mr. Dung cooperated with Le Minh Truyen, a
broker at SBS, to open five more accounts under the names of persons related to him at
SBS to trade DHT shares. Investigations showed that despite being the named account
holders, Mr. Dung’s related persons neither deposited into the account nor participated in
trading shares. All transactions of money transfers and the purchase and sale of shares
were directly carried out by Le Van Dung through the assistance of brokers at securities
companies in the form of trading over the phone or sending text messages. As of
September 2010, Mr. Dung used 11 accounts at SBS to buy 6,536,300 and sell 4,973,800
shares of DHT, accounting for 84.4 and 64.2 percent, respectively, of the total DHT shares
traded on the market. On 20 August 2010, four of DHT’s shareholders, who were related
to DVD, registered to sell about two million shares, accounting for nearly 47 percent of
DHT. This led to considerable fluctuations in DHT stock prices. In June 2010 when Mr.
Dung and his associates started to purchase DHT shares, the stock price was under VND
40,000 per share; yet it soared to over VND 100,000 in August 2010 (Vneconomy 2010).
Although Le Minh Truyen, who managed 11 of Mr. Dung’s accounts at SBS, knew about
this scheme, he assisted Mr. Dung in choosing the best times to trade, urging him to sell
DHT shares during the time that trading volume was low so that Mr. Dung could
repurchase the shares in the same trading session. The Supreme People's Procuracy
prosecuted four defendants for stock price manipulation: Le Van Dung; Le Minh Truyen;
Le Van Manh, Mr. Dung’s younger brother; and Nguyen Van Viet, Mr. Dung’s brotherin-law.
4.3.3 Other offences
Fassin and Derrick (2011) and McManus (2018) posit that CEO hubris arising when
executives experience a series of successes and achievements may lead to moral hazards
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and trigger unethical behaviour, as the decision-makers may ignore external factors that
would ordinarily drive moral awareness. Managerial hubris at DVD due to the remarkable
success of its IPO and business might have impaired executives’ moral awareness and
resulted in ethical failure at DVD. As DVD’s executives believed they were exceptional
relative to their peers and not subject to standard societal conventions. They made
unethical and illegal decisions such as the misstatement in its SEO prospectus and
violation of the regulation on tender offers.
4.3.3.1 Misstatement in SEO prospectus
To facilitate its SEO, DVD defrauded public shareholders and other stakeholders. This
twice resulted in the suspension of DVD’s SEO by the SSC – in September and November
2010 – due to falsified information disclosure in its prospectus. The first dishonest and
misleading information release involved DVD’s strategic partner, Yvery France
Pharmaceutical JSC. In DVD’s SEO prospectus, Yvery France was portrayed as a French
company specialising in researching biologically active substances and technological
processes in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and functional foods. The
strategic cooperation between DVD and Yvery was documented to provide DVD with
not only access to modern technology from France and other developed countries but also
opportunities to expand its business into European markets.
Investigators revealed that the published information about Yvery France was not
verified, was biased, and significantly affected investors’ decisions (Ha 2010). According
to VietnamCredit Group, Yvery’s representative was Nguyen Van Viet, who was a
member of DVD’s BoD and Mr. Dung’s brother-in-law. In the prospectus, DVD stated
that the cooperation between DVD and Yvery had started in 2007 when they built the Lili
of France Joint Venture factory at a cost of $24 million. However, the company was
established in March 2010 and was located in Hanoi, Vietnam.
The second misleading disclosure was related to the purpose of using the funds raised in
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the SEO. According to the information specified in the SEO propectus, funds raised in
the SEO would be used for two purposes: providing the remaining capital required to
complete the construction of the Lili of France factory, and improving R&D activities
and the company’s brand name. However, DVD used the funds raised for fraudulent or
inappropriate purposes (Ha 2010). Thus, the SSC rejected the result of the offering and
requested DVD to stop using the proceeds from the offering and to refund the investors
if required.
4.3.3.2 Violation of the regulation on tender offers
The BoDs authorised Le Van Dung to purchase 25 percent of DHT’s total share capital
from 21 June to 31 August 2010. However, as of 21 June, Mr. Dung had already acquired
19.18 percent of DHT’s total shares. On 28 June, DVD disclosed that it owned more than
one million DHT shares, equivalent to 24.71 percent of DHT’s charter capital. Notably,
Mr. Dung and his assistant, Nguyen Van Tuan, purchased DHT’s shares starting at the
beginning of June 2010, then sold these shares to DVD in the form of purchase
agreements. From June to October 2010, there were numerous DHT stock-trading
transactions related to Mr. Dung and his related persons, including his wife, brother, and
assistant. In an attempt to discourage the hostile takeover, DHT proposed plans to
repurchase their shares and issue additional shares; however, these plans were rejected by
DVD and its related persons, who became DHT’s major shareholders. As of July 2010,
DVD and its related parties owned over 60 percent of DHT’s total share capital (Minh
Quang 2010). Under Article 32 of the Law on Securities 2006, a person, business, or
group wanting to acquire more than 25 percent of outstanding shares of a public company
shall make a tender offer and send their public-offer registrations to the State Securities
Commission. Within seven days of receiving the registration, the SSC shall decide and
reply in writing. However, Mr. Dung and his associates failed to disclose the trading
information and make a tender offer in accordance with the Law on Securities 2006.
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Therefore, in November 2011 the SSC imposed a fine of VND 50 million on DVD for
violating the regulation on tender offers for DHT (Vneconomy 2010).
4.4 Main causes of the scandal
4.4.1 Internal corporate governance issues
While the DVD scandal attracted public attention, little is known about the company’s
core problems. This study suggests that DVD’s collapse was induced by issues with its
ethical framework and corporate governance practices. Five ethical and governance
issues stand out.
4.4.1.1 CEO duality – excessive concentration of power
Eisenhardt (1989); Jensen (1993) assert that combining the roles of CEO with those of
the chairperson may give more power to the CEO-chairperson, but that this corrodes
board effectiveness in monitoring managerial opportunism and compromises board
independence. Fama and Jensen (1983) hold the view that unified leadership may escalate
agency costs and entrenchment risks. Bredart (2014) argues that a board, the task of which
is to oversee the managers’ performance, tends to be led by a CEO-Chairperson, resulting
in a deterioration of the board’s monitoring function and restraining the firm’s adaptive
abilities in response to crises. Consistent with this argument, the literature suggests that
CEO duality is likely to increase the risk of bankruptcy (Daily & Dalton 1994a; Darrat et
al. 2016; Hambrick & D'Aveni 1992). These studies demonstrate that CEO duality
instigates more opportunistic behaviour on the part of the CEO-chairperson and leads to
less control of the board, and, consequently a higher probability of failure.
Le Van Dung, one of the original founders of DVD, became the CEO-Chairman of the
firm from 2004. Figure 4.1 illustrates DVD’s organisational structure as of June 2010.
Power was excessively concentrated in the hands of DVD’s leader from its establishment
until the day he was arrested. Mr. Dung played a pivotal role in shaping the firm and
oversaw its day-to-day operations as well as its long-term strategies. He completely
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controlled the firm’s key decisions, with the full agreement of the senior management
team. A VNDirect analyst report by Hong (2010) acknowledged the paramount
significance of Mr. Dung’s power, indicating that the business risk for DVD hinged upon
Mr. Dung’s personal risk preference.

Figure 4.1 DVD’s organisational structure as of June 2010
Source: Data are extracted from DVD’s prospectus.
4.4.1.2 Ownership concentration
The literature suggests that agency conflicts between controlling and minority
shareholders will allow expropriation by controlling shareholders (Liu, Q et al. 2015;
Nguyen et al. 2015b). In emerging financial markets, where there tends to be little
protection for minority shareholders, agency conflicts between controlling and minority
shareholders are relatively high. Thus, ownership concentration may lead to a situation
where large shareholders exercise their control rights and gain self-interest at the expense
of minority shareholders (Liu, Q et al. 2015). The so-called expropriation effect can
mitigate the benefits of concentrated ownership, resulting in a higher risk of default. Some
studies have found a positive correlation between ownership concentration and firm
failure (Berger et al. 2016; Darrat et al. 2016).
As stated by the IFC (2010), Nguyen et al. (2017) and Robinett et al. (2013), Vietnamese
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listed companies usually have a controlling shareholder and one or more major
blockholders, who own at least five percent of the total shares with voting rights. Most of
the controlling shareholders tend to assign their immediate family members to the board
of directors and the key management positions. Similar to the common practice in
Vietnam, DVD had concentrated ownership. Of the 11,910,000 shares outstanding,
DVD’s CEO-Chairman, Le Van Dung, held more than 34 percent; Bank Invest, a strategic
foreign institutional investor, owned more than 30 percent; ABBank, a major creditor of
DVD, owned approximately 8 percent; and the other two companies, DTEC and Medi
Medical Investment JSC, which were investigated to be related to Le Van Dung, held
over 10 percent each. Not only did he own the largest number of DVD shares and serve
as the CEO-Chairman, Mr. Dung appointed family members and people with conflicts of
interest to the BoD so that he could manipulate financial reports and stock prices to benefit
himself at the expense of minority shareholders and other stakeholders.
4.4.1.3 A board of directors with conflicts of interest
Agency theorists hold the view that outside directors are an essential internal governance
mechanism to ensure the competence of the board. Outside directors are more likely to
be effective than inside directors in preventing managers from self-interested behaviour
at the expense of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976) because of the reputation costs
that they bear and their desire to attain additional directorships (Fama 1980; Fama &
Jensen 1983). Moreover, Coffey and Wang (1998) suggest that independent directors,
who do not manage the day-to-day activities of firms and have a less financial interest in
them, may offer more-objective suggestions. Davidson et al. (2005) and Klein (2002)
document that board independence increases the effectiveness of monitoring a firm’s
financial-accounting process. Klapper and Love (2004) believe that the role of the board
matters even more in countries with weaker investor protection systems in place.
59

Nguyen et al. (2017) show that in Vietnam, the dominance of ownership concentration in
Vietnam may impede the monitoring functions of outside directors, as controlling
shareholders might select directors who are less likely to monitor and are more likely to
make decisions supporting the controlling shareholders’ interests (Yeh & Woidtke 2005).
As a consequence, there is a risk of collusion between controlling shareholders and
outside directors to exploit minority shareholders, resulting in a negative association with
firm performance and valuation (Lin et al. 2010; Nguyen et al. 2017).
Before March 2010, DVD had seven directors on the board. On 22 March 2010, DVD
appointed Hans Christian Jacobsen, a representative of Bank Invest (a strategic investor)
to be a board member. Table 4.1 shows the list of members of DVD’s BoD and their other
roles or connections with the firm as of June 2010.
Table 4.1 DVD’s BoD and their connections with DVD as of June 2010
Full aname

Role in BoD

Other roles and connections
with DVD

Le Van Dung

Chairperson

CEO (General Director)

Nguyen Thi Thanh Hue

Member

Deputy General Director; Mr.
Dung’s wife

Dao Xuan Huong

Member

CEO of Lili of France JVC

Nguyen Quoc Hai

Member

Deputy General Director

Cao Hong Van

Member

Chief Accountant

Nguyen Van Viet

Member

Staff at DVD; Mr. Dung’s
brother-in-law

Nguyen Hung Manh

Member

Representative of ABBank in
DVD

Hans Christian Jacobsen

Member

Representative of Bank Invest
in DVD

Source: DVD’s SEO prospectus
It can be seen that there is a lack of independence of the DVD’s board of directors. All
the board members had substantive relationships with DVD directly or indirectly as
60

representatives of controlling shareholders, an officer of its subsidiary, and family
members. Similar to the Enron case in which company officials had close ties with the
partnerships of Enron and breached ethical boundaries for personal gain (Sims &
Brinkmann 2003), these relationships in DVD had constrained the implementation of
independent judgment in fulfilling the responsibilities of directors.
4.4.1.4 An ornamental supervisory board
Under the Law on Enterprises (LoE), a supervisory board shall include from three to five
members. The LoE 2005 requires that the SB must have at least one member who is an
accountant or auditor12. The LoE 2014 imposes stricter requirements on the qualification
of SB members: the head of the SB must be an accountant or a professional auditor and
must work full-time at the company, unless the company Charter specifies a higher
standard13. Under the LoE, the SB is expected to play an important role in overseeing the
BoD and CEO, and proposing measures to improve the management of the company.
However, according to a survey by the IFC (2006), there are several possible reasons that
the SB may not be effective in Vietnam. First, members of the SB are not satisfactorily
competent to perform their job efficiently, at least in part because may not be provided
efficient information for their decision-making. Second, the BoD does not allow the SB
to function properly. There is a threat of being removed by the powerful BoD, which may
impede the functions of the SB. The BoD might also select members of SB who are less
likely to monitor them and more likely to make decisions supporting their interests.
Furthermore, members of SB are middle-ranking employees of the firm and depend on
their employers for their living; the lack of sufficient authority may also prevent them
from blowing the whistle or challenging any wrongdoings of the BoD or top managers.

12
13

See Article 121 of the LoE 2005.
See Article 163 of the LoE 2014.
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In addition, in many companies, the BoD and the controlling shareholders assign their
related persons, including relatives or friends, to the SB, which theoretically does not
violate the requirements of the law. However, it makes it more difficult for the SB to meet
its obligations independently. In accordance with the LoE 2005, DVD’s BS included three
members. Table 4.2 lists these members and their education and working experience as
of June 2010.
Table 4.2 DVD’s SB and their education and experience as of June 2010
Full name

Role

in Education

Working experience

SB
Nguyen Thi Head

BA

Language

Chinh

Certificate

of

Pedagogy; 1996-2001: Worked as a
Accountant language teacher in Phu Tho;

Training; Certificate of Chief 2002-2009: Worked at DVD;
Accountant Training granted 2007-: Head of DVD’s SB.
by

National

Economics

University of Vietnam
Pham

Thi Member

BA Law

2001-2003: Office staff at

Lieu

Thai Duong Law Consulting
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Xuan Law Office;
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2007-: Member of DVD’s SB

Trinh Quoc Member
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2001-2009:

Vinh

Medical

representative, then ASM, at
the Ethical Drugs division of
DVD;
03/2009-: Manager in charge
of strategic partners of DVD;
2007-: Member of DVD’s SB.
Source: DVD’s SEO prospectus

As of 2010, DVD had to comply with the LoE 2005 and Decision No. 12/2007/QD-BTC.
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Under this law, at least one member DVD’s SB was required to be an accountant or
auditor. However, the three members of its SB had qualification and experience in
pedagogy, law, and pharmacy, respectively. The head of the SB obtained two certificates
related to accountancy granted by National Economics University. Her previous
experience before joining DVD was largely irrelevant to her role in the SB. The other two
members of the SB were middle-ranking employees of the firm and had no experience in
accounting and auditing. They all joined DVD during its early formation and had sat on
the SB since 2007. It is questionable whether DVD’s SB was established with the sole
purpose of meeting the requirements of the law that a public company with more than 11
shareholders must have a SB. In fact, they failed to prevent conflicts of interest. They
could not detect and challenge any mismanagement by the CEO-Chairman and his related
persons. In the worst-case scenario, their independence might have been compromised by
financial ties between them and the company.
4.4.1.5 Lack of corporate transparency
The literature finds that the higher level of corporate transparency (through better
information disclosure and timely reporting) can reduce information asymmetries
between corporate insiders and outsiders (Amstrong et al. 2016; Lang & Lundholm 1996).
Any limitation on information transfer may impede even endowed board members’
ability to perform their advising and monitoring functions.
In the absence of reliable and timely information, outside directors, shareholders, and
other stakeholders, especially regulators, cannot take prompt action to facilitate the
monitoring of management (Amstrong et al. 2016). Lang and Lundholm (1996) document
that greater information disclosure can result in more accurate analysts’ earnings
forecasts, increased investor following, and lower cost of capital. Similarly, Bhat et al.
(2006) provide evidence that after controlling for financial disclosure and other variables,
better governance-related disclosure can lead to more accurate forecasts from analysts.
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Governance transparency becomes more critical in providing a favourable information
environment for public investors when financial-disclosure regimes are more opaque, and
legal enforcement is not strong. Mohd et al. (2008) suggest that although improved
reporting practices may not entirely eradicate firm failure, they could provide useful “red
flags” to stakeholders, particularly regulators.
DVD continually violated the regulations on disclosure of information on the securities
market. First, DVD failed to disclose a series of financial and corporate governance
reports, including the 2010 annual report, the 2010 audited parent and consolidated
financial statements, the fourth-quarter 2010 consolidated financial statements, the firstquarter 2011 parent and consolidated financial statements, and the fourth-quarter 2010
and first-quarter 2011 corporate governance reports. This resulted in HOSE issuing
Official

Letter

No.

1182/2011/SGDHCM-NY

and

Official

Letter

No.

1560/2011/SGDHCM-NY in June and August, respectively, as a formal warning to DVD.
Another critical ethical issue in the DVD case concerns the withholding of important
information. This ethical violation was exposed when HOSE received a document from
ANZ in August 2011 indicating that it had filed a creditor's petition in May 2011. This
material information was required to have been disclosed within 72 hours. However,
DVD withheld this information from the public, and investors obtained the information
only when it was published by HOSE. The lack of corporate transparency and the inability
to provide complete, timely, and accurate information under Article 2 of Circular No
51/2004/TT-BTC on the disclosure of information on the securities market should have
been a strong signal for investors and other stakeholders, especially the regulators, to pay
more attention to the firm’s credibility and financial health.
4.4.2 Weak external corporate governance controls
The literature suggests that shareholders can depend on at least two broad schemes to
safeguard their investments and ensure a reasonable return: external and internal
64

governance mechanisms (Heugens et al. 2009; Nguyen et al. 2015b; Pham et al. 2011).
Heugens et al. (2009) demonstrate that in a well-developed legal system, external
governance mechanisms effectively protect shareholders from being exploited by
managers. This case study on the collapse of DVD found that, in addition to internal
corporate governance flaws, the system of watchdogs and regulations failed entirely.
Auditors, stock analysts, the State Securities Commission, and the court clearly did not
fulfil their crucial roles as they should have.
4.4.2.1 External auditors
Most of the blame has lain with the company’s auditors, who failed to detect DVD’s
problems. Ernst & Young Vietnam (EY Vietnam) was the audit firm for DVD in 2007
and 2009. They also audited the SEO prospectus and reviewed the interim financial
statements of DVD as at 30 June 2010. DVD’s 2008 financial statements were audited by
Auditing and Consulting Co., Ltd. (A&C). EY Vietnam had developed a very good
reputation in Vietnam since the early 1990s. It was the first international auditing and
advisory organisation with 100 percent foreign ownership in Vietnam. Meanwhile, A&C,
which was established in 1992, has been one of the leading independent auditing firms in
Vietnam. Moreover, A&C was the first firm under the control of the Ministry of Finance
and an official member of HLB International, a worldwide accounting firm. These two
auditing companies were highly regarded throughout their history. The 2007, 2008, and
2009 financial statements and the interim financial statements for the six-month period
ended 30 June 2010 were cleared by both EY Vietnam and A&C. They failed to challenge
either any extraordinary figures or suspicious related-party transactions, and failed to
evaluate DVD’s financial position sufficiently. Only after DVD’s CEO-Chairman was
arrested for stock price manipulation and the company was under investigation did EY
Vietnam refuse to audit the 2010 financial statements. EY Vietnam and A&C were
inspected by the Accounting and Auditing Department under the Ministry of Finance and
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the Vietnam Association of Certified Public Accountants (VACPA) in October 2011 at
the request of the SSC. They claimed that full audit procedures were complied with
properly; however, forged documents are challenging to detect, and both auditing firms
denied any wrongdoing. While minority investors tend to rely on information provided
by the company and auditors, they may not be able to find the problem if the company
fabricates or manipulates financial information intentionally or the auditors fail.
In this case, auditors failed to detect the revenues that had been inflated by conducting
counterfeit related-party transactions. The DVD scandal led investors to perceive that
audited financial statements are not trustworthy. Although the two auditing firms were
cleared of any involvement in the scandal, they subsequently suffered a significant loss
of prestige.
4.4.2.2 Stock analysts
Soon after DVD’s IPO in December 2009, three analyst firms issued “buy”
recommendations for DVD. A TVSI report assessed DVD as an outstanding company
with sound financial results and exceptional profitability compared to other listed
pharmaceutical companies. They expressed optimism about the pharmaceutical
industry’s future, and especially DVD because of its apparently promising investment
strategies. Following an interview with the CEO-Chairman of DVD, VNDirect evaluated
DVD’s projected increase in revenues and net income of 30 percent in 2010 as being too
cautious and expected better results. Similarly, MHBS’s report on the pharmaceutical
industry made a positive appraisal of its considerable growth potential and suggested that
investors invest in financially healthy companies with stable growth rates, in particular
DHG and DVD. Vietcapital, a securities company, was the only firm to issue a “hold”
recommendation for DVD. Still, despite being aware of the potential risk associated with
DVD, they considered it as being extraordinary due to its apparent success in the industry.
In November 2010, even after the suspension of the SEO by the State Securities
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Commission and the disclosure of DVD’s many offences to the public, TS Securities
Company still recommended that investors purchase DVD shares at under VND 60,500.
However, they suggested that investors should be aware of the opaqueness of DVD’s
information disclosure and its high debts to make efficient investment decisions. In short,
no analyst firms notified investors about DVD’s problems clearly. Their analyses
completely misled many investors, including bank professionals. There was no evidence
that these firms had conflicts of interest or financial incentives to recommend DVD to
their clients. One possible explanation is that the analysts were not competent and diligent
enough to deliver a comprehensive analysis or lacked expertise to analyse the firm
properly. Thus, they failed to identify and act on the risks associated with DVD, resulting
in huge losses for investors.
4.4.2.3 The State Securities Commission
The SSC’s major responsibilities are to safeguard investors and maintain a fair and
efficient capital market. Since DVD’s bankruptcy was unprecedented in Vietnam, the
roles of the SSC became more significant to investors. However, the SSC has suffered
from substantial criticism for failing to protect minority shareholders. According to the
SSC, DVD’s misconduct started from its SEO in 2010. In April 2010, DVD sent the SSC
documents relating to the SEO, which had been approved by the Annual General Meeting
of Shareholders. However, on 6 September 2010, the SSC received an anonymous letter
about the misstatement of DVD’s SEO prospectus on its website.
After a preliminary investigation, the SSC discovered that the SEO prospectus posted on
the firm’s website was its IPO prospectus. Two days later, the SSC suspended DVD’s
public offering; however, more than VND 500 billion of its market capitalisation was lost
due to the technical adjustment of the DVD's share price from VND 144,000 to VND
100,000 on the ex-rights date by the HOSE. This was a tremendous loss to shareholders
who held DVD shares until the ex-rights date to exercise the rights. However, on 9
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September 2010, upon receipt of DVD’s explanation letter, the SSC approved the
continuation of DVD’s public offering. On 29 September 2010, the SSC received another
anonymous letter about the forged signature in DVD’s offering profile and misleading
information in its prospectus. As a result, the SSC sent an official letter requesting that
Hanoi City Police coordinate the investigation. On 15 November 2010, the Hanoi City
Police informed the SSC about evidence of the potential forgery of the SEO prospectus.
The SSC conducted the inspection and halted the issuance on 9 November 2010.
However, investors blamed the SSC for not acting decisively and not stopping the SEO
upon receipt of the investigation results. The SSC’s representative explained that DVD’s
financial statements were audited by the renowned E&Y Vietnam and A&C, and that
DVD would need to take full responsibility for the disclosed information; therefore, the
SSC did not discontinue the SEO (Duong 2011). Only on 19 January 2011, after the
infamous arrests of DVD’s leaders, was the SEO officially cancelled.
The consequences were severe. DVD share prices dropped sharply, the firm was put under
supervision, and its shares were allowed to be traded only for the last 15 minutes of the
trading session. Although DVD announced a refund of VND 20,000 per share to
investors, who had deposited money to purchase shares in the SEO, they failed to fulfil
their obligations. Although the SSC encouraged investors to file a lawsuit against DVD,
it seemed that investors had little or no confidence in regulators to fix the problems, or
there was a lack of guidance to investors on how to protect their interests. Thus, no
investors sued the company for its fraud.
4.4.2.4 The court
Although the Bankruptcy Law was first introduced in 1994 and amended in 2004 and
2014, bankruptcy cases are still rare in Vietnam. Under Article 23 of the Bankruptcy Law
2004, if the applicant is not the owner or lawful representative of the company that falls
into the state of bankruptcy, the court shall inform the company within five days from the
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receipt of a bankruptcy-filing petition. Within 15 days of the notification, the company
must provide related documents to the court. Under Article 28, the court shall decide to
open the bankruptcy procedures or not within 30 days from the receipt of the application.
Notably, under Article 29, within seven days as from the date of finalising the decision
on opening bankruptcy procedures, the court’s decision shall be sent to the company, the
procuracies of the same level, and the company’s creditors and debtors, and be published
in local newspapers where the company’s headquarters are located, and in the central
daily newspapers for three consecutive issues. However, in the DVD case, it took the Ho
Chi Minh City court three months from the receipt of ANZ’s petition in May 2011 to
provide notification of the decision on opening the bankruptcy procedures in August
2011. Surprisingly, DVD’s shareholders and creditors and the public only knew about
ANZ’s petition against DVD when ANZ notified the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange about
the petition in August 2011. This has raised crucial questions regarding the
responsibilities of regulators in information disclosure, especially the Ho Chi Minh City
court, which was supposed to notify related parties about its decision within a specified
time. If the regulators had fulfilled their responsibilities, the losses to DVD’s shareholders
and the stock market would have been much less, and investors’ confidence in regulators
to protect their wealth might have been restored.
4.5 Red flags
This study of the DVD collapse reveals some warning signs that shareholders and other
stakeholders should have observed, among which the following are detailed more fully.
An excessive concentration of power in the hands of the CEO-Chairman
Le Van Dung had been the founder and CEO-Chairman of DVD since its establishment.
Analysts recognised his vital influence on the success or failure of the firm (Hong 2010).
During his leadership, he exercised complete control over the firm’s key strategies such
as the M&A with Savipharm and R&D enhancement. According to the Supreme People’s
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Prosecutor of Vietnam, he played the leading role in DVD and DHT stock price
manipulation. Two board members, as well as related persons such as his brother, who
was the chairman of Vien Dong International JSC, became his associates in crime.
Self-interested Top Leaders
Top leaders should maintain high ethical standards and act in the best interests of
shareholders. When the personal ambitions of the top management team are placed above
the interests of the corporation, this may lead to the potential misuse of power (Fassin &
Derrick 2011). DVD’s senior management team focused more on stock trading than on
the firm’s daily operations. They inflated the firm’s revenues and provided false and
misleading information, resulting in a rapid increase in DVD’s stock price from VND
74,000 in December 2009 to VND 150,000 in September 2010. Only a few days after the
IPO, the CEO-Chairman and a board member of DVD registered to buy 1.45 million
shares. In addition to trading DVD shares, the Chairman and other board members bought
an excessive amount of DHT shares. As of July 2010, DVD and its related parties owned
over 60 percent of DHT’s outstanding shares without following the regulation on tender
offers for DHT capital (Minh Quang 2010). The case of DVD echoes what happened at
Enron, where its top executives’ ambition and greed overshadowed their corporate and
personal lives, and they participated in scandalous activities that encouraged unethical
and illegal behaviour (Sims & Brinkmann 2003).
An abnormal increase in earnings compared to competitors and before new share
issues.
Many investors did not hesitate to put their money into DVD. One reason for that was
DVD was highly regarded by analysts and professional creditors and institutional
investors. Because of its impressive business figures and remarkable business expansion,
DVD could even attract funds from prestigious banks as well as domestic and foreign
institutional investors, including ABBank, Indovina Bank, HSBC, ANZ, Bank Invest, and
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Deutsch Bank AG London.
According to the audited financial statements by EY Vietnam and A&C, DVD’s revenue
in 2006 was approximately VND 29 billion. The figure increased 18-fold to VND 528
billion in 2007, then by 22 percent to VND 646 billion in 2008, and to VND 1,024 billion
in 2009; it then fell by 17 percent in 2010 according to the unaudited 2010 financial
statements. In comparison, the pharmaceutical industry as a whole had an average annual
revenue growth rate from 10 to 20 percent from 2006 to 2011 (Vnexpress 2012). Between
2006 and 2009, DVD’s net profit after tax increased by more than 486 times, rising from
VND 224 million in 2006 to VND 109 billion in 2009. Nonetheless, the figure dropped
by 33 percent to VND 72 billion in 2010. One key question that investors should have
raised is how DVD could achieve such extraordinary growth rates compared to its
competitors. Most notably, in 2009, when the firm launched its IPO on the Ho Chi Minh
Stock Exchange, the growth rate of net income was 325 percent, which was far ahead of
its rivals. Figure 4.2 depicts the growth rate of total assets, revenue, and net profit after
tax of various pharmaceutical companies in 2009.

Figure 4.2 Growth rate of total assets, revenue, and net profit after tax of
pharmaceutical companies in 2009
Source: Data are from MHB Securities (2010)
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While DVD’s abnormal earnings growth rate compared to its rivals are one of the findings
for DVD’s bankruptcy, it should be noted that this is not always a problem for firms that
perform well. Nevertheless, investors and other stakeholders should stay alert to the
possible issues arising from the oddity in firm performance in comparison to the industry
average. It would be worthwhile to examine the reliability of accounting information and
to detect the potential distortion of financial ratios in future research, which will help
investors avoid investing in stocks that are more likely to provide unreliable information
and have higher bankruptcy risk.
The extraordinary growth of accounts receivable, especially before new share issues
According to the audited 2009 financial statements, DVD’s short-term receivables
jumped by 233 percent from VND 111 billion in 2008 to VND 371 billion in 2009, while
its revenue increased at a much slower pace of 59 percent from VND 646 billion in 2008
to VND 1,024 billion in 2009. Notably, its advanced payments to suppliers increased
31.21 times from around VND 9.5 billion in 2008 to VND 304 billion in 2009.
Suspiciously, most of the advanced payments were paid to DVD’s subsidiary, Lili of
France JVC, and its then-controlling shareholder, DTEC. According to the unaudited
2010 financial statements, while DVD's revenue dropped by 17 percent in 2010, its shortterm receivables jumped by 159 percent to VND 961 billion, of which more than VND
613 billion was paid in advance to Lili of France JVC and its controlling shareholder,
Medi Medical Investment JSC. DVD also recorded VND 143 billion as receivables from
customers in 2010, which showed an increase of 304 percent from 2009 to 2010.
However, the company did not provide details in the notes to the financial statements.
The extreme violation of information disclosure by the firm
DVD did not disclose a series of financial reports and corporate governance reports in
spite of the issuance of the Official Letter No. 1182/2011/SGDHCM-NY and Official
Letter No. 1560/2011/SGDHCM-NY in June and August by HOSE as a formal warning.
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Moreover, DVD did not publish the information related to the creditor’s petition filed by
ANZ in May 2011. The inability to disclose the required information on a timely basis
might have posed a critical question about the reasons why the firm failed to fulfil its
duty. In this case, investors should have identified whether the violation was because the
firm was financially distressed or due to other acceptable reasons.
Share sell-offs of institutional investors
From the third quarter of 2010, domestic institutional investors started to sell DVD shares.
ABBank, the largest creditor and a blockholder whose representative held one seat on the
BoD of DVD, sold half of their shares, reducing their share ownership from 7.98 percent
to 3.99 percent. Medi Medical Investment JSC, whose chairman was Do Minh Hien, a
related person to DVD, sold approximately 900,000 shares, reducing the share ownership
from 12.03 percent to 3.27 percent. In total, these two domestic institutional investors
sold more than 1.3 million shares of DVD. In early 2011, the stock market recorded a
series of divestments by major shareholders in DVD. In February, ABBank sold off all
its shares in DVD. Of DVD’s foreign institutional investors, Deustch Bank AG London
initiated to dump their shares. Then, Bank Invest sold all 1.6 million shares in March
2011. Notably, Bank Invest lost over VND 200 billion from its investment in DVD (Hai
2011). While insiders sold their shares, allegedly based on publicly undisclosed
information, most traditional shareholders retained their stakes but endured huge losses.
Due to information asymmetry and loyalty to the company, some even accumulated
shares in the hope of a future increase. The run on the company should have raised a
fundamental question to shareholders as to why financially strong organisations fled the
company at all costs.
Turnover in the top management team
The year 2010 witnessed many changes in DVD’s top management team, including two
CEO turnovers, one Deputy General Director turnover, and three director turnovers. In
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February 2010, DVD dismissed Dang Viet Hung, the Deputy General Director in charge
of R&D. Before the arrest of Le Van Dung in November 2010, DVD appointed Tran
Thanh Hoa to the position of Chairperson, the representative of ABBank in DVD and the
position of CEO to Dao Xuan Huong, a board member of DVD who was also CEO of
Lili of France JVC. Following the arrests of Le Van Dung and his related persons, DVD
continuously replaced its leaders. Conspicuously, in February 2011, the CEO and
Chairman both resigned from their positions at DVD. Most notably, after selling off all
his DVD shares in March 2011, Hans Christian Jacobsen, the representative of Bank
Invest in DVD, also resigned as a DVD board member. Investors should have questioned
why the strategic institutional investor and firm’s leaders decided to leave the company.
4.6 Lessons
The use of big names cannot guarantee top quality
DVD’s audit firms were EY Vietnam and A&C, which continue to be highly respected
in Vietnam. SSC admitted that the fact that DVD’s financial statements had been audited
by these firms as one of the reasons why they hesitated to cancel its SEO (Duong 2011).
The company was also funded by prestigious names on the capital market, including
ABBank, Indovina Bank, HSBC, ANZ, Bank Invest, and Deutsch Bank AG London.
DVD was praised by many analyst firms. Most of them issued “buy” recommendations
for DVD. These prominent names were a way of certifying DVD’s activities to investors.
Investors were in no position to second-guess the responsibilities of these gatekeepers
and depended on their reputation.
The potential problem of the top management team committing criminal offences
Investors should not ignore the risks when a firm’s top leaders have previously committed
criminal offences. The arrests of DVD’s CEO-Chairman and other top leaders for stock
price manipulation should have raised crucial questions for investors and regulators.
Firms managed by leaders who put their own financial needs above the demands of ethical
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issues must attract the attention of public investors and other stakeholders, especially
government regulators.
The risks of deficiencies in corporate governance structures
Investors and other stakeholders should not only pay attention to any financial
information that is likely to be window-dressed through earnings management (Dechow
& Skinner 2000; Lee & Yeh 2004), but also to “qualitative” information, especially
regarding

corporate

governance.

Inappropriate

internal

corporate

governance

mechanisms may reduce the effectiveness of the board in monitoring and advising
management, and of the incentives and power of management to act in the best interests
of the shareholders and to increase the firm’s value (Daily & Dalton 1994a, 1994b; Jensen
1993). In contrast, good corporate governance mechanisms can help firms align the
interests of related parties, resulting in higher firm performance and lower probability of
financial distress. The risks associated with inefficient corporate governance may be
enormous and linked with the likelihood of a firm’s financial distress (Daily & Dalton
1994a; Lee & Yeh 2004; Liang et al. 2016; Lin et al. 2010).
The hazards of inefficient regulation
Although ANZ filed a creditor’s petition with the Ho Chi Minh City court against DVD
in May 2011 and the court granted an administration order in August 2011, the authorities
in charge of the stock market were not notified about the incident. This reveals the
regulatory loopholes that exist in the coordination of information disclosure to the public
and calls for ensuring that all the relevant regulators collaborate and safeguard investors
more effectively.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter examines a single case study – the failure of DVD – which marked the first
bankruptcy on the Vietnam stock market since its establishment in 2000. Before its
collapse, DVD was the national leader in technology transfer in the pharmaceutical
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industry. The sudden fall of DVD in 2011 was a combination of unpredictable and
unusual events, including accounting manipulation, stock price manipulation, and a series
of violations of law and regulations. Weak internal and external corporate governance
practices were blamed for assisting DVD management in painting a “rosy” picture that in
effect deceived its stakeholders. The lack of corporate transparency and inability to
provide complete, timely, and accurate information showed significant information
asymmetry between DVD’s top management and its minority shareholders. Thus,
information ambiguity facilitated its insiders’ expropriation of minority shareholders.
DVD’s bankruptcy provides rich data for the study of companies from ethical and
governance perspectives and teaches various stakeholder groups bitter but valuable
lessons. First, “big names” may be used to create a sense of security and to certify a firm’s
business activities to investors, but this is no real guarantee of the firm’s integrity and
potential profitability. Investors should not ignore the risks when a firm’s executive
leadership has previously committed criminal offences. It is relatively unlikely that a
firm’s leaders who have been caught putting financial benefits above their legal and
ethical responsibilities might not now begin to act strictly in the best interests of the
shareholders. Any indication of inappropriate internal corporate governance mechanisms
should be expected to reduce the effectiveness of the board in monitoring and advising
the management and takes away from the incentives for and ability of management to act
in the best interests of the shareholders and to increase the firm value (Daily & Dalton
1994a, 1994b; Jensen 1993). This study lends support to the findings of Fassin and
Derrick (2011, p. 187), who found when analysing the collapse of Fortis in the financial
crisis that “a failure of corporate governance and ethics may lead to a strategic derailment
with fatal consequences”. This research also supports their statement that being ethical
does not necessarily prevent the company from going bankrupt; however, an ethical
mindset is needed to reduce the risk.
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This bankruptcy case has set a new path in Vietnam. Loss-making enterprises and those
that fail to fulfil their debt obligations and satisfy the Vietnamese government’s
requirements for corporate governance now face increased risks of being filed a creditor’s
petition. The DVD governance failure, like that of Enron, should be seen as an
opportunity to justify changes to institutional, legal, and corporate governance practices,
including the regulation of auditors that might otherwise seem unnecessary and
unjustifiable.
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5. CHAPTER 5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE RISK OF
INVOLUNTARY DELISTING
5.1 Introduction
Delistings have been classified into two major categories, involuntary and voluntary
delistings14, depending on who is the initiator of the delisting (Macey et al. 2008). While
the effect of voluntary delisting on shareholder wealth is inconclusive despite the
expectation to add value to the firm (Martinez & Serve 2017), involuntary delisting has
been well-documented to be detrimental for firms and their shareholders (Macey et al.
2008; Shumway & Warther 1999). Once the firm is forced out of the exchange, the
shareholders are prone to face double-hit devastation: severe liquidity problems and a
sharp drop in share value (Macey et al. 2008). Also, creditors may call in loans and
withhold new funding, the firm’s credit rating might be downgraded, and the cost of
borrowing may increase substantially. The delisting event concerns regulators as well. A
series of compulsory removal of listed firms from trading on a stock exchange may raise
questions about the quality of other listed firms, and drive away potential investors out of
the stock market. Despite the severe consequences of delisting, little is known about the
forces driving involuntary delisting. That is, what causes firms being removed from the
stock exchange while others still survive, given their financial performance and size being
controlled?
Prior research has questioned about the deficiency of corporate governance as a critical
determinant of firms’ delisting; however, the empirical results are scant and remain
inconclusive. For instance, Charitou et al. (2007) find that firms with more efficient board

14

In general, in an involuntary delisting, the firm is forced out of the exchange by the stock market
authorities mainly because of poor performance and regulation breaches. On the contrary, in a
voluntary delisting, a firm initiates its delisting as a consequence of a merger, a voluntary
restructure, and a decision to go private.
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structure and higher insider ownership reduce the risk of involuntary delisting from the
New York Stock Exchange. Chancharat et al. (2012) claim that the relationship between
board independence and the probability of firm survival exhibits an inverted U-shaped
pattern on Australian initial public offering firms. Mangena and Chamisa (2008) examine
the incidences of delisting in South Africa and provide evidence that firms with a higher
proportion of non-executive directors and an audit committee, and less block-share
ownership reduce the risk of delisting from the stock exchange. Yet, there is no systematic
relationship framed between the risk of delisting and corporate governance quality.
Therefore, this study investigates whether the overall corporate governance quality
reduces the risk of involuntary delisting, especially for the Vietnamese market.
The motivation is three-fold. First, the forced delistings of high-profile firms in Vietnam,
such as Bach Tuyet Cotton JSC and Vien Dong Pharmaceutical JSC, were attributed to
fundamentally poor corporate governance practices. For instance, in 2011, Vien Dong
Pharmaceutical JSC, which was one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in Vietnam
and was financially stable, was forced out of the exchange for violating information
disclosure requirements. Its failure was associated with deficiencies in its corporate
governance structure, for example, the excessive concentration of power in the hands of
top leaders, inefficient board structure and supervisory board (Luu 2011; Man 2014).
These corporate delistings strongly inspired the desire to study the link between corporate
governance and delisting likelihood in Vietnam.
Second, the institutional setting in Vietnam is characterised by weak law enforcement and
the lack of minority shareholder protection schemes (Hoang et al. 2016a; Kabir & Thai
2017). This is despite the fact that delisted firms are required to register on the Unlisted
Public Company Market (UPCoM) to ensure the liquidity and transparency of delisted
shares. However, many of them fail to meet the UPCoM’s self-imposed continuing
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trading criteria. As a result, they are traded over-the-counter (OTC) with minimal
regulation, limited accessible public information, and a higher possibility of fraud. For
instance, within less than a month trading on UPCoM, Tay Bac Minerals Investment JSC.
(KTB) and Phu Thinh Metallurgy JSC. (PTK) were suspended by the Hanoi Stock
Exchange (HNX) for the sake of protecting shareholders’ interests (Vietstock 2016).
Since then, they have not disclosed any further information about their business. The lack
of post-delisting information disadvantages shareholders to follow up on their
investments, resulting in significant losses (Huong & Minh 2011). This study; therefore,
may be useful to investors and stock exchange regulators who are interested in
understanding the drivers and indicators of delisting risk in Vietnam.
Third, to the best knowledge of the author, despite the substantial costs of delisting, there
has been only one study by Nguyen and Dao (2017) that forecasts the risk of delisting in
Vietnam to date. Using the data of 246 delisted firms and 60 largest listed firms on the
Vietnamese stock exchange from 2009 to 2016, they find that the director education,
number of board meetings, state ownership, and foreign ownership are negatively related
to the risk of delisting. The findings, however, are subject to several limitations. First,
they do not take into account reverse causality issues, resulting in potentially biased
estimates (Ali et al. 2018; Wintoki et al. 2012). Additionally, the 60 largest listed
companies are included in their sample so the findings may not be generalised to small
and medium-sized companies. The study does not provide any out-of-sample forecasting
results, and consequently, the predictive accuracy of the model is still questionable.
Using the sample of 701 non-financial firms listed and 114 non-financial firms
involuntarily delisted from either the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) or the Hanoi
Stock Exchange (HNX) from 2008 to 2018, this study investigates the effect of corporate
governance efficiency on the risk of delisting using a Cox proportional hazards model
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and a logistic model. In this study, rather than examining isolated governance
mechanisms, 13 characteristics of governance structure are employed, taking into account
the codes of practice recommended by the corporate governance manual for Vietnam
(IFC 2010), and establish a corporate governance index for the Vietnamese firms. This
proxy measure facilitates the assessment of a firm’s governance structure as a whole and
provides a better insight into governance composition.
The following results are obtained. First, better-governed firms experience lower
probability of involuntary delisting. Second, empirical results show that the effect of
corporate governance on the risk of delisting is more pronounced in non-SOEs, firms
having high foreign ownership and less concentrated ownership, and high growth firms.
Two-stage least squares method (2SLS) is applied to deal with simultaneity and the
propensity score matching method (PSM) is employed to eliminate sample selection bias.
The overall results are robust to endogeneity testing and the use of “distance to default”
and credit default swap spread as alternative outcomes of deficient performance. The outof-sample forecasting result using receiver operating characteristic curves shows that
corporate governance information can add to the discriminatory power of the prediction
model.
This chapter contributes to the extant literature in three ways. First, this is the first study
that shows that a composite corporate governance index is statistically related to the risk
of delisting, and can, therefore, be used as a predictor. This index-based finding supports
the need to establish an inclusive code of corporate governance, which is especially
relevant to policy-makers and regulators. Second, the findings reveal the effect of
corporate governance on the risk of delisting can be greatest for non-SOEs and for firms
with more foreign ownership, less concentrated ownership, and higher growth
opportunities. Third, this study offers country-specific evidence about the connection
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between corporate governance quality and the risk of involuntary delisting in Vietnam, a
fast-growing economy characterised by high ownership concentration, intensive
government intervention, and low investor protection. Last but not least, this study adds
to the existing literature where the corporate governance index construction is
underdeveloped. It is the first study to provide a comprehensive composition to measure
the corporate governance quality in Vietnam. The index employs the available published
information that shareholders can easily find in the annual reports of firms to avoid data
unavailability. The construction of the index is the aggregation of binary variables which
is easy to be replicated by investors and other researchers.
This study extends the prior corporate governance literature in Vietnam, which is mainly
related to firm performance (Nguyen et al. 2017; Vo & Nguyen 2014) and the literature
on the risk of delisting in Vietnam which is under-examined. The remainder of the paper
is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes the hypothesis development. Section 5.3
explains the data and research design. Section 5.4 discusses the empirical results. Section
5.5 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Literature review and hypothesis development
Corporate governance mechanisms have been documented as affecting agency costs and
information costs (Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003). Agency costs are the costs related to the
situation when opportunistic managers do not fulfil their fiduciary duties to advance the
interests of the company and its shareholders; instead, they expropriate the shareholders’
wealth (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Meanwhile, information costs are the costs of
transferring critical information between insiders and outsiders. Managers tend to have
private information and privileged firm-specific experience in all aspects of firms’
business, whereas outsiders tend to be passive as they lack specific knowledge about the
firms. A severe moral hazard problem may arise from the information asymmetry
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between insiders and outsiders, as managers can act in their own interests and effectively
transfer the firm’s wealth to themselves at the expense of stakeholders. Prior research
finds that, by reducing agency costs and information costs, corporate governance quality
increases earnings quality (Hoang et al. 2016b), stock liquidity (Ali et al. 2017), firm
performance (Duchin et al. 2010), and the likelihood of firm survival (Chancharat et al.
2012). Chen et al. (2007) contend that a good corporate governance structure can grant
investors more protection as the management team will act in the best interests of the
shareholders under proper monitoring mechanisms. In addition, corporate governance can
further enhance firm outcomes if the advisory role of the board is augmented (Hoang et
al. 2016a). Therefore, while constructing a corporate governance index, this study focuses
on the monitoring and advising functions of the board of directors and supervisory board.
The corporate governance proxy in this study covers two dimensions of corporate
governance, namely, board composition and board diversity, which comprise 13
governance attributes. The attributes stem from the Corporate Governance Codes and
codes of practice recommended by the corporate governance manual for Vietnam (IFC
2010), and constitute a corporate governance index (CGI) for the Vietnamese firms.
While the well-known Gompers et al. (2003) governance index measures firms’ antitakeover mechanism, the governance index in this study emphasizes the internal
governance mechanism.
Since the market for corporate control is immature in Vietnam, this study does not
consider the threat of takeover as a corporate governance mechanism. The corporate
governance index in this study is rather closer to Brown and Caylor (2004) and the
Horwath/University of Newcastle corporate governance report (2002); however, due to
the differences among the institutional settings of the US, Australia, and Vietnam as well
as the data availability issues, the index has to disregard some aspects, such as progressive
83

practices, and include other features that are more relevant to the Vietnamese market,
such as the supervisory board. Although the supervisory board does not exist in developed
countries, such as the US, the UK, and Australia, it has been observed as one important
corporate governance mechanism in some countries in Europe and Asia, especially China.
Thus, the corporate governance index can be generalized to countries that have similar
governance structures to Vietnam. The next section reviews each corporate governance
attribute and demonstrates how it influences monitoring and advising functions of the
board, in an effort to formulate the main hypothesis.
5.2.1 Board composition
CEO duality is one of the key features of board composition, which has attracted much
attention from regulators and researchers. In Vietnam, Corporate Governance Codes
prevent the chairperson from serving as a CEO simultaneously unless it is approved by
the annual general meeting of shareholders (see article 10 of Decision 12 and Circular
21). Agency theorists claim that a unified leadership entitles CEO/chairperson to more
power, which impairs board effectiveness in monitoring managerial opportunism
(Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen 1993); thus, it increases agency costs and entrenchment risks
(Fama & Jensen 1983). Consistent with this argument, the extant literature indicates that
CEO duality has a positive correlation with bankruptcy risk (Daily & Dalton 1994a;
Darrat et al. 2016; Hambrick & D'Aveni 1992). The CEO duality indicator is set equal to
one, zero otherwise.
Another major aspect of board composition is board independence. Decision 12 and
Circular 121, Article 11 and Decree 71, Article 13 require approximately one-third of
people on the board of directors to be non-executive directors and also suggest that
members should not be executives in the firm if board independence is to be maintained.
Agency theorists and resource dependence theorists point out that outside directors are an
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essential internal governance mechanism to ensure the board’s effectiveness by
supervising managers’ self-interested behaviour and restraining managerial opportunism
(Fama 1980; Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976). Consistent with this
argument, Liu, Y et al. (2015) find that outside directors can effectively monitor firm
management by reducing inefficiencies caused by the Chinese government’s dominant
share ownership, thereby enhancing firms’ performance and shareholders’ wealth.
Similarly, Charitou et al. (2007) and Mangena and Chamisa (2008) contend that
businesses with more independent boards are less likely to be delisted. Coffey and Wang
(1998) suggest that non-executive directors, who do not manage the day-to-day activities
and have less financial interests on the firm, offer more objective suggestions. Nonexecutive directors’ indicator is set to one if the majority of board members are nonexecutive directors, zero otherwise. Non-executive chairperson’s indicator is equal to one
if the chairperson is not in the top management team, zero otherwise.
Board size, an essential attribute of the board structure, has drawn much attention from
regulators. In Vietnam, under Decision 12, the board of directors must have five to eleven
members (see Article 11). Agency theorists suggest that smaller boards are more efficient
because they are less likely to encounter coordination and communication problems.
Directors on a small board tend to be more involved and more efficient/effective in
decision-making, so they are more effective in monitoring the management team (Daily
& Dalton 1994a; Jensen 1993). Chen (2014) argues that timely and correct decisions are
more critical for firms’ survival when there are sudden changes in the business or industry
setting. Conversely, resource dependence theorists support a larger board size, as Hillman
et al. (2009) find that they bring more skills and other resources to the firm and Switzer
and Wang (2013) claim that it is harder for managers to control a relatively large board.
Previous research on the effect of board size on a firm’s failure shows inconsistent
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findings. Bredart (2014), Chaganti et al. (1985), Darrat et al. (2016) and Switzer and
Wang (2013) document a negative association between board size and firm failure, and
suggest that more board members offer a proper mix-of-skills and breadth of experience,
thus a broader range of possible solutions for a firm’s survival and growth. In contrast,
Yermack (1996) finds that a smaller board is associated with superior firm performance
and higher firm value. Chen et al. (2007), while building their corporate governance
index, suggest that a firm is well governed when the board size is larger than the minimum
legal requirement and smaller than two standard deviations from the mean value of the
board size. Following Chen et al. (2007), the board size indicator is set to equal to one if
it is well governed, zero otherwise.
The supervisory board is a distinctive feature of governance structure in Vietnam. The
functions of the supervisory board are similar to, but broader compared to, the audit
committee. According to Corporate Governance Codes, its functions are as follows:
recommending the general assembly of shareholders to approve for the independent
external auditors to audit the financial statements of the company; taking responsibility
towards shareholders for monitoring activities; overseeing the financial status of the
company, legitimacy of the board of directors’ actions and the top management team; and
coordination between the supervisory board and board of directors, CEO, and
shareholders. A supervisory board is required to have three to five members, and they
must not work in the accounting and finance departments of a firm. They should not be
members or employees of the independent auditing firm that audited the firm’s financial
statements over the last three years. Chen et al. (2006) document the positive influence
of the presence of the supervisory board on the company’s performance. While the
presence of an audit committee in a firm has been documented as diminishing the risk of
financial distress (Miglani et al. 2015) and the incidence of listing suspension (Mangena
& Chamisa 2008), similarly, the supervisory board is expected to play an essential role in
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overseeing the board of directors and CEO and proposing measures to improve the
management of the company. The supervisory board size indicator is set to one for firms
with a supervisory board size larger than the legal requirement (three members). The
supervisory board’s independence is equal to one if all supervisors are non-executives of
the company.
5.2.2 Board diversity
Board diversity has been documented to have significant impacts on firm outcomes
(Hoang et al. 2016a, 2016b). Decree 71 promotes board diversity and requires that a
balanced contribution must be made among board members in having knowledge and
experience in law, finance, and business operations of the company, and gender in their
structure (see Article 13). From the fiduciary perspective, board diversity can be effective
in establishing better monitoring and controlling mechanisms, consistent with agency
theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Meanwhile, from the advisory perspective, ﬁrms
depend on board members’ diversity for resources, including expertise, advice, reputation
and communication networks to enhance firm performance and the survival, as supported
by resource dependence theory (Hillman et al. 2000). In particular, Adams and Ferreira
(2009) suggest a substantial contribution of female directors towards firm outcomes. The
extant literature has shown the positive effects of female directors on firm performance
in China (Liu et al. 2014), in Asian firms (Low et al. 2015), and in Vietnam (Nguyen et
al. 2015a). Thus, the gender diversity indicator is equal to one if there is at least one
female on the board, zero otherwise.
Heijltjes et al. (2003) encourage the national diversity of top management teams in small
countries that are growing internationally. This is based on the conjecture that foreign
directors understand the international business environment better; thus, they can enhance
the decision-making of the board. Furthermore, they facilitate firms’ access to global
resources and provide firms with favourable business prospects. Cox and Stacy (1991)
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provide evidence of the competitive advantages of firms with nationally diverse directors
as those firms tend to attract more valuable human capital. Similarly, Milliken and
Martins (1996) find that the impact of national diversity on performance is positive in the
long-term. The national diversity indicator is set to one if there is at least one foreign
director on the board, zero otherwise.
Agrawal and Nasser (2018, 2019) document that the presence of blockholder directors15
on the board leads to better contracting and monitoring over managers, less risk, and
superior firm value. Retaining the monitoring power as a director and keeping the
ownership interest as a blockholder director helps to align the interests of managers with
those of shareholders. The blockholder director indicator is equal to one if there is at least
one blockholder on the board, zero otherwise.
Prior studies find that a high level of education and experience among directors
contributes to the success of the board in terms of adopting new ideas and accepting
innovations, and offering a broader view and solutions to complex problems (Milliken &
Martins 1996; Wally & Baum 1994), thus reducing the risk of delisting. The board
education and board experience indicators are equal to one if the majority of the board
members have a postgraduate degree and if there is at least one director having finance
and accounting experience on the board, respectively, zero otherwise.
The extant literature suggests that top official with little experience may not have an
adequate understanding of the firm, while the longer the tenure of the chairman, the better
the understanding of the firm, its rivals and industry (Chen et al. 2006; Cornett et al.
2008). Therefore, they can enhance the monitoring and advising roles of the board. The
chairman tenure indicator is equal to one for firms with chairperson tenure higher than
the sample's mean value, zero otherwise.

15

Blockholders are investors who own five percent or more of the outstanding equity.
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Finally, Corporate Governance Codes require supervisors who work in listed firms with
over 50 percent of charter capital held by the state must be auditors or accountants. The
head of the supervisory board must be a professional auditor or accountant working fulltime at the company. This is to ensure that supervisors are equipped with relevant
expertise to oversee the financial status of the company. The supervisor experience
indicator equal to one if at least one supervisor has finance and accounting experience,
zero otherwise. In summary, the 13 attributes under the category of board composition
and board diversity are recapitulated in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1. Description of the corporate governance index
Governance

Definition

Points allocated

categories
Panel A. Board composition
1. CEO duality

CEO also serves as the Equals one if there is no CEO duality,
chairperson of the board

zero otherwise

2. Non-

The percentage of non- Equals one if the majority of the board

executive

executive directors on the members are non-executive directors,

directors

board

3. Non-

Chairperson

executive

executive

zero otherwise
is

not

an Equals one if the chairperson is not in
the top management team, zero

chairperson

otherwise

4. Board size

The number of directors on Equals one for firms with board size
the board

larger than the legal requirement (five
members) and less than two standard
deviations from the mean value of
board size, zero otherwise

5. Supervisory

The number of supervisors Equals one for firms with board size

board size

on the board

larger than the legal requirement
(three members), zero otherwise.

6. Non-

The

number

of

non- Equals one if all supervisors are not

executive

executive directors on the executives of the company, zero
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supervisors

board

otherwise.

Panel B. Board diversity
7. Gender

The number of females on Equals one if there is at least one

diversity

the board

8. National

The number of foreign Equals one if there is at least one

diversity

directors on the board

female on the board, zero otherwise
foreign director on the board, zero
otherwise

9. Blockholder

The

number

of Equals one if there is at least one

directors

blockholders on the board

blockholder on the board, zero
otherwise

10. Board

The number of directors Equals one if the majority of the board

education

who have a postgraduate members have a postgraduate degree,
degree

zero otherwise

11. Board

The number of directors Equals one if there is at least one

experience

who have finance and director
accounting experience

having

finance

and

accounting experience on the board,
zero otherwise

12. Chairperson

The number of years that Equals one for firms with chairperson

tenure

the chairperson holds the tenure higher than the sample's mean
position

value, zero otherwise.

13. Supervisor

The number of supervisors Equal one if at least one supervisor

experience

having

finance

and has

accounting experience

finance

and

accounting

experience, zero otherwise.

5.2.3 Corporate governance index constitution
The corporate governance index (CGI) is the key independent variable in this study and
is constructed to measure the corporate governance quality of each firm in Vietnam. Prior
studies have constructed the corporate governance index including two US-based
measures, - Gompers et al. (2003) and Brown and Caylor (2004), Australia-based
Horwath/University of Newcastle corporate governance report (2002), Taiwan-based
Chen et al. (2007), and Japan-based Aman and Nguyen (2008). Each of the indexes is
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constructed based on the nation’s idiosyncratic institution of governance, and thus the
index composition is yet subjective. This study finds it challenging to replicate each index
due to the absence of information/instruction provided in their studies as well as the lack
of data availability. Often is the case that model specification is missing to assign the
value for each attribute, and the selection criteria are omitted in the prior studies.
Therefore, this study addresses the issues by following the guidance of Corporate
Governance Codes and the Corporate Governance Code of Best Practices for Vietnamese
public companies to identify which attribute is related to good corporate governance
practices in the Vietnamese market. Based on the above-mentioned 13 attributes, a
corporate governance index (CGI) have been established as a proxy of its quality. In the
absence of the standard rule of weighting in constructing the CGI, an equally weighted
scoring method that has been used in existing corporate governance literature (Ali et al.
2018; Aman & Nguyen 2008; Gompers et al. 2003) is applied. Each of 13 attributes is
allocated to have binary values, as described in the previous section. The values are
aggregated to construct a composite corporate governance index ranging from zero to 13.
In order to avoid biasing the index downward, this study follows Aman and Nguyen
(2008) and normalises the corporate governance index linearly between zero and 100
percent. For instance, if the aggregated value of the index is seven, the normalised index
will be 53.85 percent (seven out of thirteen). However, if there was one missing value in
the corporate governance index, the normalised index will be 58.33 percent (seven out of
twelve). The higher the index, the better the firm is expected to be governed. This study
argues that better corporate governance enhances monitoring and advising functions of
the board of directors, which in turn reduce agency costs and information asymmetry,
resulting in a lower probability of involuntary delisting. The hypothesis is as follows:
H1. Corporate governance quality, as proxied by the corporate governance index, has a
negative relationship with the risk of involuntary delisting.
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5.3 Data and research design
5.3.1 Data and sample selection
The sample for this study consists of non-financial firms listed on and involuntarily
delisted from either the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) or the Hanoi Stock
Exchange (HNX) from January 2008 to December 2019. The first corporate governance
regulation was enforced in 2007, and the majority of Vietnamese listed firms started to
disclose information on crucial aspects of corporate governance in their annual reports
from 2008. The first incident of delisting is in 2009, and this study requires previous year
data to estimate the risk of delisting for the regression models. The last delisting is for
2019; therefore, the data for the independent variables are obtained from 2008 to 2018,
and the analysis period in this study is from 2009 to 2019. Consistent with the extant
literature, 60 firms in the finance sector are excluded from the sample because of their
unique regulatory factors and business nature (Bauer et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2016). The
final sample comprises 6,335 firm-year observations on 815 non-financial firms.
Data are hand-collected and cross-checked through different sources, including the
websites for Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE), Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX),
Vietstock, and Cafef. Data will be provided upon request. All control variables are
winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles. The whole sample is split into two subsamples, the estimation and holdout samples. The estimation sample includes firm-year
observations between January 2008 and December 2015, and the holdout sample covers
from January 2016 to December 2018, which is used to generate out-of-sample forecasts.
Table 5.2 Sample selection
Sample selection
Listed firms
Number of listed firms on HOSE and HNX as of December
2018
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749

Less number of listed finance sector firms

48

Number of listed firms in the sample

701

Involuntarily delisted firms
Number of involuntary delisted firms on HOSE and HNX as

126

of December 2018
Less number of delisted finance sector firms

12

Number of delisted firms in the sample

114

This table presents the sample selection in the study. The initial sample includes 875 firms which are
divided into listed and delisted firms.

5.3.2 Research design
5.3.2.1 Model specification
This study uses a Cox proportional hazards model (1972) and a logistic model to estimate
the effect of corporate governance on the probability of delisting. The Cox proportional
hazards model is a dichotomous choice model which controls for both the occurrence and
the timing of events, and estimates the probability of the event at each point in time t over
the forecast period, given the “random nature of the lifetime” of a company (Kim &
Partington 2015, p. 137). Thus, the Cox proportional hazards model has been applied by
many researchers, such as Dhawan et al. (2020), Kim and Partington (2015), Li et al.
(2015), Parker et al. (2002), among others. According to Kim et al. (2016), the Cox
proportional hazards model outperforms other traditional models in bankruptcy
prediction and has inherent advantages when the form of the true hazard function is either
unknown or too complicated.
The Cox proportional hazards model is specified as follows:
ℎ (𝑡) = ℎ (𝑡)exp (∑

(1)

𝛽 𝑥 )

The hazard function ℎ (𝑡) for firm i at time t is the product of two factors:
(1) h0(t) is a baseline hazard function which is the hazard when the values of all
covariates are zero, and
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(2) exp(𝑥 𝛽) is an exponentiated linear function of covariates.
where 𝑥 is the value of the jth covariate for the firm i. and βj is the corresponding
coefficient for xj.
Also, this study uses a logistic model. The model specification is given as follows:
𝑙𝑜𝑔

=∑

(2)

𝛽 𝑥

By simple algebraic manipulation, the probability that the response variable Y=1 (the
event occurs) is:
𝑝=

(

∑

(3)

)

Where xij is a vector of jth predictors for firm i, βj is a vector of unknown parameters, and
p is the probability function, where 0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤1.
To examine the effect of corporate governance on the risk of delisting (H1), Equation (4)
and Equation (5) are specified as follows:
ℎ (𝑡) = ℎ (𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽 𝐶𝐺𝐼 ,

+ 𝛽

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 ,

)

(4)

and
𝑙𝑜𝑔

= 𝛽 𝐶𝐺𝐼 ,

+ 𝛽

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 ,

(5)

Where CGIi,t-1 is the corporate governance index, and Controlsi,t-1 are the value of control
variables for firm i at time t-1, respectively. This study uses one-year lagged firm
attributes as independent variables in the regression analysis to estimate the risk of
delisting in the following year. β1 is used to test the main hypothesis, which is expected
to be significantly negative.
Control variables include Govown (government ownership), Forown (foreign
ownership), Top5 (concentrated ownership), NI_TA (net income divided by total assets),
TL_TA (total liabilities divided by total assets), RE_TA (retained earnings divided by total
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assets), Rev_TA (revenue divided by total assets), OCF_TA (net operating cash flow
divided by total assets), WC_TA (working capital divided by total assets), Rsize (firm
relative size) (natural logarithm of the ratio of each firm’s market capitalisation to that of
the VN Index or HNX Index), Mlev (market leverage ratio) (book value of debt divided
by market value of equity), ln_age (natural logarithm of the difference between the end
of the fiscal year and the date of incorporation), and MTB (market-to-book ratio) (firm’s
market capitalisation divided by its total equity). The definitions of all the variables in
this study are listed in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3. Definitions of Variables
Notation

Variable name

Measures

Panel A: Delisting risk
Delisted

A dummy variable which equals one if a firm
is forced out of either HOSE or HNX in the
sample period and zero otherwise

Panel B: Corporate governance measures
CGI

Corporate governance

CG Index is a self-constructed index based on

index

13 respective criteria and then normalised,
which ranges from zero to 100 percent each
year.

Panel C: Firm attributes
Govown

Government ownership

The ownership percentage by the state

Forown

Foreign ownership

The

ownership

percentage

of

foreign

shareholders
Top5

Top five ownership

The ownership percentage of the top five
largest shareholders

NI_TA

Net income divided by total assets

TL_TA

Total liabilities divided by total assets

RE_TA

Retained earnings divided by total assets

Rev_TA

Revenue divided by total assets
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OCF_TA

Net operating cash flow divided by total
assets

WC_TA
Rsize

Working capital divided by total assets
Relative size

Natural logarithm of the ratio of each firm’s
market capitalisation to that of the VN Index
or HNX Index

Mlev

Market leverage

Book value of debt divided by market value
of equity

Ln_age

Firm age

Natural logarithm of the difference between
the end of the fiscal year and the date of
incorporation

MTB

Market-to-book

Firm’s market capitalisation divided by its
total equity

5.3.2.2 Model validation criteria
The holdout sample consisting of all firm-year observations from 2016 to 2018 is used to
generate the out-of-sample forecasts. Utilising the coefficient estimates and the baseline
hazard rates derived from the estimation models, the probability of delisting of the
holdout sample is computed and compared with the actual outcomes. The receiver
operating characteristics (ROC) curves serve as an evaluation technique to measure the
discriminatory power of the prediction models. This method has been employed by a
number of studies on bankruptcy and financial distress prediction, including Dhawan et
al. (2020), Kim et al. (2016), and Kim and Partington (2015). According to Kim et al.
(2016), the ROC curve is advantageous as the predictive power of the estimation models
across the entire spectrum of cut-off probabilities can be examined without the need for
selecting an optimal cut-off point. The larger the area under the ROC curve (AUROC),
the better the prediction. Models with AUROC equal to or less than the random prediction
of 0.5 cannot beat random chance, and therefore they have no predictive power.
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5.3.3 Descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlation
Table 5.4 summarises the descriptive statistics for corporate governance variables and
other control variables. The entire sample in Panel A includes information of 815 nonfinancial firms where 6,335 firm-year observations are obtained. The estimation sample
in Panel B includes 4,325 firm-year observations, and Panel C contains information of
2,010 firm-year observations of the holdout sample. The Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney U)
test for each variable is employed to examine the statistical significance of the median
difference of firm characteristics between delisted and listed firms across the entire
sample and two sub-samples. All variables are shown to have a statistically significant
difference at the one percent and five percent levels. Listed firms are found to have higher
levels of corporate governance quality, government ownership, foreign ownership,
ownership concentration, profitability, retained earnings, revenue, operating cash flows,
working capital, firm size, firm age, market-to-book ratio, and excess return. In contrast,
delisted firms have a higher level of leverage and market leverage.
Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Summary statistics for the entire sample
Variable

Listing
status

N

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Corporate governance measures
CGI
Listed
5476
0.4793 0.1175
Delisted 859
0.4426 0.1198
Firm attributes
Govown Listed
Delisted
Forown
Listed
Delisted
Top5
Listed
Delisted
NI_TA
Listed
Delisted
TL_TA
Listed

5476
859
5476
859
5476
859
5476
859
5476

0.2545
0.1834
0.0963
0.0374
0.4887
0.4210
0.0617
-0.0106
0.4973

0.2545
0.2204
0.1333
0.0769
0.2057
0.2038
0.0722
0.0930
0.2196

P1

Median

P99

Mann_
Whitney
U-Test

pValue

0.2308
0.1538

0.4615
0.4615

0.6923
0.6923

62.5553

<.0001

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0562
0.0522
-0.1324
-0.2516
0.0438
97

0.1940
0.0611
0.0349
0.0077
0.5100
0.4137
0.0490
0.0034
0.5221

0.7951
0.7440
0.4900
0.3985
0.9051
0.8471
0.3056
0.1982
0.9049

52.3705

<.0001

214.7565

<.0001

92.1535

<.0001

679.4006

<.0001

110.3895

<.0001

Delisted
RE_TA
Listed
Delisted
Rev_TA Listed
Delisted
OCF_TA Listed
Delisted
WC_TA Listed
Delisted
Rsize
Listed
Delisted
Mlev
Listed
Delisted
ln_age
Listed
Delisted
MTB
Listed
Delisted

859
5476
859
5476
859
5476
859
5476
859
5476
859
5476
859
5476
859
5476
859

0.5844
0.0610
-0.0548
1.1961
0.7554
0.0391
0.0039
0.2183
0.1271
-3.9800
-4.9114
2.4273
5.5918
2.9389
2.7001
1.0836
0.8926

0.2659
0.1007
0.1746
1.0370
0.7263
0.1096
0.1015
0.2197
0.2506
1.6765
1.4235
3.4517
6.6923
0.6645
0.7860
0.8260
0.9514

0.0408
-0.2946
-0.5873
0.0317
0.0241
-0.2708
-0.2785
-0.2534
-0.3321
-7.4967
-7.5754
0.0324
0.0289
1.3863
1.0986
0.1939
0.1340

0.6255
0.0516
0.0082
0.9437
0.5656
0.0000
0.0000
0.1981
0.0965
-4.1007
-4.9391
1.2227
2.8158
2.9957
2.6391
0.8571
0.6090

0.9605
0.3415
0.1938
5.9952
3.5644
0.4000
0.4003
0.7845
0.7847
0.7496
-1.2831
19.1757
24.8713
4.0604
4.0254
4.7654
5.1827

569.9624

<.0001

217.6722

<.0001

106.9035

<.0001

127.5336

<.0001

230.4703

<.0001

204.2263

<.0001

72.1916

<.0001

153.6212

<.0001

Panel B: Summary statistics for the estimation sample
Variable

Listing
status

N

Mean

Std.
Dev.

P1

Median

P99

Mann_
Whitney
U-Test

pValue

0.2308
0.1538

0.4615
0.4615

0.6923
0.6923

60.0113

<.0001

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0534
0.0580
-0.1349
-0.2363
0.0504
0.0479
-0.2654
-0.5001
0.0354
0.0274
-0.2480
-0.2540
-0.2476
-0.3198
-7.0223

0.2750
0.0908
0.0315
0.0079
0.5100
0.4393
0.0509
0.0061
0.5313
0.6296
0.0480
0.0100
0.9743
0.5950
0.0000
0.0000
0.2015
0.0990
-3.8881

0.7913
0.7005
0.4900
0.4613
0.8866
0.8471
0.3056
0.2027
0.9018
0.9655
0.3200
0.1961
5.8061
3.5629
0.4007
0.3967
0.7564
0.7631
0.6010

73.2756

<.0001

145.4001

<.0001

49.1366

<.0001

545.3542

<.0001

87.9379

<.0001

422.0944

<.0001

182.9014

<.0001

92.0989

<.0001

102.7867

<.0001

234.3765

<.0001

Corporate governance measures
CGI
Listed
3573
0.4808 0.1172
Delisted 752
0.4425 0.1177
Firm attributes
Govown Listed
Delisted
Forown
Listed
Delisted
Top5
Listed
Delisted
NI_TA
Listed
Delisted
TL_TA
Listed
Delisted
RE_TA
Listed
Delisted
Rev_TA Listed
Delisted
OCF_TA Listed
Delisted
WC_TA Listed
Delisted
Rsize
Listed

3573
752
3573
752
3573
752
3573
752
3573
752
3573
752
3573
752
3573
752
3573
752
3573

0.2798
0.1963
0.0911
0.0385
0.4803
0.4283
0.0648
-0.0084
0.5046
0.5867
0.0600
-0.0359
1.2256
0.7756
0.0386
0.0017
0.2164
0.1307
-3.7593

0.2470
0.2183
0.1288
0.0778
0.1974
0.1955
0.0729
0.0850
0.2149
0.2612
0.0919
0.1443
1.0234
0.7031
0.1077
0.0950
0.2122
0.2441
1.5929
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Mlev
ln_age
MTB

Delisted 752
Listed
3573
Delisted 752
Listed
3573
Delisted 752
Listed
3573
Delisted 752

-4.7326
2.4753
5.5088
2.8772
2.6701
1.0334
0.8699

1.3605
3.3770
6.6033
0.6896
0.8041
0.7234
0.8106

-7.1838
0.0427
0.0351
1.0986
1.0986
0.2341
0.1735

-4.7826
1.3227
2.8161
2.9444
2.5649
0.8483
0.6459

-1.2488
17.9975
25.0011
4.0254
4.0254
4.2189
4.4849

P1

Median

0.1538
0.1538

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0577
0.0500
-0.1302
-0.2516
0.0408
0.0408
-0.4257
-0.5873
0.0262
0.0241
-0.2785
-0.2785
-0.3055
-0.3321
-7.7575
-7.7575
0.0289
0.0333
1.7918
1.7918
0.1403
0.1340

145.8852

<.0001

43.4696

<.0001

103.3739

<.0001

P99

Mann
_Whitney
U-Test

pValue

0.4615
0.4615

0.7692
0.6923

5.9791

0.0145

0.0000
0.0000
0.0419
0.0059
0.5148
0.3370
0.0455
-0.0355
0.5075
0.6136
0.0564
-0.0620
0.8948
0.3804
0.0193
0.0000
0.1897
0.0637
-4.5576
-6.2176
1.0701
2.7883
3.0910
2.8332
0.8815
0.3529

0.7970
0.8471
0.4914
0.3190
0.9410
0.8471
0.3056
0.1076
0.9186
0.9605
0.3415
0.1477
5.9951
5.1636
0.3625
0.4002
0.7847
0.7847
0.7495
-2.5931
19.9979
24.8712
4.0604
4.0604
5.1826
5.1826

18.9643

<.0001

51.2072

<.0001

46.8359

<.0001

167.0571

<.0001

11.8008

0.0006

121.4972

<.0001

61.7867

<.0001

5.0278

0.0249

24.7258

<.0001

107.1373

<.0001

41.0735

<.0001

6.6905

0.0097

49.5406

<.0001

Panel C: Summary statistics for the holdout sample
Variable

Listing
status

N

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Corporate governance measures
CGI
Listed
1903
0.4766 0.1178
Delisted 107
0.4428 0.1305
Firm attributes
Govown Listed
Delisted
Forown
Listed
Delisted
Top5
Listed
Delisted
NI_TA
Listed
Delisted
TL_TA
Listed
Delisted
RE_TA
Listed
Delisted
Rev_TA Listed
Delisted
OCF_TA Listed
Delisted
WC_TA Listed
Delisted
Rsize
Listed
Delisted
Mlev
Listed
Delisted
ln_age
Listed
Delisted
MTB
Listed
Delisted

1903
107
1903
107
1903
107
1903
107
1903
107
1903
107
1903
107
1903
107
1903
107
1903
107
1903
107
1903
107
1903
107

0.2057
0.0936
0.1060
0.0302
0.5048
0.3412
0.0560
-0.0656
0.4841
0.5714
0.0627
-0.1684
1.1409
0.6137
0.0404
0.0213
0.2212
0.1026
-4.3995
-6.1218
2.3390
6.2131
3.0570
2.9137
1.1717
0.9595

0.2613
0.2156
0.1408
0.0691
0.2198
0.2421
0.0702
0.1020
0.2270
0.2985
0.1119
0.2543
1.0420
0.8623
0.1120
0.1346
0.2315
0.2829
1.7353
1.1537
3.5924
7.3900
0.5948
0.6021
0.9588
1.3571

This table shows summary statistics of all variables for firm-year observations of the non-financial firms listed on
HOSE and HNX. Panel A shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the entire sample from 2008 to 2018. Panels
B and C present the summary statistics for the estimation sample and the holdout sample separately. Mann-Whitney
U-test is conducted to examine the significance of the median difference of firm characteristics between the groups.
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In Table 5.5, the correlation matrices of all variables are reported, using the Pearson
product-moment correlations to measure the strength of association between variables.
Talln-ballesteros (2019) suggests that a correlation coefficient of 0.6 or higher in absolute
terms indicates a relatively high level of multicollinearity. In this study, relatively high
correlations are found between NI_TA and RE_TA at about 0.75, between TL_TA and
WC_TA at about -0.60, and between TL_TA and Mlev at around 0.64. The correlation
between CGI and the delisting risk is statistically significant at the one percent level and
have their expected signs. To further detect multicollinearity in the regression models, a
tolerance level and a variance inflation factor (VIF) are calculated for each parameter.
Low tolerance levels indicate a high level of multicollinearity, whereas VIF specifies the
magnitude of the inflation in the standard errors related to a particular beta weight as a
consequence of multicollinearity. A tolerance level less than 0.40 associated with a VIF
value higher than 2.50 is considered problematic (Adeboye et al. 2014; Allison 1999;
Johnston et al. 2018; Meyers et al. 2012). In this study, the tolerance levels of NI_TA and
TL_TA are 0.33 and 0.39, respectively, while the VIF of NI_TA and TL_TA are 3.06 and
2.60, respectively. Other variables have tolerance levels of over 0.4 and VIFs less than
2.5. Following Kim et al. (2016) and Talln-ballesteros (2019), NI_TA and TL_TA are
excluded from the estimation models to avoid multicollinearity issues and overfitting in
the regression models.
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Table 5.5 Pair-wise correlation
Panel A: Correlation matrix for the entire sample
Variables
CGI
Govown
Forown
Top5
NI_TA
TL_TA
RE_TA
Rev_TA
OCF_TA
WC_TA
Rsize
Mlev
ln_Fage
MTB

Delisted
-0.106*
-0.096*
-0.157*
-0.118*
-0.334*
0.131*
-0.330*
-0.150*
-0.110*
-0.138*
-0.190*
0.259*
-0.119*
-0.077*

CGI

Govown

Forown

Top5

NI_TA

-0.128*
0.223*
0.095*
0.036*
-0.084*
0.065*
-0.007
0.029*
0.042*
0.145*
-0.087*
-0.028*
0.051*

-0.147*
0.506*
0.134*
0.089*
0.072*
0.208*
0.145*
-0.056*
0.055*
0.044*
0.185*
0.031*

0.061*
0.207*
-0.198*
0.204*
-0.021
0.098*
0.161*
0.398*
-0.205*
0.038*
0.215*

0.118*
0.057*
0.106*
0.150*
0.141*
-0.017
0.147*
-0.028*
0.134*
0.190*

-0.403*
0.747*
0.223*
0.279*
0.359*
0.364*
-0.408*
0.078*
0.396*

TL_TA

-0.322*
-0.009
-0.144*
-0.601*
-0.065*
0.639*
0.085*
-0.075*

RE_TA

Rev_TA

OCF_TA WC_TA

Rsize

Mlev

ln_age

0.155*
0.162*
0.337*
0.344*
-0.331*
0.060*
0.217*

0.130*
0.060*
-0.055*
-0.143*
0.120*
0.108*

-0.013
0.147*
-0.124*
0.101*
0.211*

-0.295*
-0.008
0.472*

0.071*
-0.301*

0.030*

RE_TA

Rev_TA

OCF_TA WC_TA

Rsize

Mlev

ln_age

0.151*
0.160*
0.358*
0.353*
-0.340*
0.056*
0.244*

0.146*
0.061*
-0.051*
-0.149*
0.140*
0.082*

-0.020
0.138*
-0.119*
0.101*
0.207*

-0.304*
-0.000
0.487*

0.087*
-0.294*

-0.014

0.039*
-0.394*
-0.035*
0.076*

Panel B: Correlation matrix for the estimation sample
Variables
CGI
Govown
Forown
Top5
NI_TA
TL_TA
RE_TA
Rev_TA
OCF_TA
WC_TA
Rsize
Mlev
ln_Fage
MTB

Delisted
-0.123*
-0.130*
-0.162*
-0.099*
-0.347*
0.137*
-0.330*
-0.172*
-0.131*
-0.147*
-0.231*
0.269*
-0.110*
-0.076*

CGI

Govown

Forown

Top5

NI_TA

-0.152*
0.196*
0.096*
0.003
-0.100*
0.055*
-0.011
0.019
0.038*
0.101*
-0.075*
-0.028
0.010

-0.162*
0.520*
0.138*
0.104*
0.081*
0.176*
0.136*
-0.059*
0.028
0.058*
0.215*
0.029

0.067*
0.217*
-0.220*
0.223*
-0.027
0.116*
0.155*
0.438*
-0.212*
0.035*
0.216*

0.097*
0.062*
0.095*
0.110*
0.127*
-0.021
0.144*
-0.011
0.107*
0.151*

-0.433*
0.763*
0.225*
0.291*
0.384*
0.352*
-0.425*
0.080*
0.395*

TL_TA

-0.344*
-0.021
-0.142*
-0.596*
-0.095*
0.653*
0.083*
-0.090*
101

0.052*
-0.402*
-0.028
0.068*

Panel C: Correlation matrix for the holdout sample
Variables
CGI
Govown
Forown
Top5
NI_TA
TL_TA
RE_TA
Rev_TA
OCF_TA
WC_TA
Rsize
Mlev
ln_Fage
MTB

Delisted
-0.064*
-0.097*
-0.122*
-0.164*
-0.354*
0.084*
-0.387*
-0.114*
-0.038
-0.113*
-0.221*
0.218*
-0.054*
-0.048*

CGI

Govown

Forown

Top5

NI_TA

-0.081*
0.276*
0.092*
0.111*
-0.051*
0.084*
0.002
0.051*
0.051*
0.239*
-0.115*
-0.032
0.119*

-0.099*
0.512*
0.124*
0.041
0.070*
0.270*
0.177*
-0.041
0.055*
-0.005
0.187*
0.063*

0.042
0.195*
-0.149*
0.169*
-0.007
0.061*
0.167*
0.378*
-0.186*
0.015
0.203*

0.162*
0.058*
0.119*
0.226*
0.162*
-0.015
0.181*
-0.053*
0.180*
0.238*

-0.342*
0.730*
0.218*
0.254*
0.310*
0.396*
-0.371*
0.085*
0.414*

TL_TA

-0.284*
0.012
-0.144*
-0.609*
-0.038
0.608*
0.124*
-0.040

RE_TA

Rev_TA

OCF_TA WC_TA

Rsize

Mlev

ln_age

0.164*
0.162*
0.302*
0.353*
-0.318*
0.062*
0.175*

0.101*
0.058*
-0.071*
-0.134*
0.085*
0.156*

-0.001
0.183*
-0.133*
0.092*
0.214*

-0.314*
0.047*
0.506*

0.056*
-0.316*

0.087*

0.028
-0.378*
-0.066*
0.084*

This table reports the Pearson correlations of the variables used in the analyses. Panel A shows the Pearson correlations for the entire sample from 2008 to 2018. Panels B and C present
the Pearson correlations for the estimation sample and the holdout sample separately. Superscripts * indicate statistical significance at the 5% level or higher.
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5.4 Empirical results
5.4.1 Main results
5.4.1.1 Model estimation
To examine the impact of corporate governance on the risk of involuntary delisting (H1),
this study employs the logistic regression and Cox proportional hazards models. Table
5.6 shows the regression results. The results based on the logistic model are presented in
Column (1), and the Cox proportional hazards model in Column (2), respectively.
Table 5.6 Corporate governance and the risk of involuntary delisting: Main results
Variables

Exp. sign

CGI

-

Govown

-

Forown

-

Top5

+/-

RE_TA

-

Rev_TA

-

OCF_TA

-

WC_TA

-

Rsize

-

Mlev

+

ln_age

-

MTB

+/-

Likelihood ratio
Censored firm-year observations
Delisted firm-year observations

Logit
(1)
-2.9626***
(54.8901)
-1.6556***
(46.8415)
-2.7562***
(21.8477)
0.3813
(2.0053)
-4.7433***
(99.8813)
-0.4725***
(45.6273)
-2.5024***
(23.0788)
-0.4545*
(3.6021)
-0.2701***
(44.9383)
0.0734***
(47.6386)
-0.2551***
(15.1828)
0.3515***
(20.2057)
887.4091
(<.0001)
3573
752

Hazards
(2)
-3.6667***
(112.7688)
-1.0146***
(25.1954)
-4.0950***
(49.9454)
0.2947
(1.7723)
-1.6248***
(25.8615)
-0.3516***
(35.4299)
-2.5552***
(29.1040)
-0.4418**
(4.7119)
-0.0971***
(8.2331)
0.0339***
(20.4123)
-0.5752***
(86.5729)
0.1983***
(12.8501)
801.8667
(<.0001)
3573
752

The table shows the regression results using Logit and Cox proportional hazards models. See Table
5.3 for definitions of variables. The likelihood ratio Chi-square test for the null hypothesis that at
least one of the predictor coefficients in the model is not equal to zero is reported. Figures in
parentheses are Chi-square statistics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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In line with the hypothesis, the overall results show that CGI has a negative and
statistically significant relationship with the risk of involuntary delisting, suggesting that
better-governed firms experience a lower probability of delisting, given others being
equal. The logistic regression shows that there is a 95 percent16 decrease in the odds of
delisting for a one-unit increase in CGI. Similarly, the Cox proportional hazards model
indicates that there is a 97 percent decrease in the expected hazard relative to a one-unit
increase in CGI. The economic significance of this result is meaningful as well. A one
standard deviation increase in CGI multiplies the odds of delisting by 70 percent17. The
hazard model results align with the results from the logistic regression, which accepts H1.
While the finding is consistent with the existing literature that suggests better corporate
governance practices reduce the agency cost, resulting in a lower level of delisting risk
(Chancharat et al. 2012; Charitou et al. 2007; Mangena & Chamisa 2008), the finding
also indicates that the corporate governance index is instrumental for investors to avoid
stocks with higher risk of delisting.
The coefficients on the firm characteristics also offer some valuable insights. For
instance, both the logit and hazards models show that Govown and Forown have negative
coefficients that are statistically significant at the one percent level. Meanwhile, the
coefficient of Top5 is positive but statistically insignificant. The logit results show that
holding other variables at a fixed value, there will be 81 percent and 94 percent decreases
in the odds of delisting for a one-unit increase in Govown and Forown, respectively.
Meanwhile, the expected hazards are 0.36 and 0.02 times lower in a firm with one unit of
Govown and Forown higher, respectively. Additionally, a one standard deviation increase
in Govown and Forown multiplies the odds of delisting by 67 percent and 71 percent,

16

The odds of delisting are calculated as exp (-2.9626) = 0.05. Therefore, a one-unit decrease in
CGI results in a 95 percent decrease in the expected hazard.
17
The standardised estimate of CGI is calculated by multiplying (-2.9626) by the standard
deviation of CGI, i.e. 0.1182. The odds of delisting are, then, calculated as exp (-0.3549) = 0.70.
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respectively. The results account for that firms with higher government ownership in
Vietnam are less likely to face the risk of delisting. This is because the severe impacts of
delisting may damage the political prospects; therefore, the state is more likely to protect
those distressed companies from being delisted. The results also support our supposition
that foreign investors with professional expertise can control managerial opportunism
more effectively; thus, reducing agency costs and the risk of delisting. These results are
consistent with the findings of Nguyen and Dao (2017). The coefficients on Top5 are
positive but not statistically significant across all model specifications. In line with our
expectation, the coefficients on RE_TA, Rev_TA, OCF_TA, Rsize, and ln_age are negative
and statistically significant at the one percent level. This indicates that firms with higher
retained earnings, more revenue, higher operating cash flows, larger size and longer
history are less likely to experience the event of delisting. The coefficient on WC_TA is
also negative but less statistically significant, which shows that firms with higher working
capital experience lower delisting risk. The positive and statistically significant
coefficients on Mlev and MTB indicate that the risk of delisting increases if firms have a
higher level of market leverage and market-to-book ratio.
As well as the quality of governance this study examines to what extent each governance
index category (board composition and board diversity) affects the risk of delisting. Six
corporate governance characteristics are assigned to board composition (see Panel A of
Table 5.1) and seven other attributes to board diversity (see Panel B of Table 5.1). Each
variable is assigned to have binary signals and aggregated to yield a composite index. The
index ranges from zero to six for the category of board composition and from zero to
seven for board diversity. Following Aman and Nguyen (2008), the indices are
normalised linearly between zero and 100 percent. The higher the indices, the better the
firm is expected to be governed. Table 5.7 shows the regression results for the logistic
(Column 1) and Cox proportional hazards models (Column 2).
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Table 5.7 Corporate governance and the risk of involuntary delisting: Individual
governance categories
Variables

Logit
(1)
-1.1607***
(27.9943)
-1.4219***
(18.0307)
-1.6627***
(40.2710)
-2.4497***
(16.5020)
0.3988
(2.1415)
-4.8023***
(101.9803)
-0.4661***
(44.8725)
-2.4833***
(22.7904)
-0.4646*
(3.7826)
-0.2692***
(44.9479)
0.0734***
(47.9097)
-0.2554***
(14.8978)
0.3491***
(19.8347)
875.5271
(<.0001)
3573
752

Board composition
Board diversity
Govown
Forown
Top5
RE_TA
Rev_TA
OCF_TA
WC_TA
Rsize
Mlev
ln_age
MTB
Likelihood ratio
Censored firm-year obs.
Delisted firm-year obs.

Hazards
(2)
-1.3279***
(50.5139)
-2.1074***
(51.7220)
-1.1326***
(27.0231)
-3.7669***
(40.5062)
0.3082
(1.9209)
-1.6133***
(25.6313)
-0.3467***
(34.8732)
-2.5250***
(28.7282)
-0.4594**
(5.1228)
-0.0944***
(7.8214)
0.0347***
(21.6770)
-0.5665***
(83.2204)
0.1915***
(11.9813)
782.0205
(<.0001)
3573
752

The table shows the regression results using Logit and Cox proportional hazards models. See Table 5.3 for
definitions of variables. The likelihood ratio Chi-square test for the null hypothesis that at least one of the
predictor coefficients in the model is not equal to zero is reported. Figures in parentheses are Chi-square
statistics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

The results show that both governance categories are significantly negatively related to
the risk of delisting. Nevertheless, the coefficient of board diversity is larger in magnitude
than that of the board composition. This indicates that the diversity of the board of
directors and supervisory board, such as gender diversity, board education, and board
experience plays a more substantial role in reducing the probability of delisting in
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Vietnam. This is consistent with the notion that the board is a valuable governance
mechanism that helps firms curtail resource constraints and get access to scarce resources
from outside (Hillman et al. 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). While uncertainty weakens
the firm’s ability to control resources and hinders its daily operations, directors who can
connect the firm with its external environment provide an effective mechanism to cope
with the uncertainty, resulting in adequate operational functioning, better firm
performance, and lower risk of delisting (Daily et al. 2003).
5.4.1.2 Endogeneity issues
It has been well-documented in the literature that endogeneity is a common problem in
research on corporate governance (Wintoki et al. 2012). In this section, this study attempts
to address the concerns about reverse causality and sample selection bias by using two
alternative model specifications. First, a potential simultaneity bias in this context may
be that not only better corporate governance quality results in a lower risk of delisting but
also firms facing a high risk of delisting may alter their governance structures to fix the
worsening performance. This results in reverse causality between corporate governance
and the risk of delisting. To address this issue, this study uses instrumental variables (IVs)
and estimates the main regression model using the two-stage probit regression approach.
A valid IV needs to be strongly correlated with the corporate governance index but is not
directly associated with the risk of delisting. According to Yang and Zhao (2014), a
company's governance arrangements (board of directors and supervisory board
structures) tend to associate with its industry peers because of similar business mix and
investment prospects; however, the industry average is unlikely to impact on the firm’s
delisting risk directly. Thus, following prior studies (Ali et al. 2018; Liu, Y et al. 2015;
Liu et al. 2014), this study instruments an industry-average CGI by using the mean value
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of the corporate governance index of all firms in the firm i’s industry18. The first-stage
regression is a generalised linear regression model with CGI as the dependent variable
and the industry-average CGI (Bjt), ownership variables, and other control variables as
the independent variables to find the fitted value for CGI.
CGIi,t = β0 + β1 IV1i + β2 -15 Controlsi,t + ε

(6)

Where CGIi,t is corporate governance index for firm i at time t, IV1i is the mean value of
the corporate governance index of all firms in the firm i’s industry, and Controlsi,t are the
value of control variables for firm i at time t.
The second-stage regression is a probit regression with the fitted value of CGI and control
variables as the independent variables and the delisted dummy variable as the dependent
variable.
Delistedi,t = β0 + β1 FittedCGIi,t-1 + β2-15 Controlsi,t-1 + ε

(7)

Where Delistedi,t is the delisting indicator variable, which equals one if firm i experiences
delisting in year t and zero otherwise, FittedCGIi,t-1 is the fitted corporate governance
index for firm i at time t-1, and Controlsi,t-1 are the value of control variables for firm i at
time t-1.
The results of the two-stage instrumental variable regression method are reported in Table
5.8.
Table 5.8 Corporate governance and the risk of involuntary delisting: Instrumental
variable two-stage regression (2SLS)

Dependent variable:
Industry-average CGI
Fitted CGI

18

First-stage
(1)
CGI
0.772***
(8.47)

Second-stage
(2)
Delisted
-6.467***
(-6.39)

According to Hoang et al. (2016a), there is no generally accepted industry classifications for
listed firms in Vietnam. Consequently, this study follows Vietstock – the oldest financial data
provider in Vietnam to use two-digit NAICS codes to classify firms in the same industry.
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Govown
Forown
Top5
RE_TA
Rev_TA
OCF_TA
WC_TA
Rsize
Mlev
ln_age
MTB
Year fixed effect
Model fits
F-test (instrument)
R2
Observations

-0.084***
(-9.93)
0.085***
(5.49)
0.080***
(7.81)
0.034*
(1.91)
0.000
(0.08)
-0.003
(-0.16)
-0.009
(-1.07)
0.009***
(6.22)
-0.001**
(-2.19)
-0.007***
(-2.99)
-0.012***
(-4.31)
Yes
91.28***
0.183
4,320

-1.495***
(-12.20)
-0.583*
(-1.68)
0.849***
(5.72)
-2.192***
(-5.82)
-0.170***
(-4.13)
-1.014***
(-3.84)
-0.141
(-1.21)
-0.109***
(-3.06)
0.033***
(3.90)
-0.107***
(-3.29)
0.058
(1.13)
Yes
0.064
4,320

This table demonstrates the first- and second-regression results from the two-stage instrumental variable
regression approach. See Table 5.3 for definitions of variables. The instrument variable used is the industryaverage corporate governance index. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Superscripts *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Column (1) of Table 5.8 displays the first-stage regression results. The coefficient on the
industry-average CGI is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level,
implying that the industry-average CGI powerfully explains the firm-level CGI.
Moreover, the validity of the IV is confirmed by the F-test for the joint significance of
the instrument. As a rule of thumb, an IV is not weak if the F-statistics is higher than ten
and is statistically significant based on Wald Chi-square statistics (Dhawan et al. 2020).
The F-statistics for the IV is 91.28 and statistically significant at the one percent level;
thus, it is valid. Column (2) of Table 5.8 demonstrates the second-stage regression results.
CGI is replaced by the fitted CGI from the first-stage regressions. The coefficient of the
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fitted value is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level, which
confirms the findings that better-governed firms are less likely to experience the incident
of forced delisting. Thus, the results have been validated after corrections for potential
simultaneity bias.
This study uses a propensity score matching technique as the second alternative model
specification to address the concern about sample selection bias that may affect the
estimation of the coefficient for the corporate governance index. This study first divides
the sample into a control and a treatment sample based on the main treatment of interest
(corporate governance index in this study). All firm-year observations with a CGI of more
than the mean value of 0.48 are assigned as treatment observations, and all observations
with a CGI of equal or less than 0.48 are appointed as control observations. In the
matching process, for each firm-year observation in the treatment sample, this study
identifies an observation in the control sample with the nearest propensity score of firm
characteristics in the same year. Control observations are then matched to the treatment
observations. Finally, the mean of the dependent variable (Delisted in this case)
conditional on the control variables and year fixed effects of the control and treatment
samples are compared. To do this, this study executes a regression where the dependent
variable is Delisted, and independent variables are Treatment, a dummy variable that
equals one if a firm-year observation is in the treatment group, and zero if it is in the
control group, and other control variables.
Table 5.9 Corporate governance and the risk of involuntary delisting: Propensity
score matching (PSM)
Panel A: Regression analysis
Dependent variable:
Treatment

Delisted
-0.376***
(-3.372)
-1.886***
(-6.328)
-3.288***

Govown
Forown
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(-4.582)
0.263
(0.811)
-5.665***
(-10.205)
-0.584***
(-6.446)
-2.431***
(-3.761)
-0.204
(-0.704)
-0.370***
(-7.163)
0.075***
(5.824)
-0.113
(-1.388)
0.270**
(2.482)
Yes
-0.887**
(-2.104)
0.2595
3,116

Top5
RE_TA
Rev_TA
OCF_TA
WC_TA
Rsize
Mlev
ln_Fage
MTB
Year fixed effects
Constant
R2
Observations

Panel B: Pre-match and post-match regressions
Dependent variable:
Treatment
Pre-match
(1)
Govown
-1.239***
(-7.41)
Forown
1.789***
(5.71)
Top5
1.380***
(6.90)
RE_TA
0.135
(0.39)
Rev_TA
0.062*
(1.80)
OCF_TA
0.061
(0.19)
WC_TA
-0.237
(-1.38)
Rsize
0.088***
(3.17) **
Mlev
-0.023
(-2.46)
ln_age
-0.062
(-1.30)
MTB
-0.207***
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Treatment
Post-match
(2)
0.103
(0.56)
-0.062
(-0.17)
-0.081
(-0.37)
0.093
(0.24)
0.015
(0.40)
-0.142
(-0.39)
-0.090
(-0.47)
-0.004
(-0.12)
-0.007
(-0.73)
0.025
(0.46)
-0.017

Constant
Pseudo R2
Observations
Panel C: Balance test
Variable
Treated
(1)
Govown
0.262
Forown
0.078
Top5
0.473
RE_TA
0.041
Rev_TA
1.152
OCF_TA
0.032
WC_TA
0.201
Rsize
-4.020
Mlev
2.993
ln_age
2.841
MTB
0.959

(-3.63)
-1.025***
(-4.31)
0.081
4,325
Control
(2)
0.256
0.079
0.473
0.040
1.129
0.032
0.202
-4.017
3.095
2.825
0.958

(-0.27)
-0.042
(-0.15)
0.001
3,116
% bias
(3)
2.20
-1.00
-0.10
1.10
2.30
-0.30
-0.50
-0.20
-2.40
2.10
0.20

t-stat
(4)
0.610
-0.270
-0.030
0.300
0.650
-0.080
-0.140
-0.070
-0.660
0.590
0.060

This table demonstrates the PSM results. See Table 5.3 for definitions of variables. Panel A reports
multivariate results. Panel B presents the coefficient estimates from the logit model which are employed to
estimate the propensity scores. The dependent variable Treatment is an indicator variable set to one if a
firm has a CGI of more than the mean value of 0.48 in a given year, zero otherwise. Panel B shows the prematch and post-match regressions. Panel C reports the results of a balance test. Figures in parentheses are
t-statistics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

The result of the propensity score matching analysis is reported in Panel A of Table 5.9.
The coefficient estimate for Treatment, which represents the difference in mean of
delisting probability between the treatment and control sample, is negative and
statistically significant at the one percent level. The result is consistent with the logit,
hazard, and instrumental variable regressions, which confirms that the main results are
robust after considering the simultaneity and selection biases using alternative estimation
methods.
Two diagnostic tests are performed to assess the method’s validity. The first test compares
pre-match and post-match samples and results are presented in Panel B of Table 5.9. None
of the coefficient estimates in the post-match sample is statistically significant, indicating
that no distinguishable trends in Delisted between the two groups are observed. In
addition, the pseudo R2 decreases significantly from 0.081 to 0.001, suggesting that the
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PSM method eliminates all the observable differences. This study further examines the
difference for each observable characteristic between the treated and the control firms.
The results in Panel C of Table 5.9. As a rule of thumb, a good balance between
observable covariates is achieved when t-tests failed to refuse the null-hypothesis of equal
means, and the bias percentage is less than five percent. The highest bias percentage is
2.3 percent for Rev_TA, and none of the p-values is lower than 0.05. The results confirmed
that the covariates are well-balanced.
5.4.2 Additional analyses
5.4.2.1 Alternative outcomes of deficient performance
Charitou et al. (2007) examine the association between corporate governance and
involuntary delisting from the New York Stock Exchange and contend that bettergoverned firms are less likely to face delisting which is an outcome of poor performance.
They also highlight that delisting is one of many potential consequences for financially
distressed firms, such as restructuring their assets and taking a firm privately and call for
further research on other outcomes that might spring from poor performance. Therefore,
in this section, this study applies distance-to-default (DD) and credit default swap spread
(CDS) which are commonly used in the literature to measure credit risk as potential
outcomes of deficient performance. DD is computed using market information based on
the theory of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). The lower DD demonstrates
the higher probability of default. Meanwhile, CDS is credit derivatives that are designed
to transfer the credit risk between two or more parties. The higher the CDS spread
indicates the higher credit risk.
Following recent studies (Ali et al. 2018; Kabir et al. 2020) among others, the DD and
CDS data are extracted from the “Credit Research Initiative (CRI)” platform of the
National University of Singapore. Using the whole sample, equation (5) is re-estimated
using the fixed effects model (FE), replacing the dependent variable with DD and CDS,
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respectively. The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
and are clustered at the firm level (Petersen 2008).
Table 5.10 Corporate governance and the risk of involuntary delisting: Alternative
outcomes of deficient performance
Dependent variable:
CGI
Govown
Forown
Top5
RE_TA
Rev_TA
OCF_TA
WC_TA
Rsize
Mlev
ln_Fage
MTB
Year fixed effects
Constant
R2
Observations

DD
(1)
0.3960**
(2.0356)
0.3293
(1.5647)
0.9939***
(2.7713)
-0.3106
(-1.5090)
1.6487***
(4.5279)
0.0129
(0.2654)
0.8282***
(4.8418)
1.3542***
(7.9047)
0.2585***
(3.7150)
-0.0771***
(-8.4220)
0.0437
(0.2089)
0.4575***
(6.7937)
Yes
1.2156*
(1.9543)
0.3496
5,344

CDS
(2)
-0.0032**
(-2.1465)
0.0001
(0.0803)
0.0024
(1.0589)
0.0012
(0.8420)
-0.0214***
(-6.8972)
-0.0006
(-1.3067)
-0.0036***
(-2.7511)
-0.0121***
(-9.6952)
-0.0029***
(-4.5763)
0.0022***
(18.0037)
-0.0006
(-0.3881)
-0.0012**
(-2.0824)
Yes
0.0212***
(4.4661)
0.5142
5,447

The table shows the regression results using the FE method. See Table 5.3 for definitions of variables.
Figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Superscripts *,
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 5.10 demonstrates the regression results for the FE model. Column (1) and (2)
present the results of DD and CDS, respectively. The results show that CGI has a positive
(negative) and statistically significant relationship with DD (CDS), suggesting that firms
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with higher corporate governance quality face a lower probability of default risk. The
result shows that a one-unit rise in CGI increases (decreases) DD (CDS) by 0.396 and 0.0032 points, respectively. In terms of the economic significance of the results, an
increase in CGI by one standard deviation increases DD and decreases CDS by 15.52
percent and 14.62 percent of its mean, respectively. In terms of ownership structure, only
foreign ownership is found to reduce the probability of default.
5.4.2.2 Effect of ownership structure
In this section, this study further examines the impact of corporate governance on the
level of earnings management under different types of ownership, SOEs and non-SOEs,
high and low foreign ownership, and high and low concentrated ownership. According to
Article 4 under the Law on Enterprise 2005, a firm is identified as an SOE if the
government holds more than 50 percent of the outstanding shares. In this study,
Vietnamese listed firms have high state ownership, with an average of 24 percent in this
study. This is partly because many listed companies were previously SOEs. In many
privatised SOEs, the government maintains a controlling interest of at least 50 percent
state equity and acts as the key shareholder. The state also appoints directors to the firm’s
board of directors and its chief executive officer (CEO) who represents the equity of the
state. This type of government intervention is also witnessed in public companies without
significant levels of state ownership (Tran & Holloway 2014). Hai and O'Donelle (2017);
Kim and Tru (2019) examine the reform of SOEs in Vietnam and conclude that SOEs
present a challenge to the economy because of their poor performance and inefficiency
of resource allocation. This can be explained by SOEs’ concentrated ownership that
reduces the disciplinary effect of the capital market. Li et al. (2008); Wang and Deng
(2006) and Li et al. (2015) suggest that firms with state shareholding may be placed public
responsibilities for attracting equity capital, promoting employment, and stimulating
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economic growth. As the severe impacts of delisting may damage the political prospects,
the state is more likely to protect those distressed companies from being delisted. In
contrast, non-SOEs are controlled by private sector entities whose ultimate goal is to
maximise shareholder wealth. They are subjected to stricter monitoring and strong
incentives to perform well. It is, therefore, expected that the impact of corporate
governance on the risk of involuntary delisting is more substantial in non-SOEs and
SOEs.
Foreign investors have been documented as having higher commitments and longer-term
investment horizons in emerging markets (Kabir & Thai 2017). However, at a low level
of shareholding, foreign ownership does not facilitate foreign investors’ engagement in
monitoring activities because they can easily offload their shares without huge losses. In
contrast, when foreign investors hold a sufficiently large proportion of the shares, the
option to exit becomes more expensive due to the substantial discounts on the sales of
large blocks. Moreover, given the significant monetary value tied to the large
shareholding, foreign investors may lose more than small investors if they remain inactive
or choose to be less-informed about their invested firms. Thus, at high ownership levels,
where monitoring becomes less costly than the exit option, foreign shareholders have
strong incentives to supervise their invested firms, resulting in better monitoring and
higher firm performance. Nhung and Okuda (2015) document that foreign investors
provide vital resources to the survival of businesses such as managerial expertise and
superior technology.
In Vietnam, most foreign investors are from advanced economies where shareholders are
more educated or aware about corporate law, strong minority shareholder protection, and
strict disclosure requirements. They possess higher expertise and can effectively monitor
the top management team since they are independent of the management. Lel (2019)
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documents that in countries with weak investor protection laws in place, foreign investors
are more active in the corporate governance environment than are domestic investors.
They are willing to take corrective actions by intervening in management issues. This
forces firms with high foreign ownership to monitor better so that agency costs are
curtailed or minimised. Therefore, it is postulated that the impact of corporate governance
quality on the risk of delisting may be stronger in firms with high foreign ownership.
In Vietnam, the average share ownership of the top five largest shareholders is
approximately 48 percent of the outstanding equity, which indicates the existence of high
concentrated ownership in Vietnamese listed firms. While the interest-alignment
hypothesis suggests that controlling shareholders have the incentives to exercise control
over management and power to implement necessary changes when poor performance is
evident, the entrenchment hypothesis proposes that the dominance of ownership
concentration may impede the monitoring functions of the board. Controlling
shareholders might select directors who are less likely to monitor and are more likely to
make decisions supporting their interests (Yeh & Woidtke 2005). Not surprisingly, there
is a risk of collusion between controlling shareholders and their selected directors to
exploit the benefits of minority shareholders, resulting in a negative association with firm
performance and valuation (Lin et al. 2010). In emerging markets, where there is weak
protection for minority shareholders, agency conflicts between controlling and minority
shareholders are relatively high. Thus, ownership concentration may lead to a situation
where large shareholders exercise their control rights and gain self-interest at the expense
of minority shareholders (Liu, Q et al. 2015). The so-called expropriation effect can
remove any benefits of concentrated ownership in emerging markets, resulting in poorer
firm performance and higher probability of delisting. Considering the institutional setting
in Vietnam where external shareholder protection is weak and the threat of civil litigation
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is absent (IFC 2010; Tran & Holloway 2014), which encourages expropriating activities,
it is expected that the benefits of good corporate governance on reducing the risk of
delisting will be less in firms with high ownership concentration.
The sample is split into six subsamples: SOEs and non-SOEs, high and low foreign
ownership, high and low concentrated ownership. A firm is identified as an SOE if the
government holds more than 50 percent of the outstanding shares. Based on sample
median, firms are classified into high foreign and concentrated ownership (e.g., if foreign
and top five largest ownership is higher or equal the sample median), and low foreign and
concentrated ownership (e.g., if foreign and top five largest ownership is lower than the
sample median). Empirically, Equations (4) and (5) are re-estimated using six separate
subsamples. Regression results are estimated using logistic and Cox proportional hazards
methods and are reported in Table 5.11. Specifically, Panels A, B, and C respectively
summarise the results of using subsamples of non-SOEs and SOEs, high and low foreign
ownership, and high and low concentrated ownership.
Table 5.11 Corporate governance and the risk of involuntary delisting: The role of
ownership structure
Panel A: Non – SOEs and SOEs
Variables
CGI
Forown
Top5
RE_TA
Rev_TA
OCF_TA
WC_TA

Non-SOEs
Logit
Hazards
(1)
(2)
-3.3405***
-3.8596***
(57.2633)
(106.4581)
-2.7243***
-3.9407***
(20.5913)
(46.3281)
0.4270
0.4449**
(2.4544)
(4.0101)
-5.0525***
-1.9936***
(99.2930)
(35.3767)
-0.4448***
-0.2745***
(33.0628)
(17.8179)
-1.4747**
-1.3670***
(6.6025)
(6.9556)
-0.4994*
-0.4407**
(3.6077)
(4.0144)
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Logit
(3)
-0.1286
(0.0180)
-6.6156**
(4.3824)
-0.4758
(0.1593)
-2.7212*
(3.6992)
-0.5788***
(11.1027)
-6.6005***
(22.9783)
-0.9684
(2.2101)

SOEs
Hazards
(4)
-1.8362**
(4.5754)
-13.7644***
(14.9500)
-2.2345**
(4.9054)
-0.3572
(0.1115)
-0.5831
(15.3473)
-6.7527***
(30.5944)
-0.8785
(2.4116)

Rsize
Mlev
ln_age
MTB
Likelihood ratio
Censored firm-year obs.
Delisted firm-year obs.

-0.1476***
(11.0008)
0.0737***
(36.0194)
-0.4364***
(35.5410)
0.2119**
(6.3053)
638.0203
(<.0001)
2412
622

0.0141
(0.1411)
0.0318***
(13.6750)
-0.7529***
(115.1298)
0.0804
(1.6071)
629.8090
(<.0001)
2412
622

-0.6577***
(37.9545)
0.0790***
(11.7335)
0.3626**
(4.6443)
0.9384***
(18.3275)
244.9888
(<.0001)
1161
130

-0.3628***
(15.4121)
0.0199
(1.4478)
0.0051
(0.0011)
0.4404***
(9.6806)
212.7468
(<.0001)
1161
130

Panel B: High and low foreign ownership
High foreign ownership
Variables
Logit
Hazards
(1)
(2)
CGI
-4.4212***
-4.6813***
(34.3184)
(49.6336)
Govown
-2.3646***
-1.8806***
(22.6110)
(18.3596)
Top5
0.7935
0.7758*
(2.5701)
(3.1239)
RE_TA
-4.4056***
-1.7072***
(29.3065)
(9.0718)
Rev_TA
-0.3479***
-0.2510**
(8.0360)
(5.6430)
OCF_TA
-2.3440**
-2.4069***
(6.6051)
(9.1109)
WC_TA
-2.0075***
-2.0453***
(15.7575)
(21.2591)
Rsize
-0.4540***
-0.2604***
(44.3512)
(19.6043)
Mlev
0.0987***
0.0319*
(18.5321)
(3.3869)
ln_age
-0.1419
-0.3998***
(1.1164)
(9.6450)
MTB
0.6329***
0.3113***
(22.7782)
(7.6970)
Likelihood ratio
332.6551
276.1131
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
Censored firm-year obs.
1810
1810
Delisted firm-year obs.
190
190

Low foreign ownership
Logit
Hazards
(3)
(4)
-2.5830***
-3.3494***
(26.8627)
(62.2045)
-1.4643***
-0.5455**
(26.0486)
(5.1129)
0.0507
-0.1207
(0.0231)
(0.2080)
-4.6685***
-1.0742***
(54.8488)
(7.0990)
-0.4802***
-0.3252***
(30.0334)
(20.1866)
-2.7525***
-2.7243***
(17.3568)
(20.0741)
0.0672
0.0380
(0.0564)
(0.0273)
-0.1637***
-0.0196
(9.5910)
(0.1925)
0.0626***
0.0411***
(25.8597)
(20.9700)
-0.2651***
-0.6568***
(11.6751)
(78.0052)
0.2289**
0.2426***
(5.5722)
(12.6093)
402.9417
341.2880
(<.0001)
(<.0001)
1644
1644
527
527

Panel C: High and low concentrated ownership
High concentrated ownership
Variables
Logit
Hazards
(1)
(2)

Low concentrated ownership
Logit
Hazards
(3)
(4)
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CGI
Govown
Forown
RE_TA
Rev_TA
OCF_TA
WC_TA
Rsize
Mlev
ln_age
MTB
Likelihood ratio
Censored firm-year obs.
Delisted firm-year obs.

-2.1066***
(2.3983)
-2.0055***
(8.5721)
-2.1013**
(36.4696)
-7.0604***
(5.9514)
-0.1759*
(58.0184)
-3.8068***
(3.2050)
-0.5303
(18.4747)
-0.3553***
(1.5361)
0.0997***
(29.4464)
-0.3464***
(28.1615)
0.5076***
(8.8464)
428.1564
(<.0001)
1660
250

-3.1977***
(25.7702)
-1.4523***
(28.4940)
-2.7896***
(12.2049)
-2.3513***
(18.9599)
-0.1635**
(3.9237)
-3.1583***
(15.5781)
-0.5104
(2.0556)
-0.1404***
(6.9665)
0.0523***
(17.6617)
-0.6955***
(44.1243)
0.2128**
(5.9532)
349.1492
(<.0001)
1660
250

-2.9711***
(38.6904)
-0.7231**
(4.9677)
-3.3328***
(16.6157)
-3.6473***
(40.5873)
-0.7249***
(54.2465)
-1.7508***
(7.1653)
-0.4372
(2.2024)
-0.2061***
(15.0827)
0.0569***
(18.8829)
-0.1965**
(6.0031)
0.2568**
(6.3216)
462.6066
(<.0001)
1913
502

-3.5954***
(77.0816)
0.1332
(0.2359)
-5.2312***
(39.7387)
-1.1346***
(7.7871)
-0.5187***
(39.3653)
-1.9518***
(10.9703)
-0.4993**
(3.9782)
-0.0400
(0.7687)
0.0180*
(3.5982)
-0.5063***
(44.1050)
0.1969***
(7.3488)
450.4229
(<.0001)
1913
502

The table shows the different effects of corporate governance on the risk of delisting based on different types
of ownership using Logit and Cox proportional hazards models. See Table 5.3 for definitions of variables. A
firm is considered to be a SOE and having high foreign and concentrated ownership if its government
ownership is higher than 50 percent of the outstanding shares, its foreign and top five largest ownership is
higher than the sample median, respectively, and vice versa. Figures in parentheses are Chi-square statistics.
Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

It is observed that the coefficients of CGI using logistic and Cox proportional hazards
methods are -3.3405 and -3.8596 for non-SOEs, which are significant at the one percent
level, and -0.1286 and -1.8362 for SOEs, which are insignificant and significant at the
five percent level, respectively. These results propose that corporate governance quality
reduces the probability of delisting, and this is stronger in non-SOEs as reflected by the
more significant and larger coefficients of CGI for non – SOEs. Consistent with the
expectation, the larger magnitude of coefficients for firms with high foreign ownership
and low concentrated ownership also suggest that the association between corporate
governance and delisting risk is more substantial in firms with higher foreign ownership
and lower concentrated ownership.
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5.4.2.3 Effect of growth opportunities
Growth opportunities have been documented as affecting the level of information
asymmetry among firms. Ali et al. (2018) suggest that in firms with higher growth
opportunities, the issue of information asymmetry is more severe as managers are more
likely to obtain more private information about firms’ future projects. High growth
businesses are; therefore, subject to higher monitoring costs (Linck et al. 2008), which
may influence their governance structure and outcomes. Ali et al. (2018) document the
role of corporate governance in reducing the risk of default by eliminating information
asymmetry between managers and shareholders, especially in high growth firms which
may suffer more from such a problem. It is proposed that corporate governance has a
stronger effect on the risk of delisting in firms with more growth opportunities.
Following Ali et al. (2018) and Hazarika et al. (2012), two proxies for firms’ growth
opportunities are used, i.e. the market-to-book (MTB) and Tobin’s Q (TobinQ). Marketto-book is the market value of equity divided by its book value, while Tobin’s Q equals
the market value of a company divided by its book value of assets. Higher MTB and
TobinQ imply higher growth opportunities. To test the conjecture, the sample is split into
two subsamples of firms based on the sample median. Firms are classified into high
growth opportunities (e.g., if MTB and TobinQ are higher than the sample mean), and
vice versa. Equations (4) and (5) are re-estimated using these subsamples separately and
report the results in Table 5.12. Panel A and B present the results using MTB and TobinQ
as a proxy for growth opportunities, respectively.
Table 5.12 Corporate governance and the risk of involuntary delisting: The role of
growth opportunities
Panel A: High and low growth opportunities (MTB)
High MTB
Variables
Logit
Hazards
(1)
(2)
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Logit
(3)

Low MTB
Hazards
(4)

CGI
Govown
Forown
Top5
RE_TA
Rev_TA
OCF_TA
WC_TA
Rsize
Mlev
ln_age
MTB
Likelihood ratio
Censored firm-year obs.
Delisted firm-year obs.

-3.4344***
(27.8805)
-1.5593***
(17.7473)
-2.2808***
(7.1178)
0.5837
(1.8965)
-4.6436***
(38.2350)
-0.3276***
(11.6858)
-2.4306***
(11.6991)
-0.8216**
(4.5784)
-0.3491***
(29.6490)
0.0842***
(10.5458)
-0.2597***
(6.9739)
0.4470***
(17.7590)
391.0152
(<.0001)
1886
278

-3.7960***
(44.7495)
-1.0307***
(10.4731)
-3.7348***
(19.5724)
0.3565
(1.0298)
-1.6261***
(10.7327)
-0.2467***
(8.8316)
-2.4751***
(14.1026)
-0.7394**
(4.9873)
-0.1568***
(8.1411)
0.0237
(2.4893)
-0.5332***
(32.2043)
0.1805**
(5.3703)
326.4788
(<.0001)
1886
278

Panel B: High and low growth opportunities (TobinQ)
High TobinQ
Variables
Logit
Hazards
(1)
(2)
CGI
-3.2860***
-3.8444***
(29.9053)
(55.7415)
Govown
-1.4981***
-0.8635***
(17.6519)
(8.6227)
Forown
-2.0104**
-3.7061***
(5.6727)
(20.8245)
Top5
0.6454
0.3819
(2.4063)
(1.3213)
RE_TA
-5.1488***
-1.4728***
(48.1687)
(10.8942)
Rev_TA
-0.3215***
-0.2497***
(12.2222)
(10.0967)
OCF_TA
-2.6144***
-2.5925***
(14.0718)
(17.0163)
WC_TA
-1.0260***
-0.7233**
(7.3481)
(5.2348)
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-2.6369***
(26.7237)
-1.7222***
(28.3980)
-3.1426***
(14.4580)
0.2936
(0.6852)
-4.5230***
(51.3642)
-0.6144***
(33.9158)
-2.9153***
(13.8722)
-0.2209
(0.4915)
-0.1944***
(13.0556)
0.0698***
(29.7353)
-0.2427***
(7.4678)
-0.00827
(0.0004)
450.0224
(<.0001)
1687
474

-3.5298***
(63.9538)
-1.1538***
(19.0710)
-4.0487***
(26.3695)
0.4850*
(2.7260)
-1.6055***
(13.7818)
-0.4677***
(27.6401)
-2.6014***
(14.5537)
-0.2802
(1.1150)
-0.0580
(1.5682)
0.0389***
(16.3958)
-0.5804***
(49.3176)
-0.0720
(0.0417)
415.4714
(<.0001)
1687
474

Low TobinQ
Logit
Hazards
(3)
(4)
-2.6610***
-3.3659***
(24.0999)
(51.0320)
-1.7934***
-1.2453***
(28.7161)
(19.4854)
-3.4783***
-4.2757***
(16.5238)
(26.8147)
0.2397
0.3725
(0.4440)
(1.4898)
-3.9498***
-1.6188***
(36.5520)
(10.7515)
-0.6430***
-0.4656***
(33.1375)
(24.2073)
-2.7777***
-2.5284***
(12.0846)
(12.6072)
-0.00317
-0.2257
(0.0001)
(0.6705)

Rsize
Mlev
ln_age
MTB
Likelihood ratio
Censored firm-year obs.
Delisted firm-year obs.

-0.3463***
(29.4886)
0.0649***
(14.1922)
-0.2538***
(7.0148)
0.3751***
(12.5749)
504.7368
(<.0001)
1801
334

-0.1413***
(7.4299)
0.0206*
(3.6308)
-0.5183***
(35.1166)
0.1424**
(4.2043)
428.3462
(<.0001)
1801
334

-0.1974***
(12.9844)
0.0641***
(17.9065)
-0.2366***
(6.7908)
-0.5697
(1.8582)
403.3484
(<.0001)
1772
418

-0.0579
(1.4127)
0.0351***
(8.5637)
-0.6157***
(48.8030)
-0.6780*
(3.1101)
391.0182
(<.0001)
1772
418

The table shows the different effects of corporate governance on the risk of delisting based on different types
of ownership using Logit and Cox proportional hazards models. See Table 5.3 for definitions of variables. A
firm is considered to be high growth if its market-to-book or Tobin’s Q is higher than the sample median, and
vice versa. Figures in parentheses are Chi-square statistics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

The coefficients of CGI using logistic and Cox proportional hazards methods are -3.4344
and -3.7960 for high growth firms and -2.6369 and -3.5298 for low growth firms,
respectively, using MTB as a proxy for growth opportunities. The results are quite similar
using TobinQ as an alternative proxy. These results suggest that corporate governance
quality reduces the probability of delisting, and this is stronger in high growth firms as
reflected by the larger coefficients of CGI for firms with higher growth opportunities.
This supports the argument that when information asymmetry is higher, corporate
governance plays a more critical role in monitoring management. The finding also
complements the literature that suggests the impact of corporate governance on firm
outcomes depends on different types of businesses (Arun et al. 2015).
5.4.3 Model validation
Table 5.13 reports the AUROC results for both the logistic and Cox proportional hazards
models. The reported results for both models are for four different regressions: firstly, a
regression that includes only accounting information; secondly, a regression that includes
market-based information; thirdly, a regression that includes both accounting and marketbased information; and fourthly, a regression that includes corporate governance index,
ownership variables, accounting and market-based information.
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Table 5.13. Predictive accuracy – area under the ROC curve
Random forecast

Logit
0.5

Hazards
0.5

Stock model with accounting information

0.817

0.772

Stock model with market-based information

0.792

0.794

Stock model with accounting and market-based information

0.836

0.802

Stock model with CGI, ownership variables, and accounting

0.852

0.809

and market-based information
This table reports the predictive accuracy of out-of-sample of models with corporate governance
variables and the stock model using ROC curves. ROC curve measures the ability of the model to
precisely distinguish between listing and delisting firms by comparing the out-of-sample forecasts
generated by the model with the actual outcomes. The AUROC estimates for all models are reported
separately. The higher the AUROC, the better the prediction.

The logit stock model that includes financial ratios and market-driven variables has an
AUROC of 0.836. When CGI and ownership variables are added to the stock model, the
AUROC estimate becomes 0.852. In similar fashion, the AUROC estimates for the
hazards model show the improvement of the predictive accuracy of the stock model by
adding corporate governance variables. The AUROC estimate of the stock model
increases slightly from 0.802 to 0.809 when CGI and ownership variables are added to
the model with financial ratios and market-driven variables. The AUROC results for the
logit and hazards models reveal that adding corporate governance variables to the stock
model that includes only accounting-driven and market-driven variables can improve the
forecast accuracy of the model. However, the effect is marginal.
5.5 Conclusion
This study examines the impact of corporate governance on the risk of involuntary
delisting using hand-collected data of 815 Vietnamese non-financial firms from 2008 to
2019. The results suggest that firms with better corporate governance mechanisms, higher
government ownership, and higher foreign ownership are strongly associated with a lower
level of delisting risk. These findings are robust to the use of two prediction models: a
logistic and Cox proportional hazards model. Results remain unchanged after the
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application of an alternative measure of financial distress and using alternative model
specifications to address endogeneity biases. Findings are consistent with those of prior
studies pointing out good corporate governance reduces agency and information costs and
enhances firms’ survival chances (Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003; Chancharat et al. 2012).
This study delves into firm characteristics to explain the negative relationship between
corporate governance and the probability of delisting. The analysis shows that the linkage
is more significant in non-SOEs, firms with high foreign ownership and low ownership
concentration, and high growth firms. Our results provide evidence that corporate
governance slightly improves the predictive accuracy of the delisting prediction model.
This study is relevant to a wide range of interest groups for the following reasons. The
insight from the empirical work is that a well-governed firm has a safety net in place for
the protection of minority shareholders. Proper corporate governance mechanisms result
in a lower risk of involuntary delisting, ostensibly due to a decrease in agency and
information costs. Directors of poorly governed firms should make the necessary changes
in their corporate governance practices to prevent the risk of delisting. Research evidence
can be a source of reference for investors to invest in firms that have less risk of delisting.
Creditors can also view a deficient corporate governance structure as a potential red flag
and request their debt covenants be more stringent. The lack of research on corporate
governance in Vietnam suggests that the findings have important policy implications for
the regulators as they endeavour to enhance corporate governance. Since one of the goals
of delisting unqualified firms is to protect the wealth of minority investors and strengthen
the capital market, the regulators should be able to monitor firms effectively and protect
investors from indiscreet investment. This study provides insight into regulating suitable
governance mechanisms to avoid possible losses.
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6. CHAPTER 6 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EARNINGS
MANAGEMENT
6.1

Introduction

Earnings management has long caught the special attention of academics and
policymakers. Klein (2002) defines earnings management as a false statement of the
actual performance of a firm by its insiders, which occurs when managers misuse their
judgment/discretion to manipulate the transactions in financial reports to either misinform
stakeholders about the underlying firm performance or to affect contractual outcomes that
are determined by the reported information (Healy & Wahlen 1999). The distortion of
financial statements has been documented to be extremely costly for shareholders and
other stakeholders because the information disclosed by firms is expected to enable them
to make informed decisions and challenge firms through shareholder motions if necessary
(Dechow et al. 2010). As a consequence, capital markets cannot value stock correctly,
resulting in market inefficiency and severe damages to stakeholders. Chen et al. (2007)
emphasise a significant role of corporate governance in stimulating transparency and
efficiency, protecting minority shareholders’ wealth, ensuring the fair treatment of all
shareholders, and facilitating the timely and accurate disclosure of all material matters.
Deficient corporate governance mechanisms may result in severe agency costs and
information asymmetry (Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003), which encourage managerial
misbehaviour. García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2009) propose that corporate
governance helps to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders and to
enhance the credibility of accounting information. Therefore, one crucial question that
remains relatively under-researched in the literature is: does better corporate governance
quality reduce earnings management?
The infamous scandals involving Enron, Worldcom, Olympus, Parmalat, and Toshiba, to
126

name but a few, have thrown up numerous questions about the efficiency of accounting,
auditing, and corporate governance practices. Di Miceli da Silveira (2013) reveals that
Enron’s internal governance failures and the recklessness of its stakeholders enabled it to
take full advantage of accounting loopholes to manipulate its earnings and conceal its
heavy losses. As a result, the international trend has been to ensure corporate governance
mechanisms can correctly monitor earnings management activities. Bao and Lewellyn
(2017) and Lel (2019), in their multi-country studies, find that firms in emerging markets
where the rule of law is weak or ignored manipulate earnings to a much higher level
compared to those in more advanced economies. They argue that in developed countries,
effective and competent legal systems help restrain earnings manipulation activities. In
particular, legal actions against firms are common, and the threat of civil litigation is the
key factor that constrains corporate misbehaviour or corruption. Conversely, in emerging
markets, especially in Vietnam, civil lawsuits against listed firms are rare, and regulators,
i.e. the State Securities Commission (SSC) in Vietnam, are the prime discipliner of firms
(Chen et al. 2006). Moreover, the distinctive institutional conditions of Vietnam are its
unique administrative governance approach, the prevalence of listed companies who are
former state-owned enterprises, and the dominance of concentrated ownership. These
further encourage highly aggressive and inappropriate earnings management.
Earnings management has attracted special public attention as a result of recent corporate
scandals in Vietnam. For instance, Vien Dong Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Company
(DVD), one of the most promising companies in the pharmaceutical industry, faced
bankruptcy in 2011. Even though DVD experienced significant losses, it was successful
at fooling its investors and regulators with impressive financial performance. In
particular, in 2009, the firm’s growth rate of net profit after tax was 325 percent, which
outperformed all its rivals. Inefficient corporate governance practices, such as the
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excessive concentration of power in the hands of top leaders, an inefficient board structure
with conflicts of interest, and an ornamental supervisory board were blamed for assisting
DVD management in defrauding its stakeholders. Similarly, other companies, such as
Hoang Anh Gia Lai Group JSC (HAG) and Ho Chi Minh Infrastructure Investment JSC
(CII), inflated their earnings to attract investors. In contrast, other firms such as Quoc
Cuong Gia Lai JSC (QCG) and Nafoods Group JSC (NAF), were revealed to have
manipulated their earnings downward for specific reasons (Tap chi tai chinh 2020). These
scandals motivate the study to explore the role of corporate governance quality as a
significant driver of earnings management.
Prior research has documented the role of different corporate governance attributes in
limiting earnings management activities; however, mostly in developed economies, and
the empirical results from these findings remain inconclusive. For instance, Klein (2002)
investigate firms listed on the S&P500 and conclude that board and audit committee
independence disincentivises earnings manipulation. In the same vein, Davidson et al.
(2005) find that Australian listed firms with a majority of non-executive directors on the
board and the audit committee can restrain earnings management, while the choice of
auditor and the formation of an internal audit function do not affect the level of
discretionary accruals. Compared to this, Park and Shin (2004) do not find ordinary
outside directors play a significant role in supervising managerial earnings management
activities in Canada. However, they suggest that outside directors with financial expertise
play a much more critical role in influencing the incentives to distort earnings. Overall,
these studies consider specific characteristics of the governance structure and ignore the
possibility that other governance mechanisms may be complements, which means
missing out on the effects of composite corporate governance quality. Moreover, these
governance mechanisms vary across studies (i.e. across different firms and samples) and
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show mixed results. By investigating the impact of a combined governance index on
earnings management, this study extends the literature that explores the determinants of
earnings manipulation.
Additionally, despite the importance of detecting earnings management, there is only one
study, by Essa et al. (2016), that examines the association between corporate governance
and earnings management in Vietnam. However, this study is subject to methodology
limitations. They consider only one governance mechanism, i.e. the board size, which
may not provide an accurate picture of a firm’s governance structure. Furthermore, they
do not take into account endogeneity bias, which is prevalent in corporate governance
research (Ali et al. 2018; Wintoki et al. 2012), resulting in potentially biased estimates.
Given the inconsistent findings in the literature, the absence of prior research in Vietnam,
and the unique institutional setting of Vietnam which is more susceptible to earnings
management, whether managers who undertake opportunistic activities can be disciplined
by efficient corporate governance mechanisms in Vietnamese listed firms is an open and
interesting empirical question. This study may provide new insights into the earnings
management practices in an emerging market economy with different characteristics
compared to other more developed economies.
This study examines the impact of corporate governance on earnings management
measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals, using the sample of 800 nonfinancial firms (5,434 firm-year observations) listed on either the Ho Chi Minh Stock
Exchange (HOSE) or the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) from 2008 to 2018. This thesis
employs 13 characteristics of governance structure, taking into account substantial
aspects of the Corporate Governance Codes and the Vietnam Corporate Governance Code
of Best Practices (SSC & IFC 2019) to establish a corporate governance index measurable
in Vietnam. This index can avoid the mixed findings resulting from using specific
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governance attributes, which have raised difficulties for the stock market and other
investors when making investment decisions. With this proxy measure, a firm’s
governance structure can be evaluated as a whole, and stakeholders can have a better
insight into firms’ corporate governance quality. The finding from this study is
statistically and economically significant, suggesting that better-governed firms
experience a lower level of earnings management. In particular, this study finds that an
increase in the corporate governance quality-index by one standard deviation decreases
the standard deviation of the absolute value of discretionary accruals by 5.10 percent.
Corporate governance mechanisms that comply with the Corporate Governance Codes
and best practices help discipline listed firms and discourage the incentive to engage in
earnings management. This index-based finding may have merit in contemplating the
establishment of an inclusive code of corporate governance, in contrast to the application
of individual governance attributes.
The robustness of the result is then checked and it is confirmed that the finding is robust
to endogeneity issues, and to alternative measures of earnings management. In particular,
to mitigate the unobserved heterogeneity, the random effects model is employed. The
changes in discretionary accruals when corporate governance quality changes are then
examined and two-stage least squares method (2SLS) is employed to deal with
simultaneity. Finally, the propensity matching score method (PSM) is used to eliminate
the sample selection bias. The result in this study is consistent across alternative model
specifications and unaffected by the endogeneity bias.
The role of institutional characteristics of Vietnamese firms (such as ownership structure
and growth opportunities) is further investigated as a potential mechanism to explain the
results. First, corporate governance quality is found to have significant effects on earnings
management in private firms, firms with high foreign ownership and low concentrated
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ownership. The findings reveal that lower earnings management driven by better
corporate governance may be partially attributed to firms’ growth opportunities. The
significant effect of corporate governance on earnings manipulation is only experienced
in high growth firms.
This study contributes to the current literature in four ways. First, prior research (Ali &
Zhang 2015; Davidson et al. 2005; Park & Shin 2004) among others, which examine the
impact of specific governance mechanisms on earnings management is extended. This
study is the first to provide evidence that firms with higher aggregate governance quality
exhibit a lower level of earnings management, even after corrections for endogeneity bias.
Second, this study offers country-specific evidence about the connection between
corporate governance quality and earnings management in Vietnam, a fast-growing
economy characterised by high ownership concentration, intensive government
intervention, a code-law system, and low investor protection. By examining the level of
compliance with the corporate governance regulations, it is confirmed that the exchanges’
and SSC’s assertions that for listed companies, better corporate governance practices can
curb earnings management and increase accounting information quality presented by
insiders to outsiders. The governance index can be used as one of the selection criteria by
investors to avoid investing in stocks that are more likely to provide unreliable financial
information and can be applied in other emerging markets that have similar corporate
governance mechanisms like Vietnam. Third, this study extends the prior corporate
governance literature in Vietnam, which is mainly related to firm performance (Nguyen
et al. 2017; Vo & Nguyen 2014) and the literature on earnings management in Vietnam
which is under-examined. Finally, this study augments the existing literature by using
resource dependence theory to complement agency theory in order to explain the nexus
between corporate governance and earnings management.
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While the extant literature mainly employs agency theory to explain the role of corporate
governance in limiting earnings manipulation, this study reveals that the association
between corporate governance and the tendency of earnings management cannot be
explained by any single theory. Agency and resource dependence theories are viewed as
being complementary in explaining this relationship. The remainder of the chapter is
organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses hypothesis development. Section 6.3
illustrates the data and the research method. Section 6.4 discusses the empirical results.
Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.
6.2

Literature review and hypothesis development

The role of corporate governance is to mitigate the agency problem and reduce agency
costs to maximise the wealth of shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Prior studies find
that companies with good corporate governance have better performance (Larcker et al.
2007), higher stock liquidity (Ali et al. 2017) and a lower probability of default risk
(Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003). Specifically, strong corporate governance mitigates
information asymmetry between insiders (e.g., managers) and outsiders (e.g., investors),
as well as among outsiders; thus, enhance corporate information transparency (Leuz et al.
2003). Because managers tend to have private information and firm-specific experience
in all aspects of firms’ businesses, severe moral hazard problems can arise out of the
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.
Opportunistic managers may act in their own interests and transfer the firm’s wealth to
themselves at the expense of stakeholders. This implies that reducing agency costs and
information costs might decrease managerial opportunism (Ali et al. 2018) and increase
firm performance (Duchin et al. 2010). Badolato et al. (2014), Davidson et al. (2005) and
Klein (2002) have documented the benefits of internal governance mechanisms, such as
audit committee and board of director characteristics in lowering agency costs and
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information asymmetries, which results in limiting the opportunity to distort earnings.
Therefore, while constructing a corporate governance index, this study focuses on the
features of the board of directors and supervisory board19.
The corporate governance proxy in this study covers two dimensions of corporate
governance, namely, board of directors and supervisory board, which comprise 13
governance attributes. The attributes stem from the Corporate Governance Codes and the
Vietnam Corporate Governance Code of Best Practices (SSC & IFC 2019), and constitute
a corporate governance index (CGI) for the Vietnamese firms. While the well-known
Gompers et al. (2003) governance index measures firms’ anti-takeover mechanism, the
governance index in this study underlines internal governance mechanism.
Since the market for corporate control is immature in Vietnam, this study does not
consider the threat of takeover as a corporate governance mechanism. The index in this
study is rather closer to Brown and Caylor (2004) and the Horwath/University of
Newcastle corporate governance report (2002). However, due to the differences among
the institutional settings of the US, Australia, and Vietnam as well as the data availability
issues, the index has to disregard some aspects, such as progressive practices, and include
other features that are more relevant to the Vietnamese market, such as the supervisory
board. The following section reviews each corporate governance attribute and
demonstrates how it influences monitoring and advising functions of the board.
6.2.1 Board of directors
CEO duality is one of the key features of board structure, which has attracted much
attention from regulators and researchers. In Vietnam, Corporate Governance Codes
prevent the chairperson from serving as a CEO simultaneously unless it is approved by
the annual general meeting of shareholders (see article 10 of Decision 12 and Circular
21). Agency theorists indicate that a unified leadership results in a more powerful
19

In Vietnam, the functions of the supervisory board are similar to, but broader compared to, the
audit committee.
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CEO/chairperson, which may impair the board’s effectiveness in monitoring managerial
opportunism (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen 1993), potentially leading to an escalation of
agency costs and entrenchment risks (Fama & Jensen 1983). Consistent with this
argument, prior research indicates that firms committing fraud tend to have CEOs who
also serve as the chairman (Chen et al. 2006). In the same vein, Lo et al. (2010) examine
266 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and find that CEO duality leads to
more opportunistic behaviour by managers, in particular, transfer pricing manipulation.
The CEO duality indicator is set equal to one, zero otherwise.
Another major aspect of the board of directors is board independence. Decision 12 and
Circular 121, Article 11 and Decree 71, Article 13 require approximately one-third of
directors on the board to be non-executive directors and also suggest that members of the
board of directors should not be executives, so that board independence is maintained.
Agency theorists and resource dependence theorists point out that outside directors are an
essential internal governance mechanism to ensure the effectiveness of the board by
supervising managers’ self-interested behaviour and restraining managerial opportunism
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). Outside directors are more likely to be effective than inside
directors in preventing managers from self-interested behaviors and actions (Jensen &
Meckling 1976) because they are more inclined to monitor firms very diligently. To
protect their reputation, they strive to constrain or report managerial opportunism (Fama
1980; Fama & Jensen 1983). Moreover, they can provide essential resources and expertise
to enhance firm performance (Hillman et al. 2000). Coffey and Wang (1998) suggest that
non-executive directors, who do not manage the day-to-day activities of firms and have
less financial interest in them, may offer more objective suggestions. Davidson et al.
(2005) and Klein (2002); Lo et al. (2010) provide evidence that a board that is more
independent of the management team is less likely to manipulate earnings. Non-executive
directors’ indicator is set to one if the majority of the board members are non-executive
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directors, zero otherwise. Non-executive chairperson’s indicator is equal to one if the
chairperson is not in the top management team, zero otherwise.
Board size, an essential attribute of the board structure, has drawn much attention from
regulators. In Vietnam, under Decision 12, the board of directors must have five to eleven
members (see Article 11). Agency theorists suggest that smaller boards are more efficient
because they are less likely to encounter coordination and communication problems.
Directors on a small board tend to be more involved and more efficient in their decisionmaking, and so more effective in monitoring the management team (Daily & Dalton
1994a; Jensen 1993). Chen (2014) argues that timely and correct decisions are more
critical for firms’ survival when there are sudden changes in the business setting. Unlike
this, resource dependence theorists support the notion of a larger board size, as Hillman
et al. (2009) find that they bring more resources to the firm, although Switzer and Wang
(2013) claim it is harder for managers to control a relatively large board. Previous
research on the relationship between board size and earnings management provides
inconsistent findings. While some studies demonstrate a negative association (Peasnell et
al. 2005; Rahman & Ali 2006), in contrast, Sáenz González and García-Meca (2014)
provide evidence that smaller board size is associated with a lower level of earnings
management. Meanwhile, Bao and Lewellyn (2017) and Katmon and Farooque (2017)
find that board size has no significant impact on earnings management. Chen et al. (2007),
while building their corporate governance index, suggest that a firm is well governed
when its board of directors is larger than the minimum legal requirement and smaller than
two standard deviations from the mean value of the board size. Following Chen et al.
(2007), the board size indicator is equal to one if it is well governed, zero otherwise.
The diversity of the board of directors has been documented to have significant impacts
on firm outcomes (Hoang et al. 2016a, 2016b). Decree 71 promotes board diversity
and requires that a balanced contribution must be made among board members in having
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knowledge and experience in law, finance, and business operations of the company, and
gender in their structure (see Article 13). From the fiduciary perspective, board diversity
can be effective in establishing better monitoring and controlling mechanisms, as
underpinned by the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Meanwhile, from the
advisory perspective, ﬁrms depend on board members’ diversity for resources, including
expertise, advice, reputation and communication networks to enhance firm performance
and the survival, as supported by resource dependence theory (Hillman et al. 2000). The
gender-diverse board has been documented as able to allocate more effort to monitoring
(Adams & Ferreira 2009), resulting in higher stock liquidity (Ahmed & Ali 2017) and
better earnings quality (Hoang et al. 2016b). The extant literature has shown positive
effects of female directors on firm performance in China (Liu et al. 2014), in Asian firms
(Low et al. 2015), and in Vietnam (Nguyen et al. 2015a). Arun et al. (2015) examine the
relationship between female directors and earnings management in the UK and find that
a high number of females is associated with less earnings manipulation, especially in
simple (low debt) firms. Thus, the gender diversity indicator is equal to one if there is at
least one female on the board of directors, zero otherwise.
Heijltjes et al. (2003) encourage diversity in terms of the nationality of top management
teams in small countries that are growing their economies internationally. This is based
on the contention that foreign directors have a better understanding of the international
business environment; they can enhance the decisions made by the board. Furthermore,
they facilitate firms’ access to global resources and now how to ensure favourable
business prospects. Milliken and Martins (1996) find that the impact of national diversity
on performance is positive in the long-term. The national diversity indicator is set to one
if there is at least one foreign director on the board, zero otherwise.
Agrawal and Nasser (2018, 2019) document that the presence of blockholder directors20

20

Blockholders are investors who own five percent or more of the outstanding equity.
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on the board leads to better contracting and monitoring over managers, lower risk, and
higher firm value. Retaining the monitoring power as a director and keeping the
ownership interest as a blockholder helps to align the interest of managers with that of
shareholders. The blockholder director indicator is equal to one if there is at least one
blockholder on the board, zero otherwise.
Prior studies find that a high level of education and experience among directors
contributes to the success of the board in terms of adopting new ideas and accepting
innovations, and offering a broader view and solutions to complex problems (Milliken &
Martins 1996; Wally & Baum 1994), thus increasing earnings quality (Lo et al. 2010).
Park and Shin (2004) examine earnings management practices in Canada and report the
importance of directors having accounting or financial backgrounds in deterring earnings
manipulation. The board education and board experience indicators are equal to one if the
majority of the board members have a postgraduate degree and if there is at least one
director having finance and accounting experience on the board, respectively, zero
otherwise.
The extant literature suggests that top official with little experience may not have an
adequate understanding of the firm, while the longer the tenure of the chairman, the better
the understanding of the firm, its rivals and industry. Therefore, they are more able to
deter fraudulent activities and reduce the incidence of earnings manipulation (Chen et al.
2006; Cornett et al. 2008). The chairman tenure indicator is equal to one for firms with
chairperson tenure higher than the sample's mean value, zero otherwise.
6.2.2 Supervisory board
Vietnam has a hybrid corporate governance system where firms have a supervisory board
(SB), which is independent of the board of directors and is meant to supervise the board
of directors and executives. According to Corporate Governance Codes, the SB does the
following: recommend the general assembly of shareholders to approve for the
137

independent external auditors to audit the financial statements of the company; take
responsibility towards shareholders for monitoring activities; oversee the financial status
of the company, legitimacy of the activities of the board of directors and the top
management team; and coordinate between the supervisory board and board of directors,
CEO, and shareholders. A supervisory board is required to have three to five members
and they must not work in the firm’s accounting and finance departments. They should
not be a member or employee of the independent auditing firm that audited the company’s
financial statements over the last three years. Chen et al. (2006) document the positive
influence of the presence of the supervisory board on the firm’s performance. Davidson
et al. (2005) study Australian listed firms and find that the presence of an audit committee
in a firm can constrain earnings management. Al-Rassas Ahmed and Kamardin (2016)
and Badolato et al. (2014) reveal that the independence and financial expertise of the audit
committee are related to higher earnings quality. Similarly, it is expected that the
supervisory board plays an essential role in overseeing the board of directors and CEO
and proposing measures to improve the management of the company, resulting in
reducing incidents of earnings manipulation. The supervisory board size indicator is set
to one for firms with a supervisory board size larger than the legal requirement (three
members). The supervisory board independence is equal to one if all supervisors are nonexecutives of the company, zero otherwise.
Corporate Governance Codes require supervisors who work in listed firms with over 50
percent of charter capital held by the state must be auditors or accountants. The head of
the supervisory board must be a professional auditor or accountant working full-time at
the company. This will ensure that supervisors are equipped with relevant expertise to
oversee the company’s financial situation. The supervisor experience indicator equal to
one if at least one supervisor has finance and accounting experience, zero otherwise. In
summary, the 13 attributes under the category of board composition and board diversity
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are recapitulated in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Description of the corporate governance index
Governance

Definition

Points allocated

categories
Panel A. Board of directors
1. CEO duality

CEO also serves as the Equals one if there is no CEO duality,
chairperson of the board zero otherwise.

2. Non-

The percentage of non- Equals one if the majority of the board

executive

executive directors on members are non-executive directors,

directors

the board

3. Non-

Chairperson is not an Equals one if the chairperson is not in the

executive

executive

zero otherwise.
top management team, zero otherwise.

chairperson
4. Board size

The number of directors Equals one for firms with board size
on the board

larger than the legal requirement (five
members) and less than two standard
deviations from the mean value of board
size, zero otherwise.

5. Gender

The number of females Equals one if there is at least one female

diversity

on the board

6. National

The number of foreign Equals one if there is at least one foreign

diversity

directors on the board

7. Blockholder

The

directors

blockholders

on the board, zero otherwise.

number
on

director on the board, zero otherwise.
of Equals one if there is at least one

the blockholder

board

on

the

board,

zero

otherwise.

8. Board

The number of directors Equals one if the majority of the board

education

who have a postgraduate members have a postgraduate degree,
degree

zero otherwise.

9. Board

The number of directors Equals one if there is at least one director

experience

who have finance and having
accounting experience

10. Chairperson

finance

and

accounting

experience on the board, zero otherwise.

The number of years Equals one for firms with chairperson
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tenure

that

the

chairperson tenure higher than the sample's mean

holds the position

value, zero otherwise.

Panel B. Supervisory board
11. Supervisory

The

number

of Equals one for firms with board size

board size

supervisors on the board larger than the legal requirement (three
members), zero otherwise.

12. Non-

The number of non- Equals one if all supervisors are not

executive

executive directors on executives

supervisors

the board

13. Supervisor

The

experience

supervisors

number

of

the

company,

zero

otherwise.
of Equal one if at least one supervisor has
having finance and accounting experience, zero

finance and accounting otherwise.
experience

6.2.3 Corporate governance index constitution
The corporate governance index (CGI) is the key independent variable in this study and
is constructed to measure the corporate governance quality of each firm in Vietnam. Prior
studies have constructed the corporate governance index including two US-based
measures, - Gompers et al. (2003) and Brown and Caylor (2004), Australia-based
Horwath/University of Newcastle corporate governance report (2002), Taiwan-based
Chen et al. (2007), and Japan-based Aman and Nguyen (2008). Each of the indexes is
constructed based on the nation’s idiosyncratic institution of governance, and thus the
index composition is yet subjective. This study finds it challenging to replicate each index
due to the absence of information/instruction provided in their studies as well as the lack
of data availability. Often is the case that model specification is missing to assign the
value for each attribute, and the selection criteria are omitted in the prior studies.
Therefore, this study addresses the issues by following the guidance of Corporate
Governance Codes and the Corporate Governance Code of Best Practices for Vietnamese
public companies to identify which attribute is related to good corporate governance
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practices in the Vietnamese market. Based on the above-mentioned 13 attributes, a
corporate governance index (CGI) has been established as a proxy of its quality. In the
absence of the standard rule of weighting in constructing the CGI, an equally weighted
scoring method that has been used in existing corporate governance literature (Ali et al.
2018; Aman & Nguyen 2008; Gompers et al. 2003) is applied. Each of these 13 attributes
has binary values as described in the previous section. The values are aggregated to
construct a composite corporate governance index ranging from zero to 13. In order to
avoid biasing the index downward, this study follows Aman and Nguyen (2008) and
normalises the corporate governance index linearly between zero and 100 percent. For
instance, if the aggregated value of the index is seven, the normalised index will be 53.85
percent (seven out of thirteen). However, if there was one missing value in the corporate
governance index, the normalised index will be 58.33 percent (seven out of twelve). The
higher the index, the better the firm is expected to be governed. This study argues that
better corporate governance enhances monitoring and advising functions of the board of
directors, which in turn reduce agency costs and information asymmetry, resulting in a
lower level of earnings management. The hypothesis is as follows:
H1. Corporate governance quality, as proxied by the corporate governance index, has a
negative relationship with earnings management.
6.3

Data and research method

6.3.1 Data and sample selection
The initial dataset of 935 firms consists of all firms listed on either the Ho Chi Minh Stock
Exchange (HOSE) or the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) during the period 2008 - 2018.
Not until 2008 did the majority of Vietnamese listed firms start to disclose information
on crucial aspects of corporate governance in their annual reports as being required by
the first corporate governance regulations in Vietnam in 2007. Consistent with the extant
literature, 64 firms in the finance sector are excluded from the sample because firms in
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the financial industry have strict regulations that have different influences on corporate
governance mechanisms, such as board structure (Bauer et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2016).
Moreover, because of their particular accounting practices, commonly used earnings
management measures may be challenging for the industry (Becker et al. 1998; Chen et
al. 2015). Thus, excluding financial companies from the sample makes the study's
findings comparable to the prior research. Furthermore, because estimating discretionary
accruals requires lagged data and at least ten firm-year observations per industry (see
Equation (2)), the sample reduces to 810 non-financial firms. The final sample, with all
required data available, contains 5,434 firm-year observations on 800 non-financial firms,
which allows the creation of a panel dataset, specifically in the control of unobserved
heterogeneity (Sáenz González & García-Meca 2014). Table 6.2 shows the sample
selection in this study.
Table 6.2 Sample selection
Sample selection
Number of listed firms on HOSE and HNX as of December

935

2018
Less number of listed finance sector firms

64

Less number of firms in the industry that has less than ten

61

firm-year observation

10

Less firms with missing data
Number of firms in the sample

800

Data were hand-collected and cross-checked through different sources, including the
websites for Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE), Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX),
Vietstock, and Cafef because there are as yet no official databases containing financial,
market, and corporate governance information on Vietnamese listed firms. Data are
available from the authors by request. To reduce the influence of extreme values in the
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data, all continuous financial data are winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles. The results
are robust to no winsorizing at all.
6.3.2 Research design
6.3.2.1 Earnings management measures
There is no perfect way to quantify earnings management (Park & Shin 2004), so the
literature has documented numerous methods to measure earnings management. Bao and
Lewellyn (2017) reveal that even though managers can manipulate earnings in many
different ways, managing operating accruals is more likely to be preferred, especially in
developing economies, because the manipulation of operating accruals does not impact
the cash flows directly and is comparatively hard to detect. Several methods have been
employed to separate discretionary (abnormal) accruals from current accruals (Dechow
et al. 2010). However, the most commonly used methods are the Jones (1991) and the
modified Jones models (Dechow et al. 1995). Both Jones and modified Jones models
estimate parameters for discretionary accruals by regressing current accruals on proxies
for non-discretionary (normal) accruals. Then, they combine the estimated parameters
with the event period data to derive discretionary accruals. Based on a large body of
literature (Bergstresser & Philippon 2006; Chen et al. 2015; Chi et al. 2015; Gaio & Pinto
2018; Katmon & Farooque 2017; Peasnell et al. 2005; Wang & Yung 2011), this study
estimates abnormal accruals using the modified Jones model. This model has been found
to be more powerful than the original Jones model in terms of detecting sales-based
manipulations (Dechow et al. 1995). To maximise the sample size and avoid survival bias
while using a firm-specific time-series approach, following Peasnell et al. (2005) and
Sáenz González and García-Meca (2014), this study estimates the modified Jones model
on a cross-sectional basis.
Following Davidson et al. (2005), Katmon and Farooque (2017) and Wang and Yung
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(2011), this study employs a cash-flow approach to calculate total accruals. Hribar and
Collins (2002) compare the accuracy of measuring accruals from the balance sheet to the
statement of cash flows and provide evidence that the cash-flow approach is superior to
the balance sheet approach. Thus, total accruals are computed as follows:
𝑇𝐴𝐶

= 𝐸𝐵𝑋𝐼

(1)

− 𝑂𝐶𝐹

Where TACijt is the total accruals for firm i in industry j in year t, EBXIit is earnings before
extraordinary items for firm i in industry j in year t, extracted from the income statement
and OCFijt is cash flow from operations for firm i in industry j in year t, obtained from
the statement of cash flows.
Following Dechow et al. (1995), to identify the non-discretionary accruals for a given
firm-year observation, the following cross-sectional models are estimated for all firms in
the same industry21. Consistent with earlier studies by Badolato et al. (2014), Dechow et
al. (1995) and Koh (2003) and others, this study requires at least ten firm-year
observations per industry:
𝑇𝐴𝐶 /𝑇𝐴

= 𝛼 [1/ 𝑇𝐴

] + 𝛽 [∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 /𝑇𝐴

] + 𝛽 [𝑃𝑃𝐸 /𝑇𝐴

]+
(2)

ε

The estimated industry-specific coefficients (𝛼 , 𝛽 , 𝛽 ) are then employed to construct
a measure of non-discretionary accruals according to the following equation:
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶 /𝑇𝐴
𝛽 [𝑃𝑃𝐸 /𝑇𝐴

= 𝛼 [1/ 𝑇𝐴
]

] + 𝛽 [(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉

− ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 )/𝑇𝐴

]+
(3)

Where TACijt is the total accruals for firm i in industry j in year t, NDACijt is the nondiscretionary accruals for firm i in industry j in year t, TAijt-1 represents the total assets for

21

According to Hoang et al. (2016a), there are no generally accepted industry classifications for
listed firms in Vietnam. So this study follows Vietstock – the oldest financial data provider in
Vietnam to use two-digit NAICS codes to classify firms operating in the same industry.
144

firm i in industry j in year t-1, ∆REVijt is the change in revenue for firm i in industry j
between year t-1 and year t, PPEijt is the level of gross property, plant, and equipment for
firm i in industry j in year t, and ∆RECijt is the change in receivables for firm i in industry
j between year t-1 and year t.
Having estimated non-discretionary accruals from equation (3), the amount of
discretionary accruals for firm i in industry j in year t is calculated as the residual from
equation (4) below:
𝐷𝐴𝐶

= 𝑇𝐴𝐶

(4)

− 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶

Each variable is deflated by the lagged value of total assets (TAt-1) to avoid
heteroscedasticity in the error term, following the existing literature.
Consistent with prior studies (Bao & Lewellyn 2017; Bergstresser & Philippon 2006;
Davidson et al. 2005; Gaio & Pinto 2018; Krishnan 2005; Wang & Yung 2011), the
absolute value of discretionary accruals is employed as the proxy for earnings
management. Hazarika et al. (2012) explain that managers can use discretionary accruals
to increase or decrease reported earnings. Earnings tend to be manipulated upwards when
managers want to boost their performance-based compensation, to raise capital, or to
avoid delisting (Xie et al. 2003). Contrary to this, incentives to manage earnings
downward may include attempts by managers to take advantage of events and
information, such as those occurring before a reissue of options or before stock
repurchases (Hazarika et al. 2012). In this way, taking the absolute value of discretionary
accruals can capture managers’ attempts to manage earnings in both directions. As the
main hypothesis focuses on the magnitude of accruals rather than the direction or sign of
manipulated accruals, this study uses the absolute value of discretionary accruals |DAC|
as a proxy of earnings management.
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6.3.2.2 Model specification
To test the reported hypothesis (H1), regression Equation (5) is formulated as follows:
|𝐷𝐴𝐶 | = α + 𝛽 𝐶𝐺𝐼 + 𝛽

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝑌𝑅 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝜐

(5)

Where |DACit| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, CGIit is
corporate governance index for firm i in year t, and Controlsi,t are the value of control
variables for firm i in year t. YRt and Indt are year dummies and industry dummies,
respectively. υit represents idiosyncratic errors in the model.
This study controls for the effect of various firm-specific characteristics by including
commonly used variables that the existing literature has found to influence the level of
earnings management, such as government ownership (Govown), foreign ownership
(Forown), ownership concentration (Top5), return on assets (ROA), market-to-book ratio
(MTB), leverage (TL_TA), firm size (Ln_TA), operating cash flow (OCF_LTA), firm age
(Age), auditor quality (Big4), firm loss (Loss), and sales growth (Sales_growth). The
definitions of all variables in this study are listed in Table 6.3 below.
Table 6.3. Definitions of Variables
Notation

Variable name

Measures

Panel A: Earnings management
|DAC|

Discretionary

The absolute value of discretionary accruals, as

accruals

measured by the cross-sectional modified Jones
model.

Panel B: Corporate governance measures
CGI

Corporate

CG Index is a self-constructed index based on

governance index

13 respective criteria and then normalised,
which ranges from zero to 100 percent each
year.

Panel C: Firm attributes
Govown

Government

The ownership percentage of the state

ownership
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Forown

Foreign ownership

The

ownership

percentage

of

foreign

shareholders
Top5
ROA

Concentrated

The ownership percentage of the top five

ownership

largest shareholders

Return on assets

Earnings before extraordinary items divided by
total assets

MTB

Market-to-book

Book value of debt divided by market value of
equity

TL_TA

Leverage

Total liabilities divided by total assets

Ln_TA

Firm size

Natural logarithm of total assets

OCF_LTA

Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged
total assets

Age

Number of years since a firm's IPO

Big4

A dummy variable that takes the value of one if
the company is audited by the big four audit
firms and zero otherwise

Loss

A dummy variable that takes the value of one if
the firm has had losses in the last two years and
zero otherwise

Sales_growth

The percentage of sales growth in the current
period

The random effects model (RE) is employed as the baseline model to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation and are clustered at the firm level (Petersen 2008). Wooldridge (2016)
concludes that the random effects model is more efficient than the fixed effects model
when the assumption that the individual-specific effect is uncorrelated with the
independent variables holds. Thus, the Hausman specification test (1978) is performed to
decide whether fixed effects or random effects are best suited to the data. Wooldridge
(2016) suggests that if the test rejects the outcome, the random effects model is biased,
and the fixed effects model is the correct estimation method. In this study, the test result
does not reject the null hypothesis of no systematic differences between the explanatory
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variables and unobserved heterogeneity, suggesting reliance on random effects. This
method is also used in similar studies by Chi et al. (2015), Liu and Lu (2007), Sáenz
González and García-Meca (2014), and Wang and Yung (2011). So it is possible for me
to assess the influence of unobserved firm-level heterogeneity.
6.3.3 Descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlation
Table 6.4 presents descriptive statistics for all firm-year observations of the entire sample.
Descriptive data on measures of discretionary accruals and other variables are reported in
Panel A of Table 6.4. The mean (median) of earnings management in terms of
discretionary accruals is 0.003 (0). Nearly 50 percent of the discretionary accruals are
positive, which shows no evidence of systematic income-increasing or income-decreasing
earnings manipulation. This may be because the sample includes all non-financial listed
firms on the Vietnamese stock exchange is a relatively random sample regarding the
incentives of earnings management (Klein 2002). Affirmed here is the decision to use the
unsigned discretionary accruals as a proxy for the combined effect of upward and
downward earnings management. The mean (median) absolute value of discretionary
accruals estimated using the modified Jones model is 0.087 (0.062), with a standard
deviation of 0.084. With reference to the corporate governance index, the mean (median)
of CGI is 0.479 (0.462), suggesting that, on average, the corporate governance practices
of the sample firms are quite weak, satisfying less than half of the best practice standards.
While on average, the state owns 24.20 percent of the company's issued equity capital,
those owned by the foreign shareholders and top five largest shareholders are 9.00 percent
and 47.90 percent, respectively. This indicates the high levels of government ownership
and ownership concentration among listed firms in Vietnam. The means (medians) of
return on assets (ROA) and growth opportunities (MTB) are 0.050 (0.045) and 1.013
(0.784), respectively. They carry a high level of debt of 51.40 percent on average in their
capital structure. The average OCF_LTA in the sample is 3.60 percent. On average, the
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sample firms are 6.54 years old, and 19.2 percent of the firms employ Big4 auditor firms.
Around four percent of firms in the sample experience losses in two consecutive years.
Their sales growth, on average, is 14.40 percent.
Panel B of Table 6.4 shows year-wise and industry-wise descriptive statistics of the
absolute value of discretionary accruals and corporate governance index. Over the sample
period, the means of |DAC| and CGI do not change substantially. With regard to the
sectors, as mentioned in the research design section, this study requires at least ten firmyear observations per industry to construct the value of discretionary accruals. Thus, there
are ten industries in the final sample. While the wholesale trade has the highest level of
earnings management measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals, with the
mean value of 0.106, the information and technology sector has the lowest average value
of 0.064. Of the ten industries in the sample, the utilities sector has the highest mean of
CGI of 0.505, while mining has the lowest mean of 0.435.
Table 6.4. Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Variable
N
Mean
Std. Dev. P1
Median
P99
DAC
5434
0.003
0.120
-0.325
0
0.394
|DAC|
5434
0.087
0.084
0.001
0.062
0.401
CGI
5434
0.479
0.118
0.231
0.462
0.692
Govown
5434
0.242
0.251
0
0.164
0.795
Forown
5434
0.090
0.129
0
0.031
0.490
Top5
5434
0.479
0.206
0.053
0.510
0.905
ROA
5434
0.050
0.123
-0.274
0.045
0.307
MTB
5434
1.013
0.822
0.15
0.784
4.924
TL_TA
5434
0.514
0.228
0.042
0.538
0.96
ln_TA
5434
13.211
1.468
9.935
13.188
17.031
OCF_LTA
5434
0.036
0.119
-0.332
0
0.418
Age
5434
6.544
3.222
2
6
15
Big4
5434
0.192
0.394
0
0
1
Loss
5434
0.043
0.203
0
0
1
Sales_growth 5434
0.144
0.567
-0.837
0.073
3.474
Panel B: Year-wise averages of the absolute value of discretionary accruals and
corporate governance index
N
|DAC|
CGI
2009
293
0.110
0.423
2010
392
0.092
0.436
2011
558
0.084
0.454
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2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

609
597
586
571
597
614
617

0.076
0.077
0.083
0.087
0.092
0.093
0.092

0.477
0.504
0.511
0.520
0.522
0.450
0.461

Panel C: Industry-wise averages of the absolute value of discretionary accruals
and corporate governance index
N
|DAC|
CGI
Agriculture
22
0.093
0.458
Construction and Real Estate
1498
0.077
0.472
Information and Technology
264
0.064
0.483
Manufacturing
2011
0.094
0.490
Mining
305
0.101
0.435
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
86
0.071
0.454
Retail trade
136
0.089
0.488
Transportation and Warehousing
431
0.085
0.467
Utilities
259
0.078
0.505
Wholesale Trade
422
0.106
0.490
This table shows summary statistics of all variables for firm-year observations of the non-financial firms
listed on HOSE and HNX from 2009 to 2018. Panel A shows a summary of descriptive statistics for the
entire sample. Panels B and C present the year-wise and industry-wise averages of the absolute value of
discretionary accruals and corporate governance index. See Table 6.3 for definitions of variables.

In Table 6.5, the correlation matrix of all variables is reported, using the Pearson productmoment correlations to measure the strength of association between variables. Tallnballesteros (2019) suggests that a correlation coefficient of 0.6 or higher in absolute terms
indicates a relatively high level of multicollinearity. In this study, the highest correlation
coefficient is 0.5 between Govown and Top5. There are no concerns raised here about
multicollinearity. To further detect multicollinearity in the regression models, a variance
inflation factor (VIF) is calculated for each parameter (not tabulated). VIF specifies the
magnitude of the inflation in the standard errors related to a particular beta weight as a
consequence of multicollinearity. A VIF value higher than 2.50 is considered problematic
(Allison 1999). In this study, the highest VIF is 1.57, suggesting no multicollinearity
issues or overfitting in the regression models. The correlation between the corporate
governance index (CGI) and the absolute value of discretionary accruals (|DAC|) is
statistically significant at the one percent level and has its expected sign.
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Table 6.5 Pair-wise correlation
Variables

|DAC|

CGI

Govown

Forown

Top5

ROA

MTB

TL_TA

Ln_TA

OCF_LTA

Age

Big4

CGI

-0.056*

Govown

-0.061*

-0.136*

Forown

-0.006

0.238*

-0.142*

Top5

-0.049*

0.080*

0.500*

0.063*

ROA

-0.047*

0.052*

0.115*

0.153*

0.117*

MTB

0.103*

0.049*

0.035*

0.237*

0.177*

0.252*

TL_TA

-0.041*

-0.085* 0.080*

-0.198*

0.059*

-0.304*

-0.058*

ln_TA

-0.023

0.139*

0.005

0.308*

0.107*

0.045*

0.142*

0.292*

OCF_LTA

-0.048*

0.031*

0.141*

0.119*

0.138*

0.208*

0.231*

-0.143*

0.047*

Age

-0.020

0.134*

-0.046*

0.226*

0.086*

0.004

0.020

-0.065*

0.133*

0.024

Big4

-0.036*

0.145*

0.054*

0.281*

0.191*

0.026

0.128*

0.025*

0.438

0.087*

0.168*

Loss

0.098*

-0.022

-0.046*

-0.063*

-0.043*

-0.394*

-0.009

0.122*

-0.098*

-0.047*

-0.014

-0.037*

Sales_growth

0.057*

0.010

-0.081*

0.022

-0.049*

0.119*

0.055*

-0.018

0.079*

-0.005

-0.028*

0.003

Loss

-0.101*

This table reports the Pearson correlations of the variables used in the analyses. See Table 6.3 for definitions of variables. Superscripts * indicate statistical significance
at the 5% level or higher.
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6.4

Empirical results

6.4.1 Main results
6.4.1.1 Model estimation
To test whether firms with higher quality corporate governance have less earnings
management (H1), random effects regression, including year and industry fixed effects,
is employed. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level to control for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Petersen 2008). Column (1) of Table 6.6 shows
the results of Equation (5), where CGI is a self-constructed corporate governance index,
and earnings management is measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals.
Table 6.6. Corporate governance and earnings management: Random effects model
(RE)

Dependent Variable

Exp. sign

CGI

-

BODI

-

SBI

-

Govown

+/-

Forown

+/-

Top5

+/-

ROA

-

MTB

+

TL_TA

+/-

ln_TA

-

OCF_LTA

-

Age

-

Big4

-

|DAC|
(1)
-0.036***
(-2.97)

-0.007
(-0.95)
0.003
(0.23)
-0.020**
(-2.29)
-0.038*
(-1.89)
0.012***
(5.20)
-0.020**
(-2.21)
0.000
(0.03)
-0.042**
(-2.08)
-0.001
(-1.31)
-0.004
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|DAC|
(2)
-0.029***
(-2.985)
-0.000
(-0.038)
-0.007
(-0.974)
0.004
(0.254)
-0.020**
(-2.275)
-0.038*
(-1.888)
0.012***
(5.215)
-0.020**
(-2.196)
0.000
(0.026)
-0.042**
(-2.092)
-0.001
(-1.285)
-0.004

Loss

+

Sales_growth

+

(-1.01)
0.037***
(5.30)
0.009***
(3.86)
Yes
Yes
0.135***
(5.25)
0.060
5,434

Year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Constant
R2
Observations

(-1.009)
0.037***
(5.291)
0.009***
(3.856)
Yes
Yes
0.130***
(4.934)
0.060
5,434

The table shows the regression results using the RE method. See Table 6.3 for definitions of variables. Column
(1) shows the results of examining the impact of the aggregate corporate governance index on earnings
management. Column (2) presents the results of examining the effect of individual governance categories on
earnings management. Figures in parentheses are the z-statistics. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

In line with the hypothesis (H1), the result shows that CGI has a negative and statistically
significant relationship with earnings management measured by the absolute value of
discretionary accruals, suggesting that better-governed firms experience a lower level of
earnings management. Proper corporate governance mechanisms can effectively
discipline the listed firms and help reduce their earnings management incentives22. The
result shows that a one-unit rise in CGI decreases |DAC| by 0.036 points. In terms of the
economic significance of the result, an increase in CGI by one standard deviation
decreases |DAC| by 0.43 percent, which is equivalent to 4.88 percent of the average |DAC|
and 5.10 percent of the standard deviation of |DAC|23. This outcome supports H1,
implying that firms with high quality corporate governance procedures in place are less
likely to distort earnings. This is consistent with the theories and findings from empirical
research that highlight the critical roles of corporate governance in reducing the agency
problem and information asymmetry, resulting in reduced managerial opportunism and
reduce firm risk (Ali et al. 2017; Cheung et al. 2010). The aggregate corporate governance

22

The baseline regression is estimated using pooled ordinary least squares method (OLS),
including year and industry fixed effects and fixed effects method (FE). The results based on
pooled OLS and FE are qualitatively similar.
23
The coefficient on CGI, i.e. -0.036 in Table 6.6 is multiplied by the standard deviation of CGI,
i.e. 0.118 and get 0.0043. This percentage is divided by the mean and standard deviation of |DAC|,
i.e. 0.087 and 0.084 from Table 6.4, and get 0.049 and 0.051, respectively.
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index can be used as a benchmark in screening stocks that are more likely to provide
accurate and transparent financial information.
Firm-specific variables also provide important insights. In particular, the results show that
the discretionary earnings quality is lower in firms with lower ownership concentration
(Top5), lower profitability (ROA), more growth opportunities (MTB), lower leverage
(TL_TA), less operating cash flows (OCF_LTA), experiencing losses in two consecutive
years (Loss), and having a higher growth rate of sales (Sales_growth). However, this
study does not find any significant relationships between government ownership, foreign
ownership, firm size, firm age, and auditor quality and the level of discretionary accruals.
All signs are consistent with the expectations. As shown in Table 6.6, the R2 obtained in
this study is relatively comparable with those in similar studies, for example, Ding et al.
(2007) and Liu and Lu's (2007) R2 range from 3.80 – 6.20 percent and 1.32 – 7.99 percent,
respectively, while those of Chen et al. (2015) are at approximately 11 percent.
The empirical results, so far, indicate that corporate governance quality has a negative
and significant association with earnings management. This study further investigates
which governance categories (board of directors and supervisory board) have a more
pronounced impact on earnings management. Ten corporate governance characteristics
that are assigned to the board of directors category (see Panel A of Table 6.1) and three
governance attributes to the supervisory board category (see Panel B of Table 6.1). Each
variable is assigned to have binary signals and aggregated to yield a composite index. The
index ranges from zero to ten for the category of board of directors (BODI) and from zero
to three for the supervisory board (SBI). Following Aman and Nguyen (2008), the indices
are normalised linearly between zero and 100 percent. The higher the indices, the better
the firm is expected to be governed. CGI is replaced with BODI and SBI and Equation
(5) is re-estimated. The results are presented in Column (2) of Table 6.6.
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The regression results show that both governance categories are negatively related to
earnings management. However, the association between corporate governance and
earnings management is mainly driven by the board of director category. This indicates
that the board of director plays a more substantial role in restraining earnings management
in Vietnam, which is consistent with the notation that the board of directors is directly
associated with management monitoring; therefore, limiting the opportunity to distort
earnings. While the supervisory board is specialised for supervising financial reporting
and audit activities, it is expected to provide shareholders with the highest protection in
upholding the credibility of a firm’s financial statements. However, the findings suggest
that the supervisory board is not a significant driver of reducing earnings manipulation.
Consequently, this calls for measures to enhance the effectiveness of the supervisory
board in deterring and detecting earnings distortion in Vietnamese companies.
6.4.1.2 Endogeneity issues
It has been well-documented in the literature that endogeneity is a common problem in
research on corporate governance (Wintoki et al. 2012). Unobserved heterogeneity,
reverse causality and sample selection bias have been identified as three major sources of
endogeneity (Kabir et al. 2020). The unobserved heterogeneity bias is addressed by using
the random effects method in the baseline regression (see Table 6.6). In this section, the
concerns about reverse causality and sample selection bias are addressed by using three
alternative model specifications.
A potential simultaneity bias in this context may be that not only better corporate
governance quality reduces earnings distortion, but also firms that manage earnings
aggressively might reconfigure their governance structure to assist their activities. For
instance, firms with a higher level of earnings management may nominate directors who
are less likely to monitor and lack expertise to detect wrongdoings and dismiss
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experienced directors, leading to poorer quality corporate governance. To address the
possible reverse causality bias, two model specifications are used. The first alternative
replaces CGI with a dummy variable, CGIDEC, which is equal to one if the corporate
governance quality decreases, and zero otherwise. Following Zhang et al. (2019), changes
in discretionary accruals when their corporate governance quality reduces by reestimating Equation (5) are then examined using CGIDEC. CGI is then replaced in
Equation (5) with a new continuous variable, ∆CGI, denoting the change in corporate
governance quality of firms to examine changes occurring in discretionary accruals when
there is a change in the corporate governance index. The results are reported in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7. Corporate governance and earnings management: Addressing reverse
causality

Dependent Variable
CGIDEC

|DAC|
(1)
0.010***
(3.21)

|DAC|
(2)

∆CGI
Govown
Forown
Top5
ROA
MTB
TL_TA
ln_TA
OCF_LTA
Age
Big4
Loss

-0.039***
(-3.18)
-0.001
(-0.19)
-0.005
(-0.33)
-0.023***
(-2.45)
-0.042***
(-2.07)
0.012***
(4.73)
-0.017*
(-1.87)
-0.001
(-0.79)
-0.042***
(-1.87)
-0.001
(-0.79)
-0.004
(-0.94)
0.034***

-0.002
(-0.21)
-0.005
(-0.31)
-0.023**
(-2.47)
-0.042**
(-2.06)
0.012***
(4.71)
-0.017*
(-1.82)
-0.001
(-0.57)
-0.043*
(-1.89)
-0.001
(-0.80)
-0.004
(-0.93)
0.033***
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Sales_growth
Year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Constant
R2
Observations

(4.87)
0.008***
(3.55)
Yes
Yes
0.069***
(3.04)
0.060
4,625

(4.89)
0.009***
(3.57)
Yes
Yes
0.070***
(3.11)
0.060
4,625

The table shows the effects of corporate governance on earnings management after addressing the endogenous
issue of reverse causality using the RE method. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. See Table 6.3
for definitions of variables. Column (1) shows the results of examining the impact of lower corporate
governance quality on earnings management. Column (2) presents the results of examining the effect of the
change in corporate governance quality on earnings management. CGIDEC is a dummy variable which is equal
to one if corporate governance quality reduces. ∆CGI represents the change in corporate governance quality of
firms. See Table 6.3 for definitions of variables. Figures in parentheses are the z-statistics. Superscripts *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

It is observed that coefficients of CGIDEC are significantly positive at the one percent
level, indicating that the decline in corporate governance quality can deteriorate the
discretionary earnings quality. As well, the significant negative coefficients of ∆CGI
suggest that as corporate governance quality increases (decreases), the sample firms tend
to engage in less (more) earnings management. The evidence supports the notion that the
change in a firm’s corporate governance quality impacts on its level of earnings
management, rather than earnings management influencing the corporate governance
practices of firms.
To further address the simultaneity issue, the second alternative model specification uses
an instrumental variable (IV) approach and estimates the main regression model using the
two-stage least squares method. A valid IV needs to be strongly correlated with the
corporate governance index but is not directly associated with the risk of delisting.
Following Ali et al. (2018) and Fisman and Svensson (2007), this study employs the
industry-location-average CGI as an IV by calculating the average value of the corporate
governance index of all firms located in the same city in the firm i’s industry. Ali et al.
(2018) propose that corporate governance of a firm includes two components, one
industry-specific and the other particular to the firm:
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𝑏

=𝐵

(6)

+𝐵

Where Bijt is the firm i’s corporate governance in industry j in year t, which represents the
idiosyncratic component, while Bjt is a portion of corporate governance that relates to a
specific industry in a specified geographical location in year t. According to Yang and
Zhao (2014), a firm’s governance structure tends to associate with its industry peers
because of similar business mix and investment prospects; however, it is unlikely that an
individual firm’s engagement in earnings manipulation is directly affected by the industry
average; rather, it would be by the firm’s governance structure. Similarly, following
Fisman and Svensson (2007), it is expected that corporate governance differs from
location to location because businesses in more developed regions are subjected to more
intense scrutiny by regulators. They tend to comply more with government rules and
regulations and have better quality corporate governance24. Therefore, the first-stage
regression is a generalised linear regression model with CGI as the dependent variable
and the industry-location-average CGI (Bjt), and other control variables as the
independent variables to find the fitted value for bijt.
𝐶𝐺𝐼 = α + 𝛽 𝐼𝑉 + 𝛽

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝑌𝑅 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝜐

(7)

Where IVi is the mean value of the corporate governance index of all firms located in the
same city in the firm i’s industry.
Then, in the second stage, this study models earnings management as a function of the
fitted value of CGI from the first-stage regression and other control variables:
|𝐷𝐴𝐶 | = α + 𝛽 𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐶𝐺𝐼 + 𝛽

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝑌𝑅 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝜐

(8)

Where FittedCGIi,t is the fitted corporate governance index for firm i in year t.
The results of the two-stage least squares method are reported in Table 6.8.

24

The average corporate governance index of firms located in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh where the
two exchanges located is calculated (unreported results). It is found that the average index of those
firms is higher than that of firms located outside those two cities.
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Table 6.8. Corporate governance and earnings management: Instrumental variable
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression

Dependent variable:
Industry-location average CGI

First-stage
(1)
CGI
0.860***
(26.45)

Fitted CGI
Govown
Forown
Top5
ROA
MTB
TL_TA
ln_TA
OCF_LTA
Age
Big4
Loss
Sales_growth
Year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Constant
Model fits
F-test (instrument)
R2
Observations

-0.060***
(-9.07)
0.125***
(9.57)
0.627***
(7.31)
0.016
(1.25)
0.000
(0.32)
-0.029***
(-3.72)
0.005***
(3.88)
0.008
(0.58)
-0.001
(-0.56)
0.003
(0.84)
-0.000
(-0.04)
-0.000
(-1.74)
Yes
Yes
-0.029
(-1.28)
700.80***
0.254
5,434

Second-stage
(2)
|DAC|
-0.071**
(-2.13)
-0.014**
(-2.18)
0.001
(0.10)
-0.008
(-1.05)
-0.020
(-0.95)
0.004***
(2.84)
-0.016**
(-2.24)
0.000
(0.14)
0.002
(-0.11)
-0.003
(-1.46)
-0.002
(-0.73)
0.038***
(5.73)
0.000***
(7.21)
Yes
Yes
0.159***
(8.66)
0.047
5,434

This table demonstrates the first- and second-regression results from the two-stage instrumental variable
regression approach. See Table 6.3 for definitions of variables. The instrument variable used is the industrylocation-average corporate governance index. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Superscripts *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Column (1) of Table 6.8 displays the first-stage regression results. The coefficient on the
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industry-location average CGI is positive and statistically significant at the one percent
level, implying that the industry-location average CGI powerfully explains the firm-level
CGI. Moreover, the validity of the IV is confirmed by the F-test for the joint significance
of the instrument. As a rule of thumb, an IV is not weak if the F-statistics is higher than
ten and is statistically significant based on Wald Chi-square statistics (Dhawan et al.
2020). The F-statistics for the IV is 700.80 and statistically significant at the one percent
level and therefore it is valid. Column (2) of Table 6.8 demonstrates the second-stage
regression results. CGI is replaced by the fitted CGI from the first-stage regressions. The
coefficient of the fitted value is negative and statistically significant at the five percent
level, which confirms the findings that better corporate governance may mitigate earnings
management. It is concluded that the results are validated after corrections for potential
simultaneity bias.
The propensity score matching (PSM) technique is used as the third alternative model
specification to address concerns about sample selection bias that may affect the
estimation of the coefficient for the corporate governance index. The sample is first
divided into a control and a treatment sample based on the main treatment of interest
(corporate governance index in this study). All firm-year observations with a CGI of more
than the mean value of 0.48 is assigned as treatment observations and all observations
with a CGI of equal or less than 0.48 as control observations. In the matching process, for
each firm-year observation in the treatment sample, an observation in the control sample
with the nearest propensity score of firm characteristics in the same year from the same
industry is identified. Control observations are then matched to the treatment
observations. Finally, the mean of the dependent variable (|DAC| in this case) conditional
on the control variables and year and industry fixed effects of the control and treatment
samples are compared. To do this, this study executes a regression where the dependent
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variable is |DAC|, and independent variables are Treatment, a dummy variable that equals
one if a firm-year observation is in the treatment group, zero if it is in the control group,
along with other control variables.
Table 6.9. Corporate governance and earnings management: Propensity score
matching (PSM)
Panel A: Regression analysis
Dependent variable:
Treatment

|DAC|
-0.007**
(-2.52)
-0.006
(-0.96)
0.000
(-0.03)
-0.005
(-0.69)
-0.011
(-0.73)
0.006***
(4.85)
-0.020***
(-2.82)
-0.001
(-0.74)
-0.004
(-0.31)
-0.003
(-1.16)
-0.003
(-0.67)
0.034***
(4.79)
0.002
(1.42)
Yes
Yes
0.146***
(5.14)
0.047
3,822

Govown
Forown
Top5
ROA
MTB
TL_TA
ln_TA
OCF_LTA
Age
Big4
Loss
Sales_growth
Year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Constant
R2
Observations
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Panel B: Pre-match and post-match regressions
Dependent variable:
Treatment
Pre-match
(1)
Govown
-1.313***
(-9.01)
Forown
1.927***
(7.16)
Top5
1.108***
(6.40)
ROA
0.269
(0.83)
MTB
0.033
(1.38)
TL_TA
-0.648***
(-4.15)
ln_TA
0.102***
(3.98)
OCF_LTA
-0.018
(-0.07)
Age
-0.015
(-0.31)
Big4
0.151*
(1.75)
Loss
-0.012
(-0.07)
Sales_growth
-0.008
(-0.81)
Constant
-1.274***
(-4.14)
2
Pseudo R
0.092
Observations
5,434
Panel C: Balance test
Variable
Treated
(1)
Govown
0.234
Forown
0.086
Top5
0.475
ROA
0.050
MTB
1.014
TL_TA
0.512

Control
(2)
0.233
0.086
0.478
0.051
1.041
0.508
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Treatment
Post-match
(2)
0.063
(0.38)
0.007
(0.02)
-0.107
(-0.55)
-0.039
(-0.10)
-0.021
(-0.74)
0.094
(0.53)
0.003
(0.11)
0.034
(0.11)
0.006
(0.12)
0.041
(0.42)
0.073
(0.42)
0.027
(0.92)
0.080
(0.12)
0.001
3,822

% bias
(3)
0.10
0.10
-1.30
-1.50
-2.30
1.60

t-stat
(4)
0.030
0.040
-0.390
-0.480
-0.700
0.480

ln_TA
OCF_LTA
Age
Big4
Loss
Sales_growth

13.187
0.035
2.945
0.189
0.046
0.206

13.178
0.035
2.944
0.183
0.042
0.173

0.60
-0.10
0.10
1.60
1.50
2.90

0.180
-0.040
0.040
0.500
0.470
0.880

This table demonstrates the PSM results. See Table 6.3 for definitions of variables. Panel A reports
multivariate results relating earnings management and corporate governance. Panel B presents the
coefficient estimates from the logit model which are employed to estimate the propensity scores. The
dependent variable Treatment is an indicator variable set to one if a firm has a CGI of more than the mean
value of 0.48 in a given year, zero otherwise. Panel B shows the pre-match and post-match regressions.
Panel C reports the results of a balance test. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Superscripts *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

The result of the propensity score matching analysis is reported in Panel A of Table 6.9.
The coefficient estimate for Treatment, which represents the difference in mean of |DAC|
between the treatment and control sample, is negative and statistically significant at the
five percent level. This result is consistent with the regressions using other methods, i.e.
RE, and IV methods, which confirms that the main results are robust after considering the
endogeneity issues using alternative estimation methods.
Two diagnostic tests are performed to assess the validity of the method. The first test
compares pre-match and post-match samples. The results are presented in Panel B of
Table 6.9. None of the coefficient estimates in the post-match sample is statistically
significant, indicating that no distinguishable trends in |DAC| between the two groups are
observed. In addition, the pseudo R2 decreases significantly from 0.092 to 0.001,
suggesting that the PSM method eliminates all the observable differences.
The difference for each observable characteristic between the treated and the control firms
is then studied. The results are reported in Panel C of Table 6.9. As a rule of thumb, a
good balance between observable covariates is achieved when t-tests failed to reject the
null-hypothesis of equal means, and the bias percentage is less than five percent. The
highest bias percentage is 2.9 percent for Sale_growth, and none of the p-values is lower
than 0.05. The results confirmed that the covariates are well-balanced.
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6.4.2 Additional analyses
6.4.2.1 Effects of ownership structure
In this section, the impact of corporate governance on the level of earnings management
under different types of ownership, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs, high
and low foreign ownership, and high and low concentrated ownership is further
examined. According to Article 4 under the Law on Enterprise 2005, a firm is identified
as an SOE if the government holds more than 50 percent of the outstanding shares. Liu
and Lu (2007) and Wang and Yung (2011) provide evidence that the government’s
protection of SOEs might reduce the pressure on managers to falsify financial statements.
Additionally, Cheng et al. (2015) examine 437 IPO firms in China and conclude that
Chinese SOEs distort earnings less than non-SOEs because of the easy accessibility to
bank loans. Because of SOEs’ lower incentives to manipulate earnings, earnings
management may not depend on the quality of corporate governance, which weakens the
relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. In contrast,
without the government’s helping hand, non-SOEs are more likely to distort earnings
because of the administrative governance approach in Vietnam, which relies mainly on
accounting information to govern listed firms. For instance, to issue additional shares to
existing shareholders, a listed firm needs to obtain a positive return on equity (ROE).
Thus, managers have the incentive to manage earnings to achieve their purposes. It is,
therefore, expected that the impact of better corporate governance quality on restraining
earnings management is more substantial in non-SOEs.
Kabir and Thai (2017) suggest that foreign investors tend to have higher commitments
and longer-term investment horizons in emerging markets. It is expected that at a low
shareholding, foreign ownership does not motivate foreign investors’ engagement in
monitoring activities because they can offload their shares without huge losses. However,
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when foreign investors hold a sufficiently large proportion of the shares, the option to exit
becomes more costly because of the substantial discounts on the sales of large blocks. In
addition, due to the significant monetary value tied to the large shareholding, foreign
investors may lose more than small investors if they remain inactive or choose to be lessinformed about their invested firms. Thus, at high ownership levels, where monitoring
becomes less costly than the exit option, foreign shareholders have strong incentives to
supervise their invested firms and restrain earnings manipulation, which is consistent with
the long-term oriented view. It is postulated that the impact of corporate governance on
earnings distortion may be stronger in firms with high foreign ownership.
In Vietnam, the average share ownership of the top five largest shareholders is
approximately 50 percent of the outstanding equity, which indicates the existence of high
concentrated ownership in Vietnamese listed firms. In emerging markets, where there is
weak protection in place for minority shareholders, agency conflicts between controlling
and minority shareholders are relatively high. Thus, ownership concentration may lead to
a situation where large shareholders exercise their control rights and gain self-interest at
the expense of minority shareholders (Liu, Q et al. 2015). The dominance of ownership
concentration may impede the monitoring functions of the board. Controlling
shareholders might select directors who are less likely to monitor and are more likely to
make decisions supporting their interests (Yeh & Woidtke 2005). As a consequence, there
is a risk of collusion between controlling shareholders and their selected directors to
exploit the benefits of minority shareholders (Lin et al. 2010). For this reason, it is
expected that the benefits of good corporate governance on restraining managerial
wrongdoings will be less in firms with high ownership concentration.
The sample is split into six subsamples: SOEs and non-SOEs, high and low foreign
ownership, high and low concentrated ownership. A firm is deemed to be a SOE if the
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government holds more than 50 percent of the outstanding shares. Based on sample
median, firms are classified into high foreign and concentrated ownership (e.g., if foreign
and top five largest ownership is higher or equal the sample median), and low foreign and
concentrated ownership (e.g., if foreign and top five largest ownership is lower than the
sample median). Empirically, Equation (5) is re-estimated using six separate subsamples.
Regression results are estimated using the random effects method and reported in Table
6.10. Specifically, Columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4), and (5)-(6) are results of using subsamples
of non-SOEs and SOEs, high and low foreign ownership, and high and low concentrated
ownership, respectively.
It is observed that the coefficients of CGI are negative and statistically significant at the
one percent level for non-SOEs and firms with low concentrated ownership, and at the
five percent level for firms with high foreign ownership. Meanwhile, the coefficients on
CGI are statistically insignificant in regressions for SOEs, firms with high ownership
concentration, and low foreign ownership. Results suggest that only non-SOEs, firms
with low concentrated and high foreign ownership may benefit from the reduction in
earnings management if corporate governance quality increases. This can be explained
by the more efficient monitoring and supervising mechanisms these companies
implement, which may more effectively constrain managerial opportunism and
misbehaviour. These results confirm that ownership structure is expected to influence the
link between corporate governance and earnings management.
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Table 6.10. Corporate governance and earnings management: The role of ownership structure

Dependent variable
CGI

SOEs

Non-SOEs

|DAC|
(1)
-0.007
(-0.36)

|DAC|
(2)
-0.039***
(2.75)

0.060
(1.29)
0.004
(0.16)
0.088
(1.28)
0.011*
(1.85)
0.006
(0.32)
-0.006***
(-2.81)
0.032
(0.95)
-0.001
(-0.87)
0.007
(1.19)
0.058***

0.003
(0.17)
-0.027***
(-2.86)
-0.054***
(-2.89)
0.011***
(4.72)
-0.022**
(-2.11)
0.002
(0.96)
-0.073***
(-2.98)
-0.001
(-1.10)
-0.007
(-1.40)
0.035***

Govown
Forown
Top5
ROA
MTB
TL_TA
ln_TA
OCF_LTA
Age
Big4
Loss

High foreign
ownership
|DAC|
(3)
-0.035**
(-2.22)
-0.019**
(-2.00)

Low foreign
ownership
|DAC|
(4)
-0.026
(-1.46)
0.004
(0.44)

-0.016
(-1.40)
0.007
(0.15)
0.013***
(3.71)
0.014
(1.03)
-0.004**
(-2.29)
-0.042
(-1.56)
-0.001
(-0.97)
-0.004
(-0.69)
0.032**

-0.022*
(-1.71)
-0.059***
(-3.14)
0.011***
(3.39)
-0.050***
(-4.09)
0.005**
(2.54)
-0.049
(-1.56)
-0.001
(-0.81)
0.001
(0.14)
0.038***
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High concentrated
ownership
|DAC|
(5)
-0.019
(-1.24)
-0.007
(-0.93)
-0.002
(-0.11)

Low concentrated
ownership
|DAC|
(6)
-0.056***
(-3.17)
-0.031**
(-2.31)
0.001
(0.06)

0.074
(1.48)
0.008**
(2.34)
0.014
(1.03)
-0.002
(-1.14)
0.001
(0.05)
0.000
(-0.51)
0.001
(0.30)
0.041***

-0.059***
(-3.21)
0.014***
(4.74)
-0.033***
(-2.67)
0.002
(0.77)
-0.089***
(-3.00)
-0.001
(-0.72)
-0.011*
(-1.80)
0.038***

Sales_growth
Year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Constant
R2
Observations

(3.22)
0.014**
(2.02)
Yes
Yes
0.192***
(5.53)
0.094
1,514

(4.68)
0.008***
(3.32)
Yes
Yes
0.113***
(3.23)
0.069
3,920

(2.41)
0.006*
(1.77)
Yes
Yes
0.172***
(6.08)
0.062
2,734

(4.83)
0.011***
(3.42)
Yes
Yes
0.070*
(1.69)
0.083
2,700

(3.62)
0.010**
(2.54)
Yes
Yes
0.138***
(4.60)
0.053
2,783

(4.43)
0.007**
(2.34)
Yes
Yes
0.102**
(2.15)
0.095
2,651

The table shows the regression results of corporate governance on earnings management based on different types of ownership using the RE method. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level. A firm is considered to be a SOE and having high foreign and concentrated ownership if its government ownership is higher than 50
percent of the outstanding shares, its foreign and top five largest ownership is higher than the sample median, respectively, and vice versa. See Table 6.3 for definitions
of variables. Figures in parentheses are the z-statistics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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6.4.2.2 Effects of growth opportunities
In this section, the importance of growth opportunities in moderating the association
between corporate governance and earnings management is examined. Agency theorists
have documented that efficient corporate governance plays a significant role in mitigating
information asymmetry (Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003; Shleifer & Vishny 1997).
Nevertheless, the level of information asymmetry is different across firms. Ali et al.
(2018) suggest that in firms with higher growth opportunities, the issue of information
asymmetry is more severe as these firm tend to have many growth perspectives; therefore,
their managers are more likely to obtain more private information about firms’ future
projects. High growth firms, thus, are subject to higher monitoring costs (Linck et al.
2008), which may influence firms’ governance structure and their outcomes. Ali et al.
(2018) document the role of corporate governance in reducing the risk of default by
eliminating information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, especially in
high growth firms which may suffer more from such problem. Thus, it is proposed that
corporate governance has a stronger effect on restraining earnings manipulation in firms
with more growth opportunities.
Following Ali et al. (2018); Hazarika et al. (2012), this study uses two proxies for firms’
growth opportunities, i.e. the market-to-book (MTB) and Tobin’s Q (TobinQ). Market-tobook is the market value of equity divided by its book value, while Tobin’s Q equals the
market value of a company divided by its book value of assets. Higher MTB and TobinQ
imply higher growth opportunities. To test or conjecture, the sample is split into two
subsamples of firms based on the sample median. Firms are classified into high growth
opportunities (e.g., if MTB and TobinQ are higher than the sample median), and vice
versa. Equation (5) is re-estimated using these subsamples separately and the results are
reported in Table 6.11. Columns (1)-(3) present the results using subsamples of firms with
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high growth opportunities, while Columns (2)-(4) show the results using subsamples of
firms with low growth opportunities.
Table 6.11. Corporate governance and earnings management: The role of growth
opportunities

MTB
Dependent Variable
CGI
Govown
Forown
Top5
ROA
MTB
TL_TA
ln_TA
OCF_LTA
Age
Big4
Loss
Sales_growth
Year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Constant
R2
Observations

High
|DAC|
(1)
-0.044***
(-2.72)
-0.019**
(-2.03)
-0.008
(-0.43)
-0.011
(-0.90)
0.037
(0.80)
0.008**
(2.59)
-0.004
(-0.30)
0.000
(0.18)
-0.030
(-1.14)
-0.001
(-0.94)
-0.012**
(-2.03)
0.058***
(3.42)
0.005
(1.20)
Yes
Yes
0.142***
(4.39)
0.053
2,898

Low
|DAC|
(2)
-0.020
(-1.33)
0.001
(0.07)
-0.006
(-0.28)
-0.023*
(-1.93)
-0.099***
(-4.03)
0.035***
(2.83)
-0.023**
(-2.16)
0.001
(0.49)
-0.056
(-1.65)
-0.001
(-1.17)
0.005
(0.92)
0.031***
(4.32)
0.012***
(3.66)
Yes
Yes
0.061***
(1.52)
0.092
2,536

Tobin’s Q
High
Low
|DAC|
|DAC|
(3)
(4)
-0.041**
-0.024
(-2.44)
(-1.58)
-0.017*
0.007
(-1.86)
(0.74)
-0.015
0.000
(-0.78)
(0.00)
-0.011
-0.029**
(-0.92)
(-2.57)
-0.029
-0.070*
(-1.29)
(-1.78)
0.008***
0.044***
(2.89)
(3.98)
-0.011
-0.039***
(-0.78)
(-3.37)
0.000
0.001
(-0.06)
(0.81)
-0.018
-0.063**
(-0.68)
(-2.11)
0.000
-0.002**
(-0.35)
(-2.01)
-0.008
0.002
(-1.41)
(0.31)
0.046***
0.030***
(3.77)
(3.79)
0.004
0.012***
(0.94)
(3.85)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.140***
0.072**
(3.69)
(2.18)
0.054
0.077
2,709
2,725

The table shows the regression results of corporate governance on earnings management based on different
growth opportunities using the RE method. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. A firm is considered
to be high growth if its market-to-book or Tobin’s Q is higher than the sample median, and vice versa. See
Table 6.3 for definitions of variables. Figures in parentheses are the z-statistics. Superscripts *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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The results show that the coefficients of CGI are negative and statistically significant for
high growth firms, whereas they are insignificant for low growth firms. The findings
suggest that the effect of corporate governance on earnings management is stronger in
firms with more growth opportunities. This supports the argument that when information
asymmetry is higher, corporate governance plays a more critical role in monitoring
managerial misbehaviour. The finding also complements the literature that suggests the
impact of corporate governance on firm outcomes depends on different types of firms
(Arun et al. 2015). The result is consistent with Ali et al. (2018), who contend that
corporate governance is more vital in firms with a high level of information asymmetry.
6.4.2.3 Robustness check
In this section, further analyses are conducted to check the robustness of the main result.
First, this study considers two alternative methods to measure earnings management, i.e.
Jones model (1991) and performance-augmented discretionary accruals model of Kothari
et al. (2005). These models are widely used in previous research on earnings management.
The Jones model is similar to the modified Jones model with one exception. The
difference between the change in revenue and the change in receivables is replaced by the
change in revenue in Equation (3) to compute fitted values. Meanwhile, in the
performance-augmented discretionary accruals model, Kothari et al. (2005) identify the
discretionary portion of accruals by estimating the following model using the OLS
regression for all firms and controlling for performance:
𝑇𝐴𝐶 /𝑇𝐴
𝛽 [𝑃𝑃𝐸 /𝑇𝐴

= 𝛼 [1/ 𝑇𝐴

] + 𝛽 [(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉

] + 𝛽 [𝑅𝑂𝐴 /𝑇𝐴

]+ε

− ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 )/𝑇𝐴

]+
(9)

Where TACijt is the total accruals for firm i in industry j in year t, ∆REVijt is the change in
revenue for firm i in industry j between year t-1 and year t, ∆RECijt is the change in
receivables for firm i in industry j between year t-1 and year t, PPEijt is the level of gross
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property, plant, and equipment for firm i in industry j in year t, TAijt-1 represents the total
assets for firm i in industry j in year t-1, and ROAijt is the return on assets for firm i in
industry j in year t.
The residuals ε

from the regressions are used as a proxy for discretionary earnings

management. Equation (5) is re-estimated using the absolute value of discretionary
accruals estimated using Jones and Kothari models and obtain similar results. The results
are consequently not sensitive to the particular measure of accruals. Table 6.12 reports
the results.
Table 6.12. Alternative measures of earnings management

Dependent variable:
CGI
Govown
Forown
Top5
ROA
MTB
TL_TA
ln_TA
OCF_LTA
Age
Big4
Loss
Sales_growth
Year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Constant

|DAC_Jones|
(1)
-0.031***
(-2.66)
-0.006
(-0.94)
0.006
(0.42)
-0.018**
(-2.19)
-0.039**
(-2.05)
0.011***
(5.13)
-0.016*
(-1.87)
0.000
(-0.23)
-0.021
(-1.11)
-0.001
(-1.44)
-0.004
(-1.05)
0.035***
(5.28)
0.007***
(3.32)
Yes
Yes
0.134***
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|DAC_Kothari|
(2)
-0.037***
(-3.19)
-0.010
(-1.56)
-0.012
(-0.85)
-0.016*
(-1.93)
-0.036*
(-1.90)
0.009***
(4.34)
-0.018**
(-2.20)
0.001
(0.87)
-0.021
(-1.05)
-0.001
(-1.32)
-0.001
(-0.17)
0.007
(1.20)
0.008***
(3.54)
Yes
Yes
0.116***

R2
Observations

(5.59)
0.056
5,434

(4.57)
0.045
5,434

The table shows the regression results using alternative measures of earnings management. See Table
6.3 for definitions of variables. Column (1) shows results using Jones model to estimate discretionary
accruals, and Column (2) presents the results using Kothari model. Figures in parentheses are the zstatistics. Superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

Second, this study uses an alternative approach to measure total accruals. Several studies
(Gaio & Pinto 2018; Park & Shin 2004; Sáenz González & García-Meca 2014; Xie et al.
2003) document the use of the balance sheet approach to estimate total accruals in
Equation (1). The operating accruals are computed by subtracting the change in current
liabilities, change in cash, and depreciation and amortisation from the changes in current
assets and short-term debt. RE method is utilised to re-estimate Equation (5) with new
values of discretionary accruals using the Jones, modified Jones, and Kothari models. The
results reported in Table 6.13 show that CGI is negative and statistically significant at the
one percent level in all models; thus, confirming the robustness of the main results.
Table 6.13. Alternative measures of total accruals: the balance sheet approach

Dependent variable:
CGI
Govown
Forown
Top5
ROA
MTB
TL_TA
ln_TA
OCF_LTA
Age

|DAC_mJones|
(1)
-0.069***
(-4.84)
-0.026***
(-3.30)
-0.030*
(-1.80)
-0.015
(-1.46)
-0.077***
(-2.71)
0.013***
(5.00)
-0.015
(-1.50)
0.002
(1.57)
-0.049***
(-2.73)
-0.002***

|DAC_Jones|
(2)
-0.062***
(-4.44)
-0.021***
(-2.74)
-0.024
(-1.52)
-0.013
(-1.36)
-0.071***
(-2.63)
0.012***
(4.92)
-0.013
(-1.32)
0.002
(1.37
-0.036**
(-2.25)
-0.002***
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|DAC_Kothari|
(3)
-0.065***
(-4.76)
-0.024***
(-3.27)
-0.026*
(-1.71)
-0.011
(-1.21)
-0.070***
(-2.62)
0.012***
(4.74)
-0.011
(-1.18)
0.002
(1.37)
-0.053***
(-3.27)
-0.001**

Big4
Loss
Sales_growth
Year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Constant
R2
Observations

(-2.68)
-0.005
(-1.06)
0.005
(0.74)
0.018***
(4.94)
Yes
Yes
0.145***
(6.63)
0.065
5,434

(-2.69)
-0.004
(-0.99)
0.004
(0.60)
0.015***
(4.47)
Yes
Yes
0.137***
(6.72)
0.058
5,434

(-2.25)
-0.001
(-0.30)
-0.008
(-1.05)
0.016***
(4.61)
Yes
Yes
0.130***
(5.84)
0.062
5,434

The table shows the regression results using the balance sheet approach to calculate total accruals. See
Table 6.3 for definitions of variables. Column (1) shows results using modified Jones model to estimate
discretionary accruals, Column (2) presents the results using Jones model, and Column (3) demonstrates
the results using Kothari model. Figures in parentheses are the z-statistics. Superscripts *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

6.5

Conclusion

The primary objective of this study is to examine, for non-financial listed firms in
Vietnam from 2008 to 2018, the impact of corporate governance on earnings
management, measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals. After controlling
for firm-specific characteristics, it is observed that better corporate governance
mechanisms restrain earnings management activities. Results remain unchanged under
alternative measures of earnings management and alternative model specifications (which
are used to allow for possible endogeneity biases). The findings from this study align with
prior studies which suggest that corporate governance reduces agency and information
costs. Considerations of moral hazard reveal that without efficient corporate governance
mechanisms, managers are more likely to act in their personal interests at the expense of
stakeholders. Improved corporate governance monitors managerial opportunism (Ali et
al. 2018), and constrains earnings management activities (Liu & Lu 2007; Shen & Chih
2007). Firm characteristics are further examined to explain the negative relationship
between corporate governance and earnings management. The analysis suggests that the
effectiveness of corporate governance’s monitoring role is subject to ownership structure
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and firms’ growth opportunities. The effect is significant only in non-SOEs, firms with
high foreign ownership and low concentrated ownership, and high growth firms due to
stricter monitoring.
This study is relevant to a wide range of interest groups for the following reasons. The
findings indicate that a well-governed business has a safety net in place for the protection
of minority shareholders. Specifically, this study finds that proper corporate governance
mechanisms result in a lower level of earnings management, reducing agency and
information asymmetry costs. As such, investment communities (e.g. fund managers)
may benefit from redirecting investment toward stocks with good corporate governance
practices and hence, better information quality. Firms acknowledge the benefits of
compliance with the law and regulations; thus, they can identify what can be done to
achieve good governance to deter misconduct and ensure that managers act in the best
interests of the shareholders. Creditors can also view a deficient governance structure as
a red flag and make their debt covenants be more stringent as firms may depict a better
image of its performance to avoid debt covenant violations. This research does have
policy implications for government/industry regulators, especially when they review the
benefits of Corporate Governance Codes in Vietnam and need to consider extensions and
improvements to the corporate governance regulations. The same applies in most
emerging market economy nations (e.g. Laos and Cambodia) with a low level of investor
protection.
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7. CHAPTER 7 CONCLUDING REMARKS

7.1 Introduction
This chapter, which offers the concluding remarks to the studies conducted in the thesis,
is structured as follows. Section 7.2 overviews the thesis. Section 7.3 presents a summary
of the main findings and 7.4 highlights their implications. Section 7.5 discusses the
limitations of the studies and suggests recommendations for future research.

7.2 Overview of the thesis
This thesis takes advantage of the uniqueness of Vietnam’s institutional setting, especially
in relation to corporate governance quality, the risk of involuntary delisting, and earnings
management. The existing literature has documented that in countries with weak investor
protection, internal corporate governance mechanisms play a more crucial role in
facilitating transparency, ensuring the fair treatment of all shareholders, and promoting
the timely and accurate disclosure of all material matters. An appropriate corporate
governance system may enhance the monitoring and advising roles of directors; thus,
reduce agency costs and information asymmetry. As a result, it helps lower the risk of
involuntary delisting and the incidence of earnings manipulation, leading to the
enhancement of investors’ confidence and public trust in the capital market. Despite these
settings, i.e. corporate governance, the risk of involuntary delisting, and earnings
management being increasingly significant, there is scant research done on Vietnam.
Motivated by the absence of prior research in Vietnam, the first essay of this thesis
undertakes a case study of a unique corporate scandal in Vietnam. The second and third
essays conduct empirical studies on the associations between corporate governance, the
risk of involuntary delisting, and earnings management using a sample of non-financial
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Vietnamese listed companies from January 2008 to December 2019. Data are handcollected and cross-checked through different sources, including the websites for the Ho
Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE), Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX), Vietstock, and Cafef.
The next section summarises the key findings of this thesis and then, highlights their
implications.

7.3 Summary of the main results
This thesis explores the association between corporate governance and different firm
outcomes for Vietnamese listed businesses. In particular, this thesis comprises three
interrelated essays that study the influence of corporate governance on the risk of
involuntary delisting and earnings management. Based on the findings, this thesis
concludes that corporate governance plays a substantial role in determining firm
outcomes in Vietnam.
7.3.1 The fall of the Vietnamese Enron: An analysis from governance and ethical
perspectives
Chapter 4 examines a single case study on the failure of DVD, the first firm under threat
of bankruptcy and delisting from the Vietnam stock exchange since its establishment in
2000. The sudden collapse of DVD in 2011 is a good example of the failure on “too big
to fail”. It was an outcome of unpredictable and unusual events, including accounting
manipulation, stock price manipulation, and a series of violations of law and regulations.
This study finds that weak internal and external corporate governance practices, the lack
of corporate transparency and significant information asymmetry facilitated DVD’s
expropriation of minority shareholders. Various lessons have been drawn from the fall of
DVD, for instance, “big names” do not necessarily guarantee the firm’s integrity and
potential profitability. Investors should be aware of the risk that a firm’s top leaders have
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previously committed criminal offences. It is unlikely that a firm’s leaders, who have put
their own financial benefits above legal and ethical responsibilities, will act strictly in the
best interests of shareholders. This study supports the findings of Fassin and Derrick
(2011) that being ethical does not necessarily prevent the company from going bankrupt;
however, the CEO’s ethical mindset is needed to reduce the risk. The DVD governance
failure, like that of Enron, sends a warning signal to policy makers to consider making
changes to corporate governance regulation and practice.
7.3.2 Corporate governance and the risk of involuntary delisting
Chapter 5 examines the impact of corporate governance on the risk of involuntary
delisting. The findings from this study align with the theoretical arguments and prior
studies claiming that corporate governance acts as an effective mechanism that monitors
managerial opportunism (Ali et al. 2018), increases firm performance (Duchin et al.
2010), and decreases firms’ delisting risk (Charitou et al. 2007). Firms with better
corporate governance mechanisms are strongly associated with a reduced delisting risk.
These findings are robust to the use of two prediction models: a logistic and Cox
proportional hazards model.
Furthermore, empirical results show that the effect of corporate governance on the risk of
involuntary delisting is more pronounced in non-SOEs, firms having high foreign
ownership and less concentrated ownership, and high growth firms. The study applies
two-stage least squares (2SLS) to deal with simultaneity and the propensity score
matching method (PSM) to eliminate the sample selection bias. The overall results are
robust to endogeneity testing, and the use of distance to default and credit default swap
spread as alternative outcomes of deficient performance. The out-of-sample forecasting
result using receiver operating characteristic curves shows that corporate governance
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information can add to the discriminatory power of the prediction model.
7.3.3 Corporate governance and earnings management
Chapter 6 investigates the impact of corporate governance on earnings management
activities. After controlling for firm-specific characteristics, the results show that better
corporate governance mechanisms restrain earnings management activities. The results
remain unchanged under alternative measures of earnings management and alternative
model specifications. In particular, the random effects model is employed to mitigate the
unobserved heterogeneity. Then, the changes in discretionary accruals when corporate
governance quality changes are examined, and two-stage least squares method (2SLS) is
applied to deal with simultaneity. Finally, to eliminate the sample selection bias,
propensity matching score method (PSM) is employed. The results are consistent across
alternative model specifications and unaffected by the endogeneity bias.
The findings align with prior studies that corporate governance reduces agency and
information costs. Considerations of moral hazard reveal that without efficient corporate
governance mechanisms, managers are more likely to act in their personal interests at the
expense of stakeholders. Better corporate governance monitors managerial opportunism
(Ali et al. 2018) and discourages earnings management activities (Liu & Lu 2007; Shen
& Chih 2007).
This study further investigates the role of institutional characteristics (such as ownership
structure and growth opportunities) as a potential mechanism that explains the results.
This study provides evidence that corporate governance quality has significant effects on
earnings management in private sector firms, firms with high foreign ownership and low
concentrated ownership. Results then show that lower earnings management driven by
better corporate governance may be partially attributed to firms’ growth opportunities.
The significant effect of corporate governance on earnings manipulation is only
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experienced in high growth firms.

7.4 Implications of this thesis
The findings of this research offer significant implications for theory, literature,
methodology and practice.
7.4.1. Implications for theory
Agency theorists point out that the agent’s incentives may not be ideally aligned with
those of the principal due to the separation of ownership and control. This necessitates
the incurrence of agency costs so as to induce the agent to act more consistently in the
best interests of the principal (Jensen & Meckling 1976). However, Jensen and Meckling
(1976) and Nguyen et al. (2015b) reveal that these costs can be lessened if firms can
establish effective corporate governance schemes to bring the managers’ interests in line
with those of the shareholders.
Meanwhile, resource dependence theorists emphasise that external resources are limited,
and boards of directors and diverse forms of owners strive to increase firm performance
by providing scarce resources, such as expertise, advice, reputation, financial buffer
during a crisis, and communication networks (Boyd & Solarino 2016; Hillman et al.
2009). While uncertainty weakens the firm’s ability to control resources and hinders its
daily operations, corporate governance mechanisms that can connect the firm with its
external environment provide an effective mechanism to cope with the uncertainty,
resulting in adequate operational functioning and better firm performance (Daily et al.
2003).
The findings from this study suggest that the relationships between corporate governance,
the risk of involuntary delisting, and earnings management can only be explained partially
using a single theory. Agency theory and resource dependence theory should be viewed
as overlapping and complementary in explaining the impact of corporate governance on
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the risk of involuntary delisting and earnings management.
7.4.2. Implications for literature
To the best knowledge of the author, this is the first study that investigates the Vietnamese
firm’s collapse from the ethical and governance perspectives to draw lessons that benefit
various stakeholder groups. This research provides insights on how ethical and
governance failure can increase firms’ risks and lead to costs and other undesirable
consequences, and thus contributes to the international experience and cross-cultural
comparisons of corporate scandals and collapses.
The empirical studies provide evidence that firms with higher aggregate governance index
exhibit less earnings management and lower probability of involuntary delisting, even
after corrections for endogeneity bias. Moreover, this study offers country-specific
evidence about the nexus between corporate governance quality, the risk of delisting, and
earnings management in Vietnam, a fast-growing economy characterised by high
ownership concentration, intensive government intervention, a code-law system, and low
investor protection. Additionally, this study greatly extends the prior corporate
governance literature in Vietnam, which is mainly related to firm performance (Nguyen
et al. 2017; Vo & Nguyen 2014), since the issues on earnings management and delisting
in Vietnam are under-examined.
Last but not least, this study adds to the existing literature where the corporate governance
index construction is underdeveloped. It is the first study to provide a comprehensive
composition to measure the corporate governance quality by following the guidance of
Corporate Governance Codes and the Corporate Governance Code of Best Practices for
Vietnamese public companies to identify which attribute is related to good corporate
governance practices in the Vietnamese market. The index employs the available
published information that shareholders can easily find in the annual reports of firms to
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avoid data unavailability.
7.4.3. Implications for methodology
Although prior studies find a significant role of various governance mechanisms in the
prediction of involuntary delisting and earnings management, they only consider specific
characteristics of the governance structure. Therefore, they ignore the possibility that
other governance mechanisms may be complements and tend to miss out the effects of
composite corporate governance quality. In particular, individual corporate governance
mechanisms produce mixed results; thus, investors find it hard to choose suitable tools to
be considered while making investment decisions. Therefore, a newly constructed
corporate governance index based on 13 relevant criteria is formed. With this original
proxy measure, a firm’s corporate governance structure can be evaluated and quantified
as a whole, and stakeholders can develop better insights into the quality of firms’
corporate governance systems. The governance index can be used as one of the selection
criteria by investors to avoid investing in stocks that are more likely to provide unreliable
financial information and can be applied in other emerging markets that have similar
corporate governance mechanisms to Vietnam.
7.4.4. Implications for practice
The research has important implications for various stakeholders. The main finding is that
proper corporate governance mechanisms result in less likelihood of delisting and a lower
level of earnings management because the agency and information costs decrease. As
such, investment communities may benefit from redirecting investment toward firms with
good corporate governance practices and hence, better information quality and lower
latent bankruptcy or profit risk. Directors of poorly governed firms can make the
necessary changes in their corporate governance practices to prevent the risk of delisting
and curb earnings management activities promptly. Investors should view corporate
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governance quality as a reference source to assess firms that are not likely to be delisted
and are more likely to provide accurate information. Creditors can also see a firm’s
deficient corporate governance structure as a potential red flag and make their debt
covenants more stringent for firms with manifestly inadequate corporate governance
practices. This research also provides policy implications for regulators. They can
regulate suitable governance mechanisms to avoid possible losses and encourage foreign
investment in the stock market and accelerate privatisation in SOEs to strengthen the
capital market. Regulators should also be cautious when ownership is concentrated in the
hands of a group of shareholders as ownership concentration may result in a higher risk
of delisting and more earnings manipulation. Academics and practitioners should apply
the composite governance index to improve the predictability and precision of the forecast
models.
7.5 Limitations and suggestions for future research
While this thesis contributes to the body of knowledge in several ways, like other studies,
it is subject to unavoidable limitations. First, given that it examines a single case in a
unique context, it may not be representative of a wider class of firms. However, since
DVD’s bankruptcy is unprecedented in size and seriousness on the Vietnamese stock
exchange, this case study may prompt crucial insights and valuable lessons. Its originality
is that it is the first to analyse and attribute the bankruptcy of a listed firm in an emerging
market economy to largely ethical and governance drivers. Future research can extend
this research by further investigating the ongoing bankruptcy of Saigon Plastic Packaging
JSC (SPP) in November 2019 to identify whether the lessons from the scandal of DVD
have been learned in SPP or not.
Second, because of a lack of data availability, especially for corporate governance
characteristics, future studies can explore the relationship between corporate governance,
183

delisting risk, and earnings management in greater depth by looking at more complex
factors that may affect the link, such as managerial compensation, board busyness, CEO
overconfidence, the pyramidal ownership structure, family ownership, and different types
of institutional ownership of firms.
Third, this thesis examines the relationships between corporate governance, the risk of
involuntary delisting, and earnings management for the non-financial firms from 2008 to
2018. These associations have not been investigated for financial institutions which are
different from non-financial companies. When financial companies (mainly banks)
become distressed, they are secured by a financial safety net. Therefore, their optimum
degree of risk-taking is different from that of non-financial firms. This gives them the
incentive to engage in more risk-taking to increase the value of these benefits, which in
turn may affect the association between corporate governance and firm outcomes.
Moreover, financial firms and banks have strict regulations exerting different influences
on corporate governance mechanisms, such as board structure. Therefore, it would be
helpful to extend this research to the context of financial firms in Vietnam.
Fourth, this thesis uses discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management and
finds that corporate governance helps enhance the quality of discretionary accruals.
Extant literature has also documented other methods to manipulate earnings, such as real
earnings management. Bozzolan et al. (2015) indicate that real earnings management
undertaken by firms’ managers make them depart from their typical business activities to
mislead stakeholders about a company’s financial performance. There will be direct
consequences for firms’ current and future cash flows. It is interesting to examine whether
proper corporate governance mechanisms can help restrain the use of real earnings
management in firms. Thus, future research can extend this research by investigating
whether corporate governance can detect real earnings management activities, in terms of
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sales manipulation, overproduction, and reduction of discretionary expenses and to what
extent.
Last but not least, this research highlights the role of corporate governance and firm
outcomes in Vietnam. The single-country nature of this study may only allow the findings
to be generalised to some other emerging market economies which share similar
characteristics, such as China, Laos, and Cambodia. Another possible extension of this
thesis is a comparative study of the relationship between corporate governance variables
and firm outcomes using a similar methodology to obtain a more in-depth understanding
of the linkage among countries with different governance quality and institutional
settings. Undertaking an international study is essential because it is helpful to study the
generalisability of the Vietnamese findings to other economies and the heterogeneity in
the relationship across different markets (e.g., legal systems).
To sum up, even though the limitations of this thesis are recognised, they do not weaken
the strengths of this thesis and the significance of its findings. They in fact offer a platform
for future research, which may broaden our current knowledge of corporate governance,
delisting risk and earnings management.
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9. Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter 4

Figure A.1 DVD’s share price and trading volume
Source: Data are extracted from VNDirect.
(A) 9 March 2010: DVD signed a strategic contract with Savi Pharmaceutical JSC
(Savipharm), one of its outsourcing factories in Vietnam. DVD bought 261,329 shares of
Savipharm, equivalent to 20.78 percent of its charter capital.
(B) 31 August 2010: ABBank and Medi Medical Investment JSC sold shares and reduced
their ownership in DVD.
(C) 8 September 2010: SSC suspended DVD’s public offering. However, the price of
DVD was technically adjusted down by 30 percent to 100,000 VND on the ex-rights date
by the HOSE.
(D) 26 November 2010: Le Van Dung, the CEO-Chairman of DVD, was arrested for
stock price manipulation.
(E) 20 February – 21 March 2011: ABBank, Bank Invest, and Deutsche Bank sold off
all the shares they held in DVD. In the same period, both the Chairperson and CEO
resigned. Nguyen Thi Thanh Hue – DVD’s founder and Le Van Dung’s wife – became
the company’s CEO-Chairperson. Hans Christian Jacobsen, a DVD board member and
Bank Invest’s representative in DVD, resigned.
(F) 5 September 2011: DVD was delisted due to major information disclosure violations.
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Table A.1 Timeline of critical events relating to DVD from March 2010 to September
2011
Date

Event

20 Mar 2010

DVD’s 2010 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders (AGM) approved
an increase in the firm’s charter capital to VND 190 billion by offering
seven million shares in June 2010.

2 Jun 2010

Le Van Dung, the CEO-Chairman of DVD, bought 790,800 shares of Ha
Tay Pharmaceutical JSC (DHT), equivalent to 19.18 percent, and became
a blockholder of DHT.

23 Jun 2010

DVD bought 1.02 million shares of DHT and became a blockholder,
holding 24.71 percent of DHT’s total shares outstanding.

16 Jul 2010

Media began to cover the abnormal acquisition of DHT, revealing that
DVD’s CEO-Chairman and his related parties bought 60 percent of the total
shares outstanding of DHT, then sold the shares to DVD.

6 Sep 2010

The SSC received an anonymous letter about a misstatement in DVD’s
SEO prospectus on its website.

8 Sep 2010

The SSC suspended DVD’s public offering. However, the price of DVD
was technically adjusted down by the HOSE by 30 percent to VND 100,000
on the ex-rights date.

11 Sep 2010

Upon receipt of DVD’s explanation letter, the SSC approved the
continuation of DVD’s public offering.

29 Sep 2010

The SSC received another anonymous letter about a forged signature in
DVD’s offering profile.

23 Oct 2010

Based on the petition of DHT, the SSC announced that DVD and its related
parties violated the regulations on tender offers and disclosure on
blockholders’ share ownership.

19 Nov 2010

The SSC suspended DVD’s public offering and announced that DVD had
included some misleading information and omitted material information in
its prospectus. The SSC did not accept the result of the offering and
requested DVD to stop using the proceeds from the offering and to refund
the investors if required.

25 Nov 2010

DVD dismissed Mr. Dung, the CEO-Chairman, and appointed Tran Thanh
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Hoa, ABBank’s representative in DVD, to the position of Chairperson and
Dao Xuan Huong, CEO of Lili of France JVC, to the position of CEO.
26 Nov 2010

Mr. Dung, now the former CEO-Chairman of DVD, was arrested for
manipulating the prices of DHT shares.

Nov – Dec Le Van Manh, Mr. Dung’s brother, and Nguyen Van Viet, a board member,
2010

were arrested for manipulating DHT’s stock prices. Cao Hong Van, the
Deputy General Director in Charge of Finance and Chief Accountant, was
arrested for bribery.

30 Nov 2010

The HOSE put DVD stock under warning status.

2 Dec 2010

The HOSE put DVD stock under supervision and trading restriction.

20 Dec 2010

Dao Xuan Huong was appointed to the position of Chairperson. Nguyen
Quoc Hai was elected as the new CEO. ABBank changed its representative
in DVD.

19 Jan 2011

The SSC officially cancelled the public offering of DVD because of the
company’s accounting frauds.

10 Feb 2011

ABBank bailed out of DVD.

24 Feb 2011

Both the new Chairperson and new CEO resigned. Nguyen Thi Thanh Hue,
Mr. Dung’s wife, became the CEO-Chairperson of DVD.

24 Feb – 23 Bank Invest, a strategic institutional investor, unloaded its stake in DVD.
Mar 2011
21 Mar 2011

Deutsche Bank sold off all its shares in DVD.

30 Mar 2011

Hans Christian Jacobsen, who was a DVD board member and Bank Invest’s
representative in DVD, resigned.
Ernst & Young refused to audit the 2010 financial statements.
DVD’s shareholders agreed to sell off its assets to pay debt obligations in
an extraordinary general meeting

13 Jun 2011

The HOSE issued Official Letter No. 1182/2011/SGDHCM-NY to remind
DVD to disclose the 2010 annual report, the 2010 audited parent and
consolidated financial statements, the fourth quarter 2010 consolidated
financial statements, and its corporate governance reports.

15 Jun 2011

DVD employees signed a petition to the police, accusing Le Van Dung of
embezzling their money in the form of capital mobilisation. Based on Mr.
Dung’s guarantee, they had taken out loans from ANZ to invest in DVD's
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"union fund" at the beginning of 2010.
15 Aug 2011

The HOSE issued Official Letter No. 1560/2011/SGDHCM-NY to remind
DVD to disclose information.

25 Aug 2011

The HOSE received a document from ANZ indicating that ANZ had filed
a creditor's petition with the People’s Court of Ho Chi Minh City in May
2011 and a bankruptcy order was granted under Decision No.
426/2011/QĐ-MTTPS. This information was required to have been
disclosed within 72 hours. However, DVD failed to disclose this
information.

1 Sep 2011

DVD had its last trading day.

5 Sep 2011

DVD was delisted due to major information disclosure violations.

30 Sep 2011

DVD terminated its business operations.
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